UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4414
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
QUINSHAWN L. WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:10-cr-00168-REP-1)
Submitted: September 28, 2011 Decided: October 14, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Gill,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael A.
Jagels, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Quinshawn L. Williams was convicted following his
conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Williams was
sentenced to a total of thirty-six months of imprisonment. On
appeal, Williams contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements based on
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that the
officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion and
impermissibly relied on race alone to justify an investigatory
stop. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review factual findings underlying the district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d
331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010).
We accord particular deference to the district court’s
credibility determinations. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d
210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008). When the district court has denied a
motion to suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. Black, 525 F.3d
359, 364 (4th Cir. 2008).
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may
conduct a brief investigatory stop when there is reasonable
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suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity is
afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Whether
there is reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the
totality of the circumstances, including the information known
to the officers and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the
time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8
(1989). Reasonable suspicion may exist even if each individual
factor alone is susceptible of innocent explanation. Black, 525
F.3d at 365. The reasonable suspicion determination is a
“commonsensical proposition,” and deference should be accorded
to police officers’ determinations based on their practical
experience. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th
Cir. 2004).
Our review of the record, construed in the light most
favorable to the Government, leads us to conclude that the
district court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion justified
the stop of Williams is sound and that the investigative stop
was not impermissibly based solely on race nor Williams’
presence in a high crime area. The district court thus properly
denied Williams’ motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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