UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4561
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RONALD DAVID ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District
Judge. (CR-04-181)
Submitted: October 17, 2005 Decided: November 21, 2005
Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ronald David Robinson pled guilty to bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000). He was sentenced on
March 18, 2005, after the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The district court
sentenced Robinson to 180 months of imprisonment, to be followed by
three years of supervised release and restitution of $2564.
Robinson appeals.
Counsel for Robinson has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging that he has
found no meritorious issues for appeal. Robinson has filed a pro
se supplemental brief, asserting that the district court erred in
enhancing his offense level based on facts found by the court by a
preponderance of the evidence, and in sentencing him as a career
offender.
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applies to the federal sentencing
guidelines and that the mandatory guidelines scheme which provided
for sentence enhancements based on facts found by the court
violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court remedied the
constitutional violation by severing and excising the statutory
provisions that mandated sentencing and appellate review under the
guidelines, thus making the guidelines advisory. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. at 746-48, 755-56 (Stevens, J.), 756-57 (Breyer, J.). After
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Booker, the sentencing court must calculate the guideline range,
making any necessary factual findings, and consider the range and
other relevant factors set out in the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), before imposing a sentence.
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005)(citing
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65).
The district court followed this procedure in this case.
Our review leads us to conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Robinson was a career offender under USSG
§ 4B1.1(a), as (1) he was over eighteen years old at the time of
the offense of conviction, (2) bank robbery is a crime of violence,
and (3) he had two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence.
Therefore, the offense enhancements Robinson complains of did not
affect his ultimate sentence, which was determined by his career
offender status and was within the twenty-year statutory maximum
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). We find the sentence to be
reasonable. See Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-47 (holding that, after
Booker, a sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range
and . . . reasonable.”).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
review. We therefore affirm Robinson’s conviction and sentence.
We deny counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw. This court
requires that counsel inform his client in writing of his right to
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petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
renew in this court his motion for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client.
We grant Robinson’s motion to file a supplemental brief.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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