UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4434
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRYANT WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-04-518)
Submitted: November 23, 2005 Decided: December 19, 2005
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kenneth W. Ravenell, Matthew A.S. Esworthy, SCHULMAN, TREEM,
KAMINKOW, GILDEN & RAVENELL, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Philip S.
Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Bryant Williams entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000). He reserved his
right to challenge the district court’s ruling on his motion to
suppress. After the district court sentenced him to 120 months’
imprisonment, Williams noted his appeal.
In determining the propriety of a district court’s denial
of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United
States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992).
At the hearing on Williams’ motion to suppress, the
Government and Williams stipulated to these facts. While
conducting surveillance at an apartment complex in regard to
suspected narcotics trafficking activities, Detective Peter
Sullivan observed Williams enter the apartment building shortly
after midnight. Some time later, he observed an unknown female,
later identified as Tyra Tucker, arrive and enter the apartment
building. Approximately ten minutes later, Williams and Tucker
exited the building together and approached Tucker’s vehicle.
Williams was carrying a brown shoulder bag. Tucker opened the
trunk of her vehicle and Williams placed the bag in the trunk.
Williams then got into his vehicle and drove away from the
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apartment complex. Tucker, in her vehicle, followed closely behind
Williams. The police officers then initiated a stop of both
vehicles. The officers obtained from Tucker her consent to search
her vehicle, and they recovered the bag from her trunk. Inside the
bag, officers discovered ten kilograms of cocaine.
Williams asserted that he had--and at all times
maintained--an ownership and possessory interest in the bag and its
contents. He stated that, when he and Tucker left the apartment
complex, he had instructed Tucker to “follow him and stay in close
contact with him [so that] he could keep an eye on her and the bag
at all times.” Williams contends that he intended to retrieve the
bag from Tucker once they reached their destination. Williams also
asserted that Tucker did not know the contents of the bag.
Following the presentation of this evidence and argument
on the issue, the district court denied the motion to suppress,
finding that Williams lacked standing to contest the consent
search. Williams appeals, arguing that the district court failed
to recognize his supervisory role over the transportation of the
bag and thus his expectation of privacy in the bag.
To succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim, an individual
must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched
or the item seized. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106
(1980). A passenger in an automobile normally has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in an automobile in which he asserts neither
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a property nor a possessory interest. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 874
(4th Cir. 1992). Here, Williams was never a passenger in the
vehicle being searched. Thus, he could not have had an expectation
of privacy in the area being searched. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at
106; United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2004)
(finding defendant, who was not present during the search, lacked
standing to challenge search of luggage he placed in a vehicle for
delivery to another location), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1746
(2005); see also United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that unauthorized driver of rental car had no
expectation of privacy in the car or any container found in the
car, and denying standing to challenge search of luggage found in
trunk of car).
Williams asserts, however, that he retained an
expectation of privacy in the bag, which he placed in the trunk of
Tucker’s car. In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), the
Supreme Court held that a general consent to search an automobile
authorized a search of any container within the vehicle that could
contain contraband. The Court held that “it was objectively
reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to
search respondents’ car [for narcotics] included consent to search
containers within the car that might bear drugs.” Id.; see United
States v. Gant, 112 F.3d 239, 243 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
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“‘general consent [to a search] permits the opening of closed but
unlocked containers found in the place as to which consent was
given.’” (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.1(c) &
n.75 (1986))); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 977-78 (1st
Cir. 1994) (“Because the duffel bags were lying in the trunk,
appellant’s general consent to a search of the automobile
constituted consent to a search of the duffel bags.”).
Based on the above-cited authority, Tucker’s consent to
the search of her vehicle included consent to search the unlocked
bag in the trunk of her vehicle. Williams’ claim of a supervisory
role over the transportation of the bag and its contents is
insufficient to afford him standing to challenge the search of a
vehicle belonging to another and the contents of that vehicle. See
United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993); United States v.
Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1995) (“No expectation of
privacy is created simply because one has ‘a supervisory role in
the conspiracy or joint control over the place or property involved
in the search or seizure.’” (quoting Padilla, 508 U.S. at 82)).
Because Williams did not have an ownership interest in
the vehicle searched, and because his co-conspirator/supervisor
argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court, we find no error
by the district court in determining that he lacked standing to
challenge the search of Tucker’s vehicle, including the bag in the
vehicle. We therefore affirm the district court’s order denying
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Williams’ motion to suppress and affirm his conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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