UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4547
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
STEFAN DELAINE DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District
Judge. (CR-04-375)
Submitted: April 11, 2006 Decided: April 27, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram,
First Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna
Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Stefan Delaine Davis appeals from his multiple convictions in
the Middle District of North Carolina on controlled substances and
firearms offenses. Davis contends that the district court
committed reversible error when, by its written order, it denied
his motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement
officers as the result of a motor vehicle search. United States v.
Davis, No. CR-04-375 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2005) (the “Order”). As
explained below, the court did not err in its suppression ruling
and we affirm.
I.
In the afternoon of April 14, 2004, Officers Richard Alston
and Ylonda Isom (formerly Ylonda Cooke) of the Greensboro (North
Carolina) Police Department pulled their cruiser behind a black
Camaro on McConnell Road in Greensboro and observed that neither
the driver, later identified as defendant Davis, nor the passenger,
a Mr. Columbel, were wearing seatbelts.1 After the officers
activated their blue lights, the Camaro slowed and the officers
observed Davis reach towards the passenger side of the front seat.
The Camaro thereafter came to a full stop.
1
The factual background relevant to the suppression issue, as
spelled out herein, is drawn from the record made at the district
court’s December 8, 2004 evidentiary hearing, and also from the
court’s Order of February 7, 2005.
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Officers Alston and Isom parked behind Davis and Columbel,
exited their police cruiser, and approached the Camaro. As Isom
spoke with Davis, Alston attempted to talk with Columbel. Alston
observed that Columbel’s eyes were “glassy and red” and that he had
a “dazed” look. Columbel was also slow in responding to Alston’s
questions and ignored two requests for identification. When Alston
asked if Columbel had been “smoking narcotics,” Columbel
acknowledged that he had been smoking marijuana.
Officer Isom then asked Davis if he would consent to a search
of the motor vehicle. Davis refused to consent to Isom’s request
and, at about the same time, Officer Alston instructed Columbel to
exit the Camaro. As Columbel exited the automobile, Alston
observed what appeared to his experienced eye to be a marijuana
seed on the car’s rear floorboard and a small marijuana leaf in the
doorjamb of the vehicle. Alston then reached into the Camaro,
retrieved the seed and the leaf, and determined, upon closer
inspection, that they were in fact marijuana.
Officers Isom and Alston promptly placed Davis and Columbel in
handcuffs, and a search of Davis’s person resulted in the seizure
of approximately $1000 cash. The officers instructed Davis and
Columbel to sit on the curb and proceeded to conduct a vehicle
search. In searching the Camaro for drugs, Alston discovered, in
the center console, a silver pistol magazine loaded with .380
caliber rounds. When Alston asked Davis where the handgun for the
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magazine was located, Davis responded that there was no firearm in
the car.
At Officer Alston’s request, a canine handler and drug-
detecting dog were then brought to the search scene. Although the
dog did not alert on the exterior of the vehicle, it went inside
the Camaro and immediately alerted to the glove compartment. A
subsequent search of the Camaro’s glove compartment uncovered a
silver .380 caliber semiautomatic pistol and a bag containing
cocaine.
Davis and Columbel were arrested and transported to the
Greensboro Police Department’s headquarters, where they were
further searched. A search of Davis’s person uncovered 8.3 grams
of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”) hidden in his crotch. Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) then advised Davis
of his Miranda rights (which he waived) and proceeded to interview
him. During the interview, Davis indicated that, upon seeing the
blue lights of the police cruiser behind his vehicle, he had
stuffed the crack cocaine into his pants and reached over to the
passenger side to push the handgun further into the glove
compartment. Davis advised the FBI agents that he did not want the
police officers at the scene to search the vehicle because he
feared they would find the loaded magazine and the handgun, and he
knew that, as a convicted felon, he was prohibited from possessing
the magazine or the handgun.
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On September 27, 2004, a grand jury in the Middle District of
North Carolina indicted Davis on four counts of federal firearms
and controlled substances offenses. On November 1, 2004, Davis
entered a plea of not guilty and, on November 8, 2004, he filed a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the motor
vehicle search, including the crack cocaine seized at the police
station and the statements he had made to the FBI agents. After
conducting an evidentiary hearing on December 8, 2004, the court
denied Davis’s motion to suppress by the Order of February 7, 2005.
In the Order, the court carefully considered the evidentiary
presentation, and made the following findings and conclusions:
The court finds that probable cause existed for the
search of the vehicle. The investigating officers found
one of the occupants under the influence of marijuana.
Upon directing the passenger to remove himself from the
vehicle, the officer saw, what appeared from his
experience, to be a marijuana seed and marijuana leaf in
close proximity to the passenger. This substantial
probable cause is bolstered by the actions of the
Defendant’s driving when the officers were attempting to
stop him. Based on what the officers observed and their
experience in drug interdiction, the officers reasonably
believed the Defendant was attempting to hide his
contraband as they followed him. Based on the totality
of the circumstances, the officers had an abundance of
probable cause to search the vehicle. Defendant also
contends that when the canine was put into action, his
failure to discover drugs on the outside of the vehicle
prohibited the use of the canine inside the car. The
court cannot accept this theory. Once probable cause
existed, the search could continue until the officers
completed their investigation.
Order at 5-6.
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Davis thereafter entered conditional pleas of guilty to each
count of the four-count indictment, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s
suppression ruling. On April 29, 2005, the court sentenced Davis
to 152 months of imprisonment. Davis has timely noted this appeal,
and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1291.
II.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, we review the court’s factual findings for clear error
only. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 396 (4th Cir. 2000).
A district court’s legal conclusions in connection with such a
ruling are reviewed by us de novo. Id.
III.
Davis’s appeal is limited to his challenge to the legality of
his four convictions, and he maintains that they must be vacated
because the district court erred in its denial of his motion to
suppress. By that motion, Davis asserted that the search of the
Camaro he was driving on April 14, 2004, was not supported by
probable cause, in contravention of his Fourth Amendment rights.
He maintained in the district court, and contends again on appeal,
that the evidence seized from the vehicle and from his person, as
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well as the statements he made to the FBI agents, must be
suppressed.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that police officers may
search an automobile without a warrant if they possess probable
cause to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 135 (1925); see also United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 798 (1982). And in this case,
Officers Alston and Isom possessed probable cause before the
contested search to believe that the Camaro contained controlled
substances. Officer Alston, upon pulling the police cruiser behind
the vehicle on the streets of Greensboro and activating his blue
lights, observed Davis reach toward the glove compartment. After
the Camaro was stopped, Columbel failed to respond to two of
Alston’s requests for identification. When he finally responded,
Alston observed that Columbel’s eyes were “glassy and red” and that
he had a “dazed” look. After Alston asked him if had been “smoking
narcotics,” Columbel admitted that he had been smoking marijuana.
As Columbel exited the vehicle, Officer Alston, based on his
training and experience, recognized a marijuana seed and marijuana
leaf. These circumstances were more than sufficient to “warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief” that criminal activity was
afoot. California v. Carney 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
Davis also maintains on appeal that the seizure of the
marijuana seed and leaf from the Camaro was not justified by the
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plain-view doctrine. And he contends that the statements he made
to the FBI agents at the police station were the result of an
unconstitutional motor vehicle search and thus should be suppressed
as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Because the officers possessed
probable cause, however, based on the totality of the
circumstances, to conduct the challenged motor vehicle search and
related seizures, it is irrelevant whether the seizure of the
marijuana was justified under the plain-view doctrine.
Furthermore, because the motor vehicle search was properly
conducted, Davis’s fruit of the poisonous tree argument must also
fail.
On these facts, the officers possessed probable cause to
search the Camaro and, after arresting Davis, they were entitled,
as the district court observed, to continue their search “until
[they] had completed their investigation.” Order at 6. The
district court therefore did not err — either factually or legally
— in its denial of Davis’s suppression motion.
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IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we reject Davis’s challenge to the
district court’s suppression ruling and affirm his convictions.2
AFFIRMED
2
We are content to dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before us and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
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