UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4220
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SAMUEL BUSH WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-03-146)
Submitted: March 20, 2006 Decided: April 14, 2006
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Michael E. Lawlor, Sicilia Chinn Englert, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Gina L. Simms, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Bush Wright was convicted after a jury trial of
one count of conspiracy to steal firearms, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(u) (2000), one count of theft of firearms and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(u), 2 (2000),
one count of felon in possession of firearms and aiding and
abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 2 (2000), and one
count of possession of stolen firearms and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 2 (2000). These crimes involved
break-ins and attempted break-ins at several firearms dealers. In
determining the sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines,*
the probation officer concluded that Wright was subject to
sentencing as an armed career criminal pursuant to USSG
§ 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), and recommended restitution in the amount of
$24,440.31. This amount included $150 to The Gun Rack, which is
not in dispute, $15,768.27 to Galyan’s Sporting Goods in
Gaithersburg, Maryland, and $8522.04 to Galyan’s Sporting Goods in
Fairfax, Virginia. Wright objected on several grounds to the
amount of restitution. The district court held a hearing, rejected
Wright’s objections to restitution, and imposed a sentence of 188
months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, a $400
special assessment, and restitution of $24,440.31.
*
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) (2002).
- 2 -
Wright first argues that the district court exceeded the
authority of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18
U.S.C. § 3663A (2000), in determining the amount of restitution due
to Galyan’s Trading Company. He asserts that the district court
erred in using the retail value instead of the wholesale value of
the stolen firearms, that the court erred in not deducting the
value of three recovered firearms, that the Government failed to
prove the retail value of the firearms, that the court erred in
ordering payment of replacement costs for damaged property rather
than its pre-damage value, and that the court erred in ordering
payment of consequential damages. The Government agrees that the
costs of security personnel after the burglary of the Maryland
Galyan’s store are consequential damages that are not properly
included in the restitution order. We review a restitution order
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 420
(4th Cir. 1994).
We have held that “the MVRA requires that a court enter
an order of full restitution when the loss is caused by a property
offense, and the focus of the court in applying the MVRA must be on
the losses to the victim caused by the offense.” United States v.
Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2003). Our review of the
record leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in using the retail value of the stolen handguns as
the measure of the value of the firearms for purposes of
- 3 -
restitution, and that the Government established the retail value
by a preponderance of the evidence. Nor did the district court err
in declining to reduce the restitution amount by the value of the
three recovered handguns, and properly included the costs of
repairs to damaged property in the restitution order.
Wright next argues that the district court erred in
failing to consider his economic circumstances in determining the
manner of payment of the restitution ordered. The district court
ordered that Wright make monthly restitution payments of $150
beginning thirty days after he was released from confinement, but
did not explicitly discuss Wright’s financial condition or ability
to pay. Wright did not object to the district court’s failure to
make the required findings at sentencing or to the schedule of
payments ordered by the district court, and therefore his claim is
reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d
540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing standard of review). Although
the district court erred in failing to make the required findings
linking the schedule of restitution payments to Wright’s financial
condition, we conclude that Wright has not demonstrated that the
error affected his substantial rights. The MVRA requires that
restitution be ordered in this case, which Wright does not dispute.
Wright also does not suggest a different schedule of payments that
would have resulted if the district court had articulated the
- 4 -
findings regarding his financial condition. United States v.
Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 420 (4th Cir. 2001).
Wright argues that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)
is unconstitutional facially and as applied in his case because its
application caused an increase in his sentence based upon facts not
alleged in the indictment or submitted to the jury for findings
beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright does not allege that he does
not qualify for sentencing under the ACCA, but asserts only a legal
argument against its application in his case. Wright’s arguments
are foreclosed by this court’s precedent. United States v. Cheek,
415 F.3d 349, 352-53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 640
(2005).
Wright also argues that the MVRA is unconstitutional
facially and as applied in his case because its application caused
an increase in his sentence based upon facts not alleged in the
indictment or submitted to the jury for findings beyond a
reasonable doubt. Wright does not assert that the MVRA does not
apply in his case, but argues that the district court’s restitution
order was based on fact-finding that violated the Supreme Court’s
decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Wright did
not assert a Sixth Amendment objection at sentencing, and therefore
this claim is reviewed for plain error. Wright argues that, since
restitution is part of the punishment imposed for a crime, its
imposition is governed by the principles announced in Blakely. The
- 5 -
circuit courts of appeals that have considered the applicability of
Blakely and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to the
MVRA have uniformly concluded that these decisions do not apply to
restitution under the MVRA. United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165,
169-70 (5th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); United States v.
Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
King, 414 F.3d 1329, 1330 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases);
United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005). We
conclude that even if error occurred, such error is not plain in
light of the predominant rulings that restitution under the MVRA is
not affected by Blakely or Booker.
We therefore vacate the restitution order and remand for
the district court to recompute the amount of restitution without
the security guard charges. We affirm all other aspects of
Wright’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
- 6 -