Vacated by Supreme Court, April 18, 2005
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4645
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DONALD LYNN FIELDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CR-02-
356-AMD)
Submitted: August 25, 2004 Decided: September 15, 2004
Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harold I. Glaser, GLASER & SOLOMON, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Debra L.
Dwyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Donald Lynn Fields appeals his conviction and sentence
for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). We affirm.
Fields asserts the district court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress statements he made on two occasions. We
review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence de novo, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and
reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error.
United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir. 2003).
For an incriminating statement by a defendant obtained as
the result of a custodial interrogation to be admissible in court,
the defendant must have been given Miranda warnings prior to making
the statement. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-33
(2000); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A defendant may
waive his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel if he does so “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. This inquiry requires two distinct
prongs: first, that relinquishment of the right was voluntary, and
second, that “‘the waiver must have been made with a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” United States v.
Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 139-40 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).
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“A statement is involuntary under the Fifth Amendment
only if it is ‘involuntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause.” United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777, 780 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc). For a statement to be involuntary under the Due
Process Clause, it must be extracted by threats or violence,
obtained by direct or indirect promises, or by the exertion of
improper influence. Id. at 780. The critical inquiry in
determining whether a statement was voluntary is whether the
subject’s will was “overborne” or his “capacity for self-
determination critically impaired.” United States v. Pelton, 835
F.2d 1067, 1071 (4th Cir. 1987). We review the totality of the
circumstances when deciding whether a defendant’s Miranda rights
were properly waived. Cristobal, 293 F.3d at 140; see United
States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1990). This includes
the defendant’s individual characteristics and background, the
setting in which the statement occurred, and the details of the
interrogation or interview. United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135,
1143-44 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United
States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219-20 (4th Cir. 2002).
A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is violated when incriminating statements "deliberately elicited"
by the government, made after indictment and outside the presence
of counsel, are admitted against the defendant at trial. United
States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 604 (4th Cir. 1998). “[A]n accused
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. . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1981); see Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (applying
Edwards to Sixth Amendment cases). If the accused does not
initiate the conversation, any waiver of rights made after further
police interrogation is invalid. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
With respect to Fields’s statement on September 27, 2001,
we conclude Fields knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
his rights because he was fully advised of his Miranda rights, and
no promises, threats, or other inducements were made to him. With
respect to Fields’s August 9, 2002, statement, we conclude Fields’s
waiver of rights was valid because no attempt was made to
deliberately elicit incriminating statements from him after he
invoked his right to counsel and because Fields initiated further
questioning.
Accordingly, we affirm Fields’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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