UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4761
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRYANT ELLIOTT DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-03-412-WDQ)
Submitted: March 16, 2005 Decided: March 29, 2005
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Gary W. Christopher, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Allen F. Loucks, United States Attorney, Richard C.
Kay, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Following the denial of his motion to suppress a firearm
as evidence, Bryant Davis pled guilty in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland to possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). As a condition to
his guilty plea, Davis reserved the right to appeal the denial of
his motion to suppress. Davis now appeals, contending that the
district court erred in finding reasonable, articulable suspicion
existed to justify an investigative stop prompted by the tip of a
face-to-face informant who had not previously served as an
informant and had just been arrested for drug dealing. We find no
merit to Davis’s contention; consequently, we affirm his
conviction.
This court reviews the district court’s factual findings
underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the district
court’s legal determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317,
320 (4th Cir. 2004). When a suppression motion has been denied,
this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.
1998).
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer may,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable
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suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). To conduct a Terry stop, there must be
at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the
stop. Id. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch but
less than probable cause and may be based on the collective
knowledge of officers involved in an investigation. Id.; see also
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). In evaluating
police conduct in a Terry stop, courts must consider the totality
of the circumstances, see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8
(1989), including all information available to an officer and any
reasonable inferences to be drawn at the time of the decision to
stop a suspect. United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328
(4th Cir. 1989). Reasonable suspicion may be supported by second-
hand information, such as a tip, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972), provided the tip possesses sufficient indicia of
reliability. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269-70 (2000).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the
officers’ suspicion of criminal activity was both reasonable and
articulable. The informant associated himself with Davis; his tip
sufficiently described Davis’s vehicle and located it within a
“high-crime area”; and the informant’s just-infiltrated act of drug
dealing, as the district court found, provided the informant strong
incentive to supply accurate information. Davis attempts to place
Jones, who was otherwise unknown to the officers aside from the
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arrest, in a disfavored class of informants, but the classification
misses the mark. “Where the informant is known or where the
informant relays information to an officer face-to-face, an officer
can judge the credibility of the tipster firsthand and thus confirm
whether the tip is sufficiently reliable to support reasonable
suspicion.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir.
2004) (citations omitted) (contrasting with an anonymous tip, which
“must be accompanied by some corroborative elements that establish
the tip’s reliability”).
Consequently, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Government, the district court did not err in finding that
the Terry stop was valid and in denying Davis’s motion to suppress
the firearm.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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