UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DUJUAN FARROW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District
Judge. (CR-04-278)
Submitted: November 2, 2005 Decided: November 21, 2005
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Lassiter, JEFFERSON & LASSITER, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, Angela Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Dujuan Farrow appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2000). Farrow
asserts the district court erred because there was a delay between
the admission of evidence regarding Farrow’s heroin possession and
use and the district court’s instruction to the jury to disregard
that evidence. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient
to convict him of the charge because he had no ownership interest
in the cocaine at issue, and he was unaware that his activities
were related to a cocaine transaction. Finding no error, we
affirm.
This court adheres to the presumption that the jury obeys
the limiting instructions of the district court. United States v.
Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1994). An exception exists
for cases in which there is “some strong indication that the
evidence is so powerful that a jury could not ignore it and that
the defendant would be harmed as a result.” United States v.
Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1990). In this case, there is
no basis for assuming the jury did not follow the court’s
instruction. Moreover, at trial, Farrow brought attention to his
heroin use and possession several times after the district court
gave the jury limiting instructions to disregard all mention of
Farrow’s association with heroin. We therefore reject this claim.
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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
considers whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Government, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942). Because this case involved a conspiracy charge under 21
U.S.C. § 846, the Government was required to prove (a) an agreement
between Farrow and another person to engage in conduct that
violated a federal drug law; (2) Farrow’s knowledge of the
conspiracy; and (3) Farrow’s knowing and voluntary participation in
the conspiracy. United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 384-85
(4th Cir. 2001). The record here supports the conclusion that the
evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to have found these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government elicited
testimony from co-conspirators and law enforcement that a
conspiracy existed to buy and distribute cocaine; that Farrow,
through words and conduct, knew of this conspiracy; and that Farrow
voluntarily participated in the scheme.
Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s
limiting instructions and conclude that Farrow’s insufficiency of
the evidence claim lacks merit. We therefore affirm Farrow’s
conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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