Maynard v. Westport Insurance

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-1956

DWAYNE MAYNARD; TAJUANA MAYNARD,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

WESTPORT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff - Appellee,

and

BRIDGETTE HARRIS-SMITH; SMITH & JEFFERSON,
LLC,

Third Party Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CA-
01-232-DKC)

Submitted: January 23, 2003 Decided: February 10, 2003

Before WIDENER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stewart A. Sutton, LAW OFFICE OF STEWART A. SUTTON, L.L.C.,
Germantown, Maryland, for Appellants. Bryan G. Schumann, R. J.,
Smyk, BOLLINGER, RUBERRY & GARVEY, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

2
PER CURIAM:

Dwayne and Tajuana Maynard appeal from the district court’s

order denying their motion for summary judgment, granting Westport

Insurance Corporation’s cross motion for summary judgment, and

declaring that Westport is not obligated to indemnify their former

counsel, Bridgette Harris-Smith, for a $272,000 default judgment

entered against her in favor of the Maynards for her legal

malpractice in a bankruptcy proceeding.

This Court reviews de novo a district court’s order granting

summary judgment and views the facts in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v.

Objective, Inc., 180 F.3d 583, 590-91 (4th Cir. 1999). Summary

judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact

exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We conclude that the district court

properly granted summary judgment and declaratory relief for the

reason stated in its comprehensive opinion and orders and affirm

for the reasons stated by the district court. See Maynard v.

Westport Ins. Corp., No. CA-01-232-DKC (D. Md. July 3 and Aug. 15,

2002).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

3