UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4964
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMARI HARCUM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CR-
05-188-JFM)
Submitted: May 18, 2006 Decided: June 6, 2006
Before WIDENER, WILKINSON, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Edwin S. MacVaugh, Tara G. LeCompte, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, James T.
Wallner, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Jamari Harcum was convicted by a jury of possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §
841(a)(1) (West 1999), and possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006). The district court sentenced Harcum to
a total of sixty-seven months imprisonment and three years of
supervised release. Harcum challenges his convictions, arguing
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On February 11, 2005, several members of a joint Federal/State
task force, including members of the Baltimore City Police
Department, were involved in investigating narcotics trafficking
via commercial carriers. In conjunction with this investigation,
the Task Force began surveillance of Harcum in Baltimore City,
Maryland. The Task Force members were dressed in plain clothes and
drove unmarked vehicles. During the surveillance, Harcum employed
at least two counter-surveillance maneuvers, the second of which
temporarily resulted in a single Task Force Member, Detective
George Vigue of the Baltimore City Police, remaining in
surveillance of Harcum. While following Harcum, Vigue personally
observed Harcum failing to stop at stop signs posted at two
separate intersections in Baltimore City.
2
By the time Detective Vigue observed the traffic infractions,
the Task Force members, who had remained in contact with one
another via Nextel cellular telephones to share their collective
observations of Harcum’s movements, suspected that Harcum was in
possession of narcotics. Detective Vigue notified the other Task
Force members of the traffic violations and a decision was made to
have a Baltimore City uniformed officer stop Harcum’s vehicle.
According to Detective Vigue, the Task Force uses uniformed
officers with distinctive vehicles (as opposed to plain-clothed
officers in unmarked vehicles) to stop a suspect as a safety
precaution because it tends to eliminate misunderstandings that
might otherwise occur.
Baltimore City Police Detective Forrest Taylor, who was in
uniform and driving a marked police car with lights and siren, was
in the area at the time and was asked by Detective Vigue’s
supervisor to stop Harcum’s vehicle. Detective Taylor stopped the
vehicle as requested and, shortly thereafter, Task Force members
arrived and took control of the stop. Officer Hymel, a canine
handler with the Maryland State Police, was asked to respond with
a drug-detecting dog. The dog ultimately alerted to a bookbag in
the front passenger foot well area of the vehicle, which was seized
and found to contain over 1500 grams of marijuana in Ziploc bags.
A Smith and Wesson 9 millimeter semi-automatic handgun with
ammunition was also found on Harcum’s person during a pat-down.
3
Harcum filed a motion to suppress the evidence derived from
the traffic stop, claiming that the stop violated his rights under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Following
a hearing, the district court denied the motion.
Motions to suppress are decided by the district court, which
may make findings of fact and rulings of law. See United States v.
Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir. 2005). “[T]he standard for
our review is well-established: We defer to the district court’s
factual findings and do not set them aside unless clearly
erroneous; and we review legal conclusions de novo.” Id.; see also
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
A traffic stop is permissible if the officer has probable
cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810
(1996); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.
1993). When an officer observes even a minor traffic offense, a
stop of the vehicle is permissible, and this is so even if the
officer suspects the vehicle’s occupants of some other criminal
activity. See Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730. The subjective
motivations of the officers involved are not determinative; indeed,
the stop “remains valid even if the officer would have ignored the
traffic violation but for his other suspicions.” Id. at 730
(internal quotations marks omitted).
4
In this case, Detective Vigue’s observation of Harcum’s
failure to stop at the stop signs provided a sufficient basis to
stop Harcum’s vehicle. Harcum claims, however, that the district
court clearly erred in finding that he was properly stopped for a
traffic violation because Detective Forrest did not personally
observe the alleged moving violations, was not a member of the Task
Force, and only stopped the vehicle at the direction of a Task
Force member. Harcum also claims that the district court clearly
erred in crediting the testimony of Detective Vigue and finding
that Harcum committed the alleged traffic violations.
We are unpersuaded. Contrary to Harcum’s contention, the fact
that Detective Forrest stopped him at the direction of the Task
Force members and did not personally observe a traffic violation is
irrelevant. See United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1072
(4th Cir. 1980) (“[S]o long as the officer who orders an arrest or
search has knowledge of facts establishing probable cause, it is
not necessary for the officers actually making the arrest or
conducting the search to be personally aware of those facts”); see
also United States v. Pitt, 382 F.2d 322, 324 (4th Cir, 1967)
(“Probable cause . . . can rest upon the collective knowledge of
the police, rather than solely on that of the officer who actually
makes the arrest”). We have also reviewed the testimony and other
evidence presented and see no basis upon which to conclude that the
district court erred in crediting the testimony of Detective Vigue
5
when making its factual findings. See Stevenson, 396 F.3d at 543
(noting that appellate courts must defer to the trial court’s
factfinding function on motion to suppress).
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err by
denying Harcum’s suppression motion and affirm his conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6