THAYER
v.
SPRATT.
No. 207.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 12, 1903. Decided April 6, 1903. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.*350 Mr. Joseph Simon for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. George C. Stout for defendant in error. Mr. John H. Mitchell and Mr. T.H. Ward were on the brief.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The decision of the Land Department as to the character of the land in question resulted from an erroneous construction of the timber act of June 3, 1878. There was no dispute as to the actual condition of the land, but the department held that land so situated could not be entered under the timber act. In this construction the department made a legal error. It has been held by this court that the act included lands covered with timber, but which might be made fit for cultivation by removing the timber and working the land. United States v. Budd, 144 U.S. 154. Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court in the above case, states as follows:
"Lands are not excluded by the scope of the act because in the future, by large expenditures of money and labor, they may be rendered suitable for cultivation. It is enough that at the time of the purchase they are not, in their then condition, fit therefor. The statute does not refer to the probabilities of the future, but to the facts of the present. Many rocky hill-slopes or stony fields in New England have been, by patient years of gathering up and removing the stones, made fair farming land; but surely no one before the commencement of these labors would have called them fit for cultivation. We do not mean that the mere existence of timber on land brings it within the scope of the act. The significant word in the statute is `chiefly.' Trees growing on a tract may be so few in number or so small in size as to be easily cleared off, or not seriously to affect its present and general fitness for *351 cultivation. So, on the other hand, where a tract is mainly covered with a dense forest, there may be small openings scattered through it susceptible of cultivation. The chief value of the land must be its timber, and that timber must be so extensive and so dense as to render the tract as a whole, in its present state, substantially unfit for cultivation."
The lands in this case are within that description. The evidence shows that the timber was excellent, as good as any in that section of the country. It was as good as any ever examined by the witness, who had had large experience. In fact he said there was none better in that part of the country, and the quantity of the timber was large to the acre, but the land was not especially valuable for cultivation until it had been cleared.
Even though the decision of the Land Department was erroneous, yet having been made, and the entries and certificates cancelled, although without notice to defendant, they could not thereafter be used even as prima facie evidence of the validity of the original entries. It was perfectly easy to have given defendant notice of the proposed cancellation. He resided in Alpena, Michigan, and the deeds showed that fact, and the record shows the department was aware of their existence through the report of its special inspector. There is no hardship or inconvenience, therefore, in holding that, in a case, at least, where the residence is known, the transferee has the right to notice. If not known, a publication of notice ought at least to be made. It seems this is the practice of the Land Department.
It has been held in this court, in Guaranty Savings Bank v. Bladow, 176 U.S. 448, and Hawley v. Diller, 178 U.S. 476, 488, that a cancellation of a certificate of entry was not conclusive as against a transferee who had no notice and no opportunity to be heard upon the question of the original validity of the entry, but that it left the transferee without the right to use the entry certificate as prima facie evidence of the validity of the entry or of his subsequent claim. The transferee is, however, left free to prove the validity of the entry by any means other than the certificate. Although the assignment or conveyance of the certificates did not transfer the legal title to the *352 lands described therein, yet the transferee or grantee thereby became possessed of an equitable interest in the lands which could not be taken from him without some notice. The character of the certificates as a mere means of evidence could be and was destroyed, but the transferee was nevertheless not thereby deprived of his right to show the validity of the former entry.
In this case we think he has done so. He proved by his own evidence that he was a bona fide purchaser of the property for value paid to the entrymen, and that he had no agreement or understanding of any kind with them prior to the time that he purchased the land from them.
We do not refer to the bona fide character of the purchase by defendant from the entrymen for the purpose of thereby showing the defendant to be entitled to the benefit of that character under section 2 of the timber act of 1878. The reason that he is not so entitled is that by the assignment of the certificates he did not become clothed with the strict legal title to the land, but simply with an equity, and the act does not cover such a case. Hawley v. Diller, 178 U.S. 476, 487. We refer to the bona fide character of the purchase by defendant, for the purpose only of showing it was without any prior agreement or understanding with the entrymen, and was not in violation of the provisions of the timber act.
The stipulation between counsel that the papers on file in the Land Department might be regarded as in evidence and considered by the court, permitted the court to regard those papers as properly introduced in evidence and competent to be considered by it in the further consideration of the case. Those papers show a compliance on the part of the entrymen with all the provisions of the timber act and a valid entry under it in regard to the lands in question. As the entries had not been cancelled for any fraud in fact, but only upon an erroneous interpretation of the law by the department, the evidence of such error being apparent on the trial, the defendant did all he was required to do in order to show the entries valid, and if the plaintiffs wished to show any fraud in fact, to overcome the case made by the defendant, they were called upon to do so, *353 otherwise, the original proof being sufficient to warrant the issuing of the certificates, that proof would be regarded as sufficient on the trial of this suit.
There is not a word of any proof showing any fraudulent act on the part of the entrymen or of their transferee, the defendant herein, and, on the contrary, there is proof of an absence of any fraud and the bona fide purpose on the part of the entrymen to properly avail themselves of the act of 1878.
But however this may be, we are precluded by the finding of facts in the state court from looking at the evidence upon which such findings may rest. Upon a writ of error to a state court this court has no right to review its decision upon the ground that the finding was against evidence or the weight of evidence. Egan v. Hart, 165 U.S. 188; Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 U.S. 362, 370; Bement v. National Harrow Company, 186 U.S. 70, 83; Jenkins v. Neff, 186 U.S. 230, 235.
By the findings in this case it appears that the entrymen at the time of making their entries were entitled to purchase the lands under the act of Congress of 1878, and that they duly made such application, duly verified by the oath of the applicants before the register of the land office, and that in the purchase of the land they fully complied with the laws of the United States and the rules and regulations of the Land Department, and that all the requirements of the timber and stone act in regard to making a legal and valid entry and purchase thereunder were fully complied with by the entrymen, and that thereafter the applications were allowed and certificates duly issued as applied for, and the lands included in the entries were at all times chiefly valuable for the timber thereon and at that time unfit for cultivation. It was also found that the action of the land office in cancelling the timber entries was based upon a misconstruction of the act of 1878, and that the department, by reason of such misconstruction, erroneously held that land covered with a heavy growth of valuable timber, if it could be successfully cultivated after the timber was removed, was not subject to entry as timber land under that act, although the timber on the land might be itself the chief element of the value *354 of the land, and the land could not be cultivated at all in its then condition.
Upon these findings it is apparent that the defendant showed the validity of the entries by his grantors, and that their conveyances to him passed a good equitable title to the lands in question for which he was entitled to a patent from the United States, and that as such patent was granted to appellants, the defendant was entitled to the relief given him by the judgment.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington is therefore
Affirmed.