BALTIMORE
v.
BALTIMORE TRUST AND GUARANTEE COMPANY.
No. 209.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 11, 12, 1897. Decided April 26, 1897. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.*680 Mr. Thomas G. Hayes for appellant. Mr. Thomas Ireland Elliott was on his brief.
*681 Mr. Francis K. Carey and Mr. E.J.D. Cross for appellee. Mr. John N. Steele and Mr. John E. Semmes were on their brief.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The discussion on the argument of this case took quite a wide range, but in the view we take, we can dispose of this appeal without deciding whether the common council had or had not the power to make a contract for the perpetual use of its streets by the railroad company, upon the terms and conditions which might be agreed upon between the common council and the railroad company, and which when once agreed upon should not be thereafter subject to repeal or material alteration by the common council. It is sufficient for the decision of this case to hold that the direction to lay but one track through Lexington street, between the points mentioned, did not substantially change the terms of the contract, and was no more than the exercise by the city of its acknowledged power to make a reasonable regulation concerning the use of that street by the railroad company and that the original contract (assuming that one existed) was entered into subject to the right of the city to adopt such a regulation.
Chapter 370 of the act of 1890, referred to in the foregoing statement of facts, distinctly granted to the mayor and city council of Baltimore the power to regulate the use of the streets by railway companies. In the absence of any such positive legislation, we think there could be no well founded doubt of this power, and that any contract entered into by the city with a railroad company would be subject to its exercise, so long as it did not materially modify or impair the rights granted by the contract. Indeed, no question is made of the existence of a power of regulation by any party to this suit. It was not denied by the court below. The only dispute on this branch of the case between the parties is in regard to the question whether the direction to lay but a single track on Lexington street, between the points mentioned, *682 is or is not a reasonable regulation of the use of that street to which the contract was subjected, as above stated.
We are not now concerned with the question of the right of the common council absolutely or unconditionally to repeal ordinance No. 23, but simply as to whether the passage of the subsequent ordinance amounted to a valid regulation of the use of the street by the railroad company. We think that the later ordinance, although the word "repeal" was used in its first section, was in substance a regulation of the use of the street which the city had the power to enact. The effect of the whole ordinance was simply to change the right of the company to operate its road on Lexington street for eleven hundred feet, so that instead of using double tracks it should have in that street but a single track.
There is sufficient in the case before us from which it may be seen that the laying down of double tracks in some portion of the street in question was done with the knowledge that it was against the wishes of the mayor and the city authorities, and in spite of the notification by them to the company that immediate measures would be taken to have ordinance No. 23 so altered by the common council at its first session as to provide for the laying of but one track instead of double tracks between North and Calvert streets on Lexington street. Notwithstanding such notice the company proceeded by working night and day to lay down the double tracks in Lexington street between the points last named. In looking at the question, therefore, of the reasonableness of the ordinance which made no provision for payment by the city of the expense of taking up one track and relocating the other along Lexington street, but which on the contrary provided that it should be done at the expense of the railroad company, it is proper that we should view the case as if the proposed regulation had been passed before the company had laid any track on Lexington street, between North and Calvert streets, and before it had been put to any expense on account of such double track. We cannot say the regulation was unreasonable simply on the ground that it did not provide for paying the expense of taking up one track already laid in the street between Calvert *683 and Charles streets (a distance of a few hundred feet), to the laying of which the city had not, at the time, objected. Having at one time granted the right to the company to lay double tracks through certain named streets of the city of Baltimore, was it a reasonable regulation of the use of one of those streets to thereafter, and before the completion and operation of the road therein, provide that but a single track in that street should be used instead of the double tracks which had been first provided for?
Upon the facts already set forth a sufficient foundation was laid for the exercise of a fair and reasonable legislative discretion in determining the question whether the portion of the street mentioned should be occupied by a single or double track of the railway company. A regulation of that portion of the street by subjecting it to the use of but one instead of double railway tracks did not (in our judgment) thereby materially modify nor did it, in effect, prohibit the exercise of the privileges previously granted by the city to the railroad company, nor did it impair the obligation of the contract or destroy vested rights, nor was this regulation substantially inconsistent with the terms of ordinance No. 23. While that ordinance provided generally for double tracks through the streets mentioned therein, the reduction of the right to use two tracks and the granting of the right to use but one for such a comparatively short distance in one particularly crowded and narrow thoroughfare was not a regulation inconsistent with the terms of the original ordinance. It would, we think, be unreasonable to hold that the least limitation of the power to operate double tracks was an infringement and impairment of the contract as set forth in the ordinance. In our opinion, the ordinance does not give any such cast iron right or one which shall be beyond any reasonable limitation and supervision by the city. It granted the use of the streets for double tracks for many miles, and the subsequent limitation of that use to one track related to but a few hundred feet where peculiar and exceptional conditions existed, where the danger to be apprehended from the use of electric cars on double tracks in a narrow and busy thoroughfare was very *684 great, and where it might fairly be decided by the common council that double tracks at that point would be an unreasonable and dangerous use of the street by the company and directly tend to prevent its reasonable and safe use and enjoyment by the public at large.
In St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 U.S. 465, 469, Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court in regard to the power of regulation of the streets of a city, said:
"It is given power to open and establish streets, to improve them as it sees fit, and to regulate their use, paying for all this out of its own funds. The word `regulate' is one of broad import. It is the word used in the Federal Constitution to define the power of Congress over foreign and interstate commerce, and he who reads the many opinions of this court will perceive how broad and comprehensive it has been held to be. If the city gives a right to the use of the streets or public grounds, as it did by ordinance No. 11,604, it simply regulates the use when it prescribes the terms and conditions upon which they shall be used. If it should see fit to construct an expensive boulevard in the city, and then limit the use to vehicles of a certain kind, or exact a toll from all who use it, would that be other than a regulation of the use? And so it is only a matter of regulation of use when the city grants to the telegraph company the right to use exclusively a portion of the street, on condition of contributing something towards the expense it has been put to in opening and improving the street."
To same effect, see Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203: "The power to regulate commerce," says Mr. Justice Field, speaking for this court, "is the power to prescribe the rules by which it shall be governed, that is, the conditions upon which it shall be conducted."
If it be said in this case that the city had already regulated the use by prescribing that there should be two tracks, the answer is that this power of regulation is a continuing power; it is not exhausted by being once exercised, and so long as the object is plainly one of regulation, the power may be exercised *685 as often as and whenever the common council may think proper; the use of the street may be subjected to one condition to-day and to another and additional one to-morrow, provided the power is exercised in good faith and the condition imposed is appropriate as a reasonable regulation, and is not imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 672; N.Y. & N.E. Railroad v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 567.
The effect of the third section of the latter ordinance was to leave with the railroad company the power to lay down and maintain and use one track instead of double tracks on Lexington street between the streets named. It is true the city assumed to attach a condition to the exercise of this right, which was that the railroad company should within twenty days remove the double tracks and replace the pavement. In view of all the facts, we should incline to regard this as in the nature of a penalty to secure obedience of the company to the regulation, and in any event, in the light of the conduct of the parties in relation to the litigation in the state court, we think the railroad company has not lost the right to maintain one track in the street in question as it now exists, without the adoption of any further ordinance on the subject.
On the ground which we have stated, we think the decree of the Circuit Court wrong, and for that reason it must be
Reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.