Silmon v. Can Do II, Inc.

                      United States Court of Appeals,

                               Fifth Circuit.

                                No. 95-30818.

              Timothy Scott SILMON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                          v.

                    CAN DO II, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

                               July 25, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.

Before KING, DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

      W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

      Appellant, a member of the crew of the M/V CAN DO II, appeals

the dismissal of his maintenance and cure claim which the district

court rejected because his illness was due solely to his own

willful misconduct.       We affirm.

                                          I.

      On October 15, 1990, Timothy Scott Silmon began employment as

a   crew   member    aboard   the   M/V       CAN   DO   II,   a   vessel   owned   by

defendant, Can Do II, Inc.                For the first ten days, Silmon

performed his work without incident. On the evening of October 24,

1990, Silmon was transferring supplies, including leftover food and

a five gallon jug of water, from an offshore platform's boat deck

to another crewman standing on the vessel's stern.                     The food was

transferred without incident. When Silmon tried to hand the bottle

of water to his fellow crew member, the vessel fell in the swells.

When this occurred, Silmon testified that he lost his balance,

dropped the bottle of water to the vessel deck and felt pain in his

                                          1
back.   According to Silmon, he promptly reported his discomfort to

the captain and mate of the vessel and left his watch to lie down.

The captain and mate testified that Silmon did not report any pain

until the next morning and that he finished his watch.     The next

morning, when he complained of excruciating pain in his back and

legs, he was evacuated by helicopter to an onshore clinic for

treatment.   The doctor at the clinic in Cut Off, Louisiana, told

him to spend three to four days in bed.

     When the pain did not subside with bed rest, Silmon went to

the West Jefferson Hospital Emergency room in Marrero, Louisiana.

Initially he was treated by Dr. Carl Culicchia, a neurosurgeon, who

made a preliminary diagnosis after initial tests that Silmon had

suffered a ruptured disc.    Dr. Culicchia recommended surgery to

repair the ruptured disk which was performed on November 8, 1990.

During surgery, Dr. Culicchia discovered no disc defect but rather

an epidural abscess in Mr. Silmon's spine caused by a bacterial

infection.    Dr. Culicchia consulted with Dr. Mark Workman, a

specialist in infectious diseases, who confirmed that plaintiff's

abscess was caused by a bacterial infection.   Dr. Workman could not

culture the bacteria to identify the strain, probably due to the

antibiotics given Silmon prior to surgery. The abscess was removed

and Silmon was treated further with antibiotics.    Even though his

condition improved, he continued to feel pain.     Silmon consulted

Dr. David Jarrott at the recommendation of his attorneys.     After

examining Silmon and his past records, Dr. Jarrott concluded that

his abscess was not due to a bacterial infection, but rather to a


                                 2
ruptured intervertebral disc.

     In February 1991 Silmon sued Can Do II, Inc., for damages

under the Jones Act and general maritime law and for maintenance

and cure.   The Jones Act/general maritime law claims were tried to

a jury; the maintenance and cure claim was reserved for the court.

     Can Do II, Inc., presented evidence demonstrating Silmon's

history of illegal drug use.    Specifically, the defendant produced

hospital records showing intravenous drug use on two occasions:

May 1982 and January 1990.     Silmon, however, was tested for drugs

at the commencement of his employment and on admission to the West

Jefferson Hospital and both those tests were negative.     Although

the bacterial strain could not be identified to determine the

source of the infection, both Drs. Culicchia and Workman concluded

that Silmon's abscess from the bacterial infection was most likely

caused by his IV drug use.     A third doctor, Dr. Conway, who was

originally hired by Silmon but testified for Can Do II, agreed with

Drs. Culicchia and Workman on the cause of Silmon's injury.     The

doctors also testified that only in an unusual case would an

epidural abscess such as Silmon's be the result of a twisting back

injury. Dr. Jarrott testified for Silmon that the abscess was from

a ruptured disc caused by a twisting back injury.

     The jury found that Silmon had no accident and exonerated the

employer in the Jones Act/general maritime law claims.    The court

then dismissed all claims with prejudice and Silmon appealed to

this court.   A panel of this court affirmed the judgment as to the

Jones Act/general maritime claims, but remanded the maintenance and


                                   3
cure claim for findings of fact and conclusions of law.            Silmon v.

Can Do II, Inc., No. 93-3416, 30 F.3d 1494 (5th Cir. filed July 22,

1994).

     On remand, the district court made findings of fact and

conclusions of law and entered a judgment for Can Do II, Inc. on

Silmon's maintenance and cure claim. The court found that Silmon's

back injury was the result of a bacterial infection caused by

illegal IV drug use and that such drug use was willful misconduct

which forfeited his right to maintenance and cure.          Silmon filed a

timely notice of appeal.

                                    II.

         We review the district court's findings of fact under a

clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law de novo.

Prudhomme v. Tenneco Oil Co., 955 F.2d 390, 392 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S.Ct. 84, 121 L.Ed.2d 48 (1992).

         Maintenance and cure is an ancient duty1 imposed upon a

shipowner to provide for a seamen who becomes ill or injured during

his service to the ship.           This duty is implied in maritime

employment contracts between the seaman and his employer and is not

premised on the fault or negligence of the shipowner.             Aguilar v.

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 318 U.S. 724, 730, 63 S.Ct. 930,

933-34, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943);             see also, Bertram v. Freeport

McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008, 1013 (5th Cir.1995).

     The    Supreme   Court   in   Aguilar    made   it   clear   that   the


     1
      See, Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730 n. 6,
63 S.Ct. 930, 933-34 n. 6, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943).

                                     4
shipowner's defenses to a seaman's maintenance and cure claim are

few and narrowly applied.        The precise question presented in that

case was whether a seaman could recover for maintenance and cure

for   injuries   he   received    while   on   shore   leave   for   his   own

relaxation.      In defining the breadth of the remedy the court

states:

      So broad is the shipowner's obligation that negligence or acts
      short of culpable misconduct on the seaman's part will not
      relieve him of the responsibility. Peterson v. The Chandos,
      6 Sawy. 544, 4 F. 645 (D.C.[1880] ); see also The J.F. Card,
      43 F. 92 (D.C.[1890] ); The Ben Flint, 1 Abb. (U.S.) 126, 1
      Biss 562, Fed.Cas. No. 1,299 (D.C.[1867] ). Conceptions of
      contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and
      assumption of risk have no place in the liability or defense
      against it. Only some willful misbehavior or deliberate act
      of indiscretion suffices to deprive the seaman of his
      protection.   The Ben Flint, 1 Abb (U.S. 126), 1 Biss 562,
      Fed.Cas. No. 1,299 (D.C.[1867] ) supra.       The traditional
      instances are venereal disease and injuries received as a
      result of intoxication, ...

Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 730-31, 63 S.Ct. at 934.

      In Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 71 S.Ct. 432, 95

L.Ed. 503 (1951), the Supreme Court was presented with the question

of whether a seaman could recover maintenance and cure when he

injured himself from a fall after he had been drinking at a dance

hall and grabbed a defective handrail on a balcony.             The Supreme

Court concluded that this was not such gross misconduct as would

bar his recovery.       The Court, however, reaffirmed its earlier

statement in Aguilar:

      The question is whether the injury was due to the wilful act,
      default or misbehavior of petitioner....        The standard
      prescribed is not negligence but wilful misbehavior.

Id. at 528, 71 S.Ct. at 435 (Internal quotations and citations

omitted).

                                      5
     Appellant argues that because his alleged wilful misconduct

occurred before he began his employment with the defendant, he

should still recover for his illness which became symptomatic while

he was in the service of the ship.             This argument ignores the

substantial body of law to the contrary relating to illness caused

by venereal diseases.

     As early as 1853, in Chandler v. The ANNIE BUCKMAN, 5 F.Cas.

449 (S.D.N.Y.1853) (No. 2591A), the court stated:            "A sailor is not

entitled to be treated on shipboard at the expense of the ship, not

to wages, whilst disabled by disease brought on by his own vices,

nor when he, being in diseased state, ships as an able man, the

master and owners being ignorant of his condition."                    Id.   The

Supreme Court in Aguilar cited Chandler as an example of the wilful

misconduct exception applicable to illness caused by venereal

diseases.   Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 731 n. 10, 63 S.Ct. at 934 n. 10.

     We   have   found   no    reported    decision   reaching     a   contrary

conclusion.      In   Trimm    v.   United   Fruit    Co.,   41   F.Supp.    395

(S.D.N.Y.1941), the court denied maintenance and cure to a seaman

whose illness was caused by venereal disease contracted more than

thirty years before.          The court expressed its sympathy for the

seaman but stated:       "Nevertheless, upon the facts as here shown,

the illness of the plaintiff is definitely attributable to a

voluntary vice of his own, and for which defendant, under existing

law, is in no way responsible.         It follows that plaintiff cannot

recover."

     More recently, in Bynum v. Premier Cruise Lines, Ltd., Inc.,


                                       6
1994 A.M.C. 2185, 1994 WL 617067 (M.D.Fla.), the court denied

maintenance and cure to a seaman diagnosed with the HIV virus after

the plaintiff admitted to contracting the virus through sexual

activity with several partners, both male and female, prior to

signing on the ship.

     Other district courts have reached a similar conclusion in

cases where the illness was caused solely by chronic alcoholism.

See Des Jardins v. Foss Maritime Co., 1993 A.M.C. 2233, 1993 WL

521785 (W.D.Wash.);      Blouin v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines,

Inc., 319 F.Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y.1970);        Smith v. Isthmian Lines,

Inc., 205 F.Supp. 954 (N.D.Ca.1962).

      Thus, the cases consistently support the district court's

legal conclusion that when the illness is caused solely by the

wilful misconduct of the seaman, regardless of when the wilful

misconduct   occurred,    the   shipowner   will   escape   liability   for

maintenance and cure.

      In this case, the medical testimony of defendant's experts

fully support the district court's finding that Silmon's back

injury was due solely to an epidural abscess caused by a bacterial

infection contracted from Silmon's illegal IV drug use.                 This

finding is therefore not clearly erroneous.          The district court

also correctly concluded that illegal IV drug use constitutes

wilful misconduct.    Thus, the district court committed no error in

rejecting Silmon's maintenance and cure claim.

                                   III.

     For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court's


                                    7
judgment.

    AFFIRMED.




                8