UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-1183
EMMANUEL KEWU AMEH,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN D. ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the
United States,
Respondent.
No. 04-1134
EMMANUEL KEWU AMEH,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT,
Respondent.
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (A74-887-925)
Submitted: July 23, 2004 Decided: August 6, 2004
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Petitions denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald D. Richey, RONALD D. RICHEY & ASSOCIATES, Rockville,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney
General, Mark C. Walters, Assistant Director, William C. Erb,
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated petitions for review, Emmanuel Kewu
Ameh, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions this court for
review of two separate orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board”). In No. 03-1183, Ameh petitions for review of the
Board’s order affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s
order denying Ameh’s motion to terminate proceedings, granting
voluntary departure, and entering an alternate order of removal to
Ghana. In No. 04-1134, Ameh petitions for review of the Board’s
subsequent order denying his motion to reopen.
We first address the Board’s denial of Ameh’s motion to
reopen and find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion as untimely filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)
(2004); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992). We further
find that we lack jurisdiction to review Ameh’s claim that the
Board should have exercised its sua sponte power to reopen his
removal proceedings. See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472,
474-75 (3d Cir. 2003); Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th
Cir. 2002); Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review in No. 04-1134.
Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s finding
that the state court’s grant of probation before judgment
constituted a “conviction” within the meaning of the federal
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immigration laws. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000);
Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 234-37 (4th Cir. 1993).
Finally, to the extent that Ameh claims that the Board’s
use of the summary affirmance procedure as set forth in 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(4) (2004) violated his rights under the Due Process
Clause, we find that this claim is squarely foreclosed by our
recent decision in Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272
(4th Cir. 2004). We do not separately review whether the Board
appropriately streamlined this case. See id. at 281 (holding that
the remedy when the Board improperly affirms a case under its
summary affirmance procedures, for example, by "allow[ing] a
non-harmless error to slip through," is judicial review of the
immigration judge's decision). We therefore deny the petition for
review in No. 03-1183.
Accordingly, we deny both petitions for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITIONS DENIED
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