United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-50350.
Richard R. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Defendant-Appellant.
June 13, 1996.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY, GARWOOD and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:
Richard Buchanan sued the City of San Antonio under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),1 after the city repeatedly
turned down his applications to become a city police officer. The
district court awarded him a judgment of $300,000 in compensatory
damages, together with back pay, attorney's fees and interest. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Buchanan is a patrolman with the Bexar County sheriff's
department. He injured his back during a foot chase of a suspect
in 1986. He claimed that he fully recovered from this injury.
After being off work for a few months, he returned to duty with the
sheriff's department, and testified that he has had no recurring
problems with his back since that time.
Buchanan wanted to join the San Antonio police force, because
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
1
the pay and benefits were better than those offered by the
sheriff's department. On numerous occasions he applied for a job
with the police department, but was always turned down. He last
applied for employment with the police department in April of 1992,
and was rejected in October of 1992. The dates of his last
application and rejection are relevant, since the ADA became
effective on July 26, 1992.2 The ADA is not applied retroactively.3
In August of 1993 he filed this suit under the ADA, alleging
in general terms violation of the Act due to discrimination on the
basis of disability. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of
plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of
law. The motion was based on two specific violations of the ADA
which were not pleaded in the complaint. Plaintiff claimed that he
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the city had
(1) subjected him to a physical examination before making a offer
of employment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d), and (2) failed
to keep information regarding his medical condition confidential
and in a separate file, also in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
The district court took the motion for judgment under
advisement at the close of the first day of trial. The next
morning, the court announced that it was granting the motion, would
allow each side a few minutes to look over the court's proposed
charge, and would then charge the jury. By these actions the court
2
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 note.
3
Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 588
(5th Cir.1995).
2
made clear that it would not allow the introduction of any
additional evidence. The court then instructed the jury that the
city had violated the ADA and submitted two special interrogatories
to the jury on damages. The jury answered "yes" to the first
question, inquiring whether Buchanan "has sustained damages from
Defendant City of San Antonio's violation of the [ADA]." It then
awarded $300,000 in compensatory damages for "future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, and mental
anguish." After the verdict, the district court entered judgment
for this amount, and also awarded back pay, attorney's fees and
post-judgment interest.
DISCUSSION
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law
Judgment as a matter of law against a party is proper on an
issue if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue."4 A judgment
as a matter of law is appropriate if the facts and inferences point
so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that
reasonable people could not arrive at a verdict to the contrary.5
If anything, an even greater showing is required where, as
here, the plaintiff moves for and receives judgment as a matter of
law before the jury hears from the defendant. Rule 50 itself only
contemplates judgment as a matter of law against a party after that
4
FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a).
5
Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120, 123 (5th
Cir.1995).
3
party "has been fully heard on an issue." While courts have the
power to direct a verdict in plaintiff's favor at the close of
plaintiff's case,
[t]his power must nonetheless be exercised with great
restraint in order to avoid the possibility that a party will
be precluded from presenting facts which make out a question
for the jury. Where there is any doubt at all as to the
propriety of a directed verdict, district courts should not
jump the gun but should wait until both sides have presented
their evidence before ruling on motions for directed verdict.6
Buchanan did not establish as a matter of law a standard
claim of discrimination under the ADA, and does not argue
otherwise. The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."7 A "disability"
includes "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual," "a
record of such an impairment," and "being regarded as having such
an impairment."8 A "qualified individual with a disability" means
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
6
United States v. Vahlco Corp., 720 F.2d 885, 889 (5th
Cir.1983).
7
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
8
Id. § 12102(2).
4
employment position that such individual holds or desires."9
Buchanan did not establish as a matter of law that he has a
"disability," that he was "a qualified individual with a
disability," or that the city discriminated against him because of
his disability. For example, evidence was introduced that Buchanan
was rejected not because of his prior back injury, but because he
had failed to wait one year from his prior rejection before
reapplying, as required by city policy, and because of his prior
work history.10
B. Premature Physical and Confidentiality
The basis for Buchanan's motion for judgment as a matter of
law was two alleged specific violations of the ADA regarding
employer information about an applicant's medical history. He
9
Id. § 12111(8).
10
For example, a city internal memorandum introduced by
plaintiff requested that his application be rejected because of
his past employment history and failure to wait one year before
reapplying. Although the memo discusses his back injury, it
states, as reasons for rejecting the application:
During the investigation of applicant's May 12,
1989 application, Officer Burleson was advised by
Captain D. Gabehart, for the Bexar County Sheriff's
Department, that applicant "had a bad attitude, a
person that wants to do things his own way regardless
of procedures.["] He went on to say that applicant was
rigid in his decision making with no flexibility, and
that he would not be eligible for re-hiring.
Applicant was enrolled at the U.S. Border Patrol
Academy from Sept. '88 to Jan. '89 but was released
after failing the mandatory Spanish test. When the
Border Patrol Academy Director was contacted regarding
applicant's academic record, I was advised that
applicant was also failing several of the other
courses, and that he was asked to resign.
5
relied on 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d), which prohibits an employer from
conducting a medical examination of a job applicant unless, among
other requirements, the employer has already made the applicant a
job offer conditioned on a medical examination. This provision of
the ADA also provides that a post-offer medical examination is only
allowed if (in addition to other requirements and exceptions not
relevant here) "information obtained regarding the medical
condition or history of the applicant is collected and maintained
on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as
a confidential medical record."
Buchanan established through the city's own records that
Buchanan was given a medical examination in August of 1992, after
the effective date of the ADA. We cannot agree with the city that
it conducted a medical examination only after it had made a
conditional offer of employment. While Buchanan did sign an
acknowledgement in May of 1992 that he was receiving a conditional
offer of employment, the document itself makes clear that the offer
was not conditioned solely on a medical examination, but was
instead conditioned on successful completion of "the entire
screening process," which included "physical and psychological
examinations, a polygraph examination, a physical fitness test, an
assessment board, and an extensive background investigation."
Buchanan did not establish as a matter of law that the city
failed to keep medical information obtained after the effective
date of the ADA in a separate file and failed to treat such
information as confidential. While the evidence clearly showed
6
that information regarding Buchanan's medical condition was
provided to the department officials in charge of hiring decisions
after the effective date of the ADA, and that medical information
was included in Buchanan's general personnel file, Buchanan did not
establish that this information was obtained after the effective
date of the Act. We agree with the EEOC that the ADA does not
require the segregation or confidential treatment of medical
information obtained before the effective date of the ADA.11
C. Proof of Damages
A further gap in support for this judgment is the absence of
proof of damage, even if the other predicates had been established,
caused by a premature medical examination. Our reading of the ADA
requires a causal link between the violation and the damages sought
by the plaintiff. The remedies provided under the ADA are the same
as those provided by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-6,
2000e-8, 2000e-9.12 Title VII allows a private suit by a plaintiff
"aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice."13
Generally, relief is not afforded to the plaintiff if he was not
hired or otherwise subjected to adverse employment action "for any
reason other than discrimination...."14 Title VII does recognize
as an unlawful employment practice discrimination "which was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
11
See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (May 19, 1994) (Example 3).
12
See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
14
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A).
7
factors also motivated the practice."15 However, damages may not
be awarded for such a violation if the defendant "would have taken
the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor...."16 In such circumstances relief is limited to certain
declaratory and injunctive relief, costs and attorney's fees.17
While the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the type of damages
which may be recovered under Title VII and the ADA to included
punitive and general compensatory damages,18 compensatory damages,
like other damages, are not recoverable under Title VII (and
derivatively under the ADA) unless the prohibited employment
practice was the cause of the applicant's rejection.19
To be sure, the first interrogatory to the jury asked whether
Buchanan had sustained damages "from" the city's violation of the
ADA, and the jury was also instructed that it could only award
damages that plaintiff proved were "caused" by the city's wrongful
conduct. However, the jury was not properly instructed that it
must find a causal link between the specific ADA violations that
were the basis of the directed verdict and the injuries sustained.
The jury was never informed that the ADA violations found by the
court as a matter of law pertained to the medical examination and
15
Id. § 2000e-2(m).
16
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
17
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
18
42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
19
In this regard we agree with the Eighth Circuit's recent
analysis in Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301-
03 (8th Cir.1995).
8
disclosure of medical information. Instead, it was instructed only
that the court "has determined as matter of law that the City of
San Antonio has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act."
There was no finding, by the court or the jury, that Buchanan was
not given a job offer because of the medical examination. Again,
there was considerable evidence to the contrary. In addition to
the evidence discussed above, the jury had before it evidence that
the city was aware of Buchanan's back injury before the effective
date of the ADA, and that it was able to offer jobs to only a small
percentage of applicants. Further, by granting the motion for
judgment and cutting off additional evidence, the court deprived
the city of an opportunity to offer further evidence that Buchanan
would not have received a job offer even if the city had not
conducted a pre-offer medical examination.
For the foregoing reasons, we remand the case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
9