UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4733
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALBERT LOPEZ WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00223-WO-1)
Submitted: August 10, 2010 Decided: September 10, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
A. Wayne Harrison, Sr., LAW OFFICES OF A. WAYNE HARRISON,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner,
United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Albert Lopez Williams, Jr., appeals the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized
following a North Carolina police officer’s stop of Williams’s
vehicle on suspicion that Williams violated N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 20-63(g) (2009), prohibiting the willful covering of any part
of a registration plate. On appeal, Williams contends that the
district court erred in finding that the stop was reasonable.
We affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. United
States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008). The facts
are reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below. United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir.
2007). A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, and is permissible if the officer has
probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred,
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996), or has a
reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968), regardless of the officer’s subjective
motivations, Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813-19.
After reviewing the record, we hold that the district
court’s denial of Williams’s motion to suppress was not in
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error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately expressed in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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