UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-4276
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MELTON KEITH WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (CR-01-138-V)
Submitted: January 21, 2004 Decided: February 23, 2004
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tolly A. Kennon, III, KENNON & ASSOCIATES, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., United States
Attorney, Robert J. Gleason, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Melton Keith Williams was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000), and
sentenced to seventy-seven months imprisonment. He appeals,
raising five issues. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
First, Williams alleges that his § 922(g) conviction is
unconstitutional under the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s opinion
in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). This court has
expressly rejected such a claim. United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d
808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996). To the extent Williams argues that his
conviction violates the Tenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, we have also rejected these arguments. See United
States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 724 (4th Cir. 1999) (Tenth
Amendment); United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 323 (4th Cir.
2000) (Fifth Amendment).
Second, Williams’ instant federal prosecution, following
his state prosecution by North Carolina for the same offense, does
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because of the dual
sovereignty doctrine. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 28
(1977).
Third, we find that the Government did establish the
interstate commerce element of the crime. The evidence revealed
that both weapons at issue were manufactured outside the state of
possession. See United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th
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Cir. 2001); United States v. Nathan, 202 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.
2000).
Next, we find that Williams has failed to show that the
district court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the
grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Williams has failed to
show that the prosecutor had a “genuine animus” toward him, United
States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001), and the
Government clearly had probable cause to believe he committed the
crime. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
Finally, we find no merit to Williams’ claim that he was
denied the right to a fair trial because there was conflicting
testimony from the Government’s witnesses. Williams’ allegations
amount to little more than minor discrepancies; the relevant facts
of Williams’ possession of the guns and his status as a felon are
unblemished. See United States v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976, 979 (4th
Cir. 1995). This court does not make credibility determinations on
appeal. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 868 (4th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, we affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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