In the Interest of: J.B., Appeal of: M.J.

J-A29037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.J., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 443 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY :
OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND :
FAMILIES :
:
:
: No. 540 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Family Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.K.B., A/K/A J.B., A :
MINOR CHILD :
:
:
:
: No. 541 WDA 2022
J-A29037-22

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023

In this matter, M.J. (Father) appeals the order entered by the Allegheny

County Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily terminated his rights to his three-

year-old son, J.B. (the Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(8) and (b). The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and

Families (CYF or the Agency) had also petitioned for termination under Section

2511(a)(2) and (a)(5), but the orphans’ court ruled that CYF had failed to

meet its burden under these other subsections. CYF cross-appeals the denial

of termination under Section 2511(a)(2) and (5). The Child, through his

appointed representation, also cross-appeals the court’s denial, but only as to

Section 2511(a)(2).1 After review, we affirm the orphans’ court decision to

terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). Because we need

only agree with the court’s decision as to any one subsection under Section

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), we dismiss the cross-appeals as moot.

We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows: The family

came to the attention of CYF when the Child tested positive for cocaine at

birth. CYF removed the Child from parental care in July 2018 and petitioned

____________________________________________

1The orphans’ court also involuntarily terminated the rights of C.B. (Mother).
She did not appeal.

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for dependency. The juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent on

August 3, 2018 and placed the Child in foster care. At the time of the

adjudication, the identity of the Child’s father was unknown.

Father became involved in this case in January 2019. The juvenile court

ordered Father to achieve certain goals to aid with reunification. The goals

were to: bolster parenting skills through coached parenting services; address

intimate partner violence issues; engage in continued mental health treatment

that addressed dual-diagnosis issues;2 and resolve his criminal matters.

Father also had to address his alcohol issues by providing negative screens.

Throughout the dependency proceedings, Father was cooperative with

CYF. Father was consistent with his medication management and his

psychiatric care. Father also visited with the Child. By December 2019, Father

was permitted unsupervised and overnight visitation. But that same month,

Father was charged with multiple offenses following an incident of domestic

violence, where Mother was the victim. Father was charged with felony

strangulation, misdemeanor simple assault, summary harassment and

summary public drunkenness. Father was placed on probation for one year,

prohibited from violent contact with Mother, ordered to complete DNA

registration, prohibited from possessing a firearm, ordered to complete

batterer’s intervention, and ordered to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation.

____________________________________________

2Father reported that his mental health issues included anxiety, depression,
and post-traumatic stress disorder.

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CYF filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights in March 2021. As Father

complied with the dependency and criminal cases, he eventually achieved

unsupervised visitation again. However, in September 2021, Father was

charged with driving under the influence following a car accident. Father

refused to provide a blood sample, and charges were apparently dropped, but

the incident necessitated that the visits revert to being supervised.

The orphans’ court held the hearing on March 29, 2022. During the

hearing, the court heard the testimony of Father, the CYF caseworker, and the

psychologist who evaluated Father. Thereafter, the orphans’ court granted

CYF’s petition to terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b);

the court determined that CYF had not met its burden under Section

2511(a)(2) and (a)(5). Specifically, the court determined that CYF did not

prove that Father “cannot or will not” remedy the causes that led to the Child’s

dependency. These appeal and cross-appeals followed.

Father’s appeal presents the following issues:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily
terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Father’s parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the Child pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 7.

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CYF’s cross-appeal presents the following issue:

Did the Agency prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the
grounds for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental
rights to the Child, J.B., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
2511(a)(2) and (a)(5)?

CYF’s Brief at 5.

Through his representation, the Child’s cross-appeal presents the

following issue:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as
a matter of law in denying CYF’s petition to terminate
Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2) after CYF presented clear and convincing
evidence that grounds for termination existed?

Child’s Brief at 9.

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

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Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108,

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should

review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports

that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record

for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must

affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary

determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

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Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

These appeals implicate Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b), which

provide:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:

[…]

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.

[…]

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.

[…]

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of

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removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.

[…]

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (b).

Critically, we may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis

exists for the result reached. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. We need only agree

with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well

as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (en banc).

We begin with Father’s appeal, and thus our focus turns to the orphans’

court decision under Section 2511(a)(8). To terminate parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove: (1) the child has been removed

from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of the removal; (2)

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and

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welfare of the child. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(citation omitted).

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(8), “the

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice

of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Termination under

Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused the

placement, or the availability or efficacy of the services provided by the local

children and youth agency. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759 (citation omitted).

Here, there is no question that CYF satisfied the first prong of the

analysis. The Child was removed from parental care at birth. Approximately

45 months elapsed between the Child’s removal and the termination hearing

– three times as long as the statutory mandate.

The second prong asks whether the conditions which led to the Child

removal continue to exist. In its thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion the

orphans’ court explained that it determined CYF satisfied the second prong,

notwithstanding Father’s substantial compliance:

At the time of adjudication, Father was not involved – upon
his participation in the proceedings, the court entered
numerous orders establishing his goal and setting attendant
requirements. Initially, Father was to complete coached
parenting and intimate partner violence classes, continue
his mental health treatment, and comply with any
recommended drug and alcohol treatment
recommendations. As the case progressed and Father’s
struggles with alcohol came to light, completing dual

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diagnosis treatment and resolving his criminal matters were
added as goals. [… T]wo months prior to the filing of the
TPR petition […] Father’s compliance was listed as
“substantial.” From that point forward, Father’s compliance
was consistently reported as “substantial” until October of
2021 when his compliance was downgraded to “moderate,”
seemingly coinciding with Father’s criminal charges
involving a DUI incident.

In accordance with the showing of general compliance with
his goals throughout the life of this case, the evidence
revealed that Father had more or less complied with the
orders of the court directing him to engage services.
However, Father was noncompliant in one most important
area – addressing his underlying substance abuse issues
with alcohol. Compliance with drug and alcohol treatment
was court ordered from the beginning of Father’s
involvement in the case, and initially he was compliant.

Importantly though, as time passed, Father’s struggles were
revealed. He sounded intoxicated on phone calls with
caseworkers, he appeared intoxicated during a domestic
violence incident with Mother, and he was charged with a
DUI offense to which he and counsel stipulated to the
underlying facts. Father was also evasive about his alcohol
use with Dr. Bliss [(the psychologist who conducted the
evaluation)], which made it challenging for her to effectively
evaluate his treatment needs. Father admitted that he was
aware of the requirement that he complete substance abuse
treatment. The only steps toward completing drug and
alcohol or dual-diagnosis treatment that Father took were
after the date of the first scheduled TPR hearing on March
16, 2022. Father’s last ditch effort to comply with treatment
for his alcohol use cannot be considered and is arguably
irrelevant given the lengthy duration of this case – he had
more than sufficient opportunity to address these concerns.

It is unclear from the record what steps the Agency, through
[the CYF caseworker], took to assist Father in engaging with
dual-diagnosis treatment. Absent from [the caseworker’s]
testimony was any discussion of how the Agency worked
with Father to alleviate the circumstances that led to the
Child’s removal and stood between Father and reunification.
Whether the Agency had engaged in reasonable efforts
throughout the life of the case is not a subject upon which

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this [trial judge] can opine as it did not oversee the
underlying dependency proceedings, but the testimony of
the caseworker calls into question how much support was
provided to Father.

Nonetheless, given the above, the court justifiably
concluded that the evidence established the first two
elements required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

TCO 16-18 (style adjusted) (citations to the record omitted).

On appeal, Father argues that CYF did not satisfy the second prong of

the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, because it did not prove that the conditions

which led to the Child’s placement continued to exist. He claims he had

participated in mental health treatment, and that the reason he did not

accomplish his alcohol treatment goal was because the service provider could

not provide treatment for his dual-diagnosis needs. He explains that the

service provider could not accommodate him, because of staffing shortages

resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. See Father’s Brief at 15-16.

Moreover, Father alleges that his delay in treatment did not pose a concern

for CYF, as evidenced by the fact that CYF never claimed that he was

intoxicated during a visit with the Child. Id. Father concludes his argument

by noting the Agency’s lack of assistance in helping him find suitable treatment

in a timely manner.

In our review, we observe that the orphans’ court was persuaded by

Father’s argument that his delay in treatment was excusable and that perhaps

CYF bore some of the blame. The court found that CYF did not meet its burden

under Section 2511(a)(2), because that subsection asks whether the causes

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of the Child’s dependency “cannot or will not” be remedied. The court

determined that CYF could not prove that element by clear and convincing

evidence. See T.C.O. at 20-21. Similarly, the court determined that CYF

failed to meet its burden under Section 2511(a)(5). That subsection expressly

inquires into the services or assistance that was reasonably available to Father

to ask the larger question of whether the conditions leading to placement can

be remedied. The orphans’ court was not satisfied with the Agency’s

testimony regarding its services and assistance.

However, the orphans’ court was not persuaded by Father’s arguments

as to its analysis of Section 2511(a)(8). The court was cognizant that the

question of Father’s ability to remedy the conditions and of CYF’s reasonable

efforts had limited applicability in a Section 2511(a)(8) analysis. We discern

no issue with the court’s approach.

As our Supreme Court noted in In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa.

2014), neither Section 2511(a) nor (b) requires a court to consider the

reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior to the termination of parental

rights.

The High Court explained:

[T]his Court has observed that the provision or absence of
reasonable efforts may be relevant to a court’s
consideration of both grounds for termination and the best
interests of the child. For example, as applicable to
subsection (a)(2), a court may find an agency’s lack of
assistance to a parent relevant to whether a parent’s
incapacity “cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.”
[…]

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Further, while we acknowledge that other states have
included reasonable efforts as either an element or merely
a factor in their termination provisions, the Pennsylvania
legislature has not incorporated reasonable efforts into the
language of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and it would be
improper and, indeed, unwise for this Court to add such an
element to the statute by judicial fiat. In contrast, we
recognize that the legislature included consideration of the
reasonable services available to the parent in regard to
another ground for termination, subsection 2511(a)(5)
(providing consideration of whether “the services or
assistance reasonable available to the parent are not likely
to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child within a reasonable period of time.”).

D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 672-73 (citations omitted); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511

cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(9) (concerning matters to be determined at the

permanency review hearing, including whether the agency has provided the

family with necessary services).

Having concluded that the orphans’ court’s approach to Section

2511(a)(8) was proper, the question remains: did the conditions which led to

the Child’s placement continue to exist? The orphans’ court determined that

Father’s alcohol abuse was a condition that led to the Child’s placement and

was the primary barrier to reunification. The court further determined that

Father’s first meaningful steps toward alcohol treatment occurred days before

the termination hearing. Thus, the court ruled that the conditions that led to

the Child’s placement continued to exist. To be sure, the orphans’ court

carefully considered Father’s reasons for why he did not obtain appropriate

treatment sooner. While the court apparently found Father’s reasons to be

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persuasive insofar as Section 2511(a)(2) and (a)(5) were concerned, the court

did not have to factor his reasons into its analysis of Section 2511(a)(8).

Moreover, the orphans’ court was not persuaded by Father’s attempt to

downplay the alcohol issue. Father claimed that the Agency was not

concerned about whether he appeared intoxicated during the visits with the

Child. Father seems to argue that because he substantially complied with the

rest of his permanency plan, and because his alcohol use was a minor issue,

the court’s termination was unwarranted. The orphans’ court was not moved

by this argument, and neither are we. To the extent that the Agency was

confident Father would be appropriate during the visits, it does not follow that

the Agency was unconcerned with Father’s alcohol abuse. Ultimately, we

discern no abuse of discretion, nor error of law on this second prong of the

Section 2511(a)(8) analysis.

Having concluded that the orphans’ court properly determined that CYF

established the first two prongs of the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, we address

the court’s conclusions under the third element: whether termination best

served the needs and welfare of the Child. Father challenges the court’s best

interest analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) contemporaneously with his

challenge to the court’s best interest analysis under Section 2511(b). Thus,

we do the same.

Both analyses consider “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and

stability.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 12 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). The

court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying

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close attention to the effect of permanently severing the bond.” I.J., 972 A.2d

at 12 (citation omitted). In performing a “best interests” analysis:

The court should also consider the importance of continuity
of relationships to the child, because severing close parental
ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider
whether a natural parental bond exists between child and
parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,
necessary and beneficial relationship. Most importantly,
adequate consideration must be given to the needs and
welfare of the child.

Id. (citations omitted).

This Court has explained further:

[S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of
a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child

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had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting

bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert

testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. Finally, we

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child

is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court thoroughly set forth its

findings:

The evidence in this matter supports this court’s conclusion
that the Child’s bond with Father is not significant enough
that the Child will suffer extreme emotional consequences
from termination of Father’s parental rights. The only
evidence regarding a bond between Father and the Child is
found in Dr. Bliss’s report of June 21, 2021, which states
that at that time, they did not have a close parent-child
bond, but that they could very likely foster one over time.
This court also gave great weight to Dr. Bliss’s testimony
that there would be concerns with removing this Child from
his primary attachment [with the foster mother]. In June of
2021, Dr. Bliss stated that reunification remained a viable
goal. [At the time of the termination hearing in March 2022,
Dr. Bliss] no longer believes that to be the case.

The timeline of this case as well as the uncontradicted
expert testimony presented at the termination hearing drive

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the analysis of this factor. By the date of the TPR hearing,
the child had been in placement for approximately 45
months. The Child’s primary bond, resembling that of a
parent and child, is with his foster mother, D.M. Dr. Bliss
further testified that based upon the interactional evaluation
of Father and Child, there was not a significant bond
between the two – despite Father’s demonstrated age-
appropriate play and direction with the Child.

In addition to the potential harm to the Child and separating
him [from] the only parent figure that he has known, the
Child’s need for permanency also militates in favor of
termination. If reunification were to occur, Father’s history
makes it unlikely that reunification would be permanent.
This court must defer to the judgment of those who presided
over this case during the dependency phase and could
properly gauge the likelihood of success of any permanency
strategy. During the three years that the Child was in care
of a foster parent, Father never demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the court that he was capable of unsupervised
visits for any significant length of time. This court also gave
great weight to Dr. Bliss’s opinions regarding Father’s
inability to independently parent his Child. Father’s
inconsistent approach to his own health and safety
demonstrate that he cannot provide the reliable support and
attention that a child needs. The Child’s need for safety,
permanency, and stability outweighs the potential benefit to
him of maintaining his relationship with Father and, further,
that termination of Father’s parental rights best serves the
Child’s needs and welfare.

T.C.O. at 25-27 (style adjusted) (citations to the record omitted).

In his Brief, Father argues that the orphans’ court’s best interests

analyses under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b) were erroneous. In our view,

Father takes primary aim at the weight that the court afforded certain aspects

of Dr. Bliss’s testimony. He highlights that portion of the testimony that

indicates he is an appropriate parent, with whom the Child enjoys spending

time. See Father’s Brief at 20-21.

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Father misunderstands our appellate function. The abuse-of-discretion

standard in terminations cases is highly deferential, and we must affirm the

lower court’s decision even when evidence exists that would support a

contrary determination. See P.Z., 113 A.3d at 849. This Court may not

search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that

of the orphans’ court. See S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d at 1124. Rather, our function

is merely to review the record to determine whether it supports the decision

of the orphans’ court. Id.

Upon such review, we conclude the record supports the determinations

of the orphans’ court. The history of Father’s alcohol abuse supported the

court’s determination that permanent reunification would not transpire any

time soon. In other words, the court properly determined that the Child’s

need for permanency was superior to whatever detrimental effect that

termination might have. Moreover, the record supports the court’s weighted

consideration of the relationship that the Child has with the foster parent. We

do not overlook Father’s efforts, and we recognize the positive relationship he

maintained with the Child. But Father’s efforts do not distract us from the fact

that he has never been the Child’s caregiver. Instead, it is foster parent with

whom the Child has developed a primary attachment.

In sum, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its

discretion when it determined that CYF proved termination was warranted

under each prong of Section 2511(a)(8) as well as Section 2511(b). Having

resolved that Father’s appeal lacks merit, we do not reach the claims made by

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CYF and the Child in their respective cross-appeals. As noted above, we need

only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. B.L.W., 843 A.2d at

384. Our disposition of Father’s appeal means that even if ruled in favor of

CYF or the Child, such a ruling would not have any legal force or effect. For

that reason, the cross-appeals are moot. See Interest of D.R.W., 227 A.3d

905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon

the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”).

Order affirmed. Cross-appeals dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/3/2023

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