UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-7672
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DUJUAN FARROW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:04-cr-00278-REP-2)
Submitted: March 15, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dujuan Farrow, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Mastandrea-Miller,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dujuan Farrow appeals the district court’s order
denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion for a sentence
reduction based on an amendment to the crack cocaine sentencing
guidelines. We review a district court’s decision on whether to
reduce a sentence under that provision for abuse of discretion;
however, we review de novo a court’s conclusion on the scope of
its legal authority under § 3582(c). United States v. Munn, 595
F.3d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 2010).
Section 3582(c)(2) is inapplicable to Farrow because
he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range” that was
subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Rather, as
the district court properly found, he was sentenced to the
statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Farrow’s
sentence is therefore not subject to reduction via § 3582(c)(2).
See Munn, 595 F.3d at 187 (“[A] defendant who was convicted of a
crack offense but sentenced pursuant to a mandatory statutory
minimum sentence is ineligible for a reduction under
§ 3582(c)(2).”); United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 235-36
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 321 (2009). To the extent
that Farrow’s appellate filings raise issues not contained in
his motion to the district court, we decline to entertain them.
Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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