UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4897
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL DANIEL HAMMONDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (CR-02-535)
Submitted: April 26, 2006 Decided: June 6, 2006
Before LUTTIG,* WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua Snow Kendrick, JOSHUA SNOW KENDRICK, P.C., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United States
Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
*Judge Luttig was a member of the original panel but did not
participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by quorum of
the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
PER CURIAM:
Michael Daniel Hammonds appeals his resentencing
following this court’s remand. See United States v. Hammonds, 139
F. App’x 486 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). For the reasons stated
below, we affirm Hammonds’ 300-month sentence.
Hammonds pled guilty to armed robbery interfering with
interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2 (2000);
armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2000);
and attempted armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) (2000). Hammonds received two sentences of 240 months’
imprisonment and one sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, all to
be served concurrently.
Hammonds appealed, alleging claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and challenging his four sentencing
enhancements under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We
affirmed Hammonds’ convictions, but vacated his sentence and
remanded for resentencing because Hammonds’ six-level sentencing
enhancement for use of a firearm violated United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005). On remand, the district court limited its
reconsideration to the firearm enhancement. The district court,
noting that the sentencing guidelines were advisory, overruled
Hammonds’ objection to the six-level enhancement for use of a
firearm and imposed the identical 300-month sentence, which it
concluded was reasonable.
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Hammonds appealed, and his attorney filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether: (1) the mandate rule precludes consideration
of any issues other than Hammonds’ sentencing enhancement for use
of a firearm; and (2) Hammonds’ sentence was reasonable under
Booker. Hammonds was informed of the opportunity to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but declined to do so. The Government did not
file a brief.
The mandate rule “forecloses relitigation of issues
expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court,” as well as
“issues decided by the district court but foregone on appeal.”
United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993). We find the
district court properly limited its decision on remand to
resentencing on the firearm enhancement.
After Booker, courts must calculate the appropriate
guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with other
relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and impose a sentence. If the court
imposes a sentence outside the guideline range, it must state its
reasons for doing so. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546
(4th Cir. 2005) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-61). The sentence
must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . .
reasonable.” Id. at 546-47. A sentence imposed within a correctly
calculated guideline range is presumptively reasonable. United
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States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006). At Hammonds’
resentencing, the district court calculated the advisory guidelines
range, made a finding of fact regarding the firearm enhancement,
that was amply supported by the record, noted it had considered the
statutory sentencing factors, and concluded the imposed sentence
was reasonable.
We affirm Hammonds’ sentence, as the reasoning and
decision making by the district court on remand fall well within
the boundaries of reasonableness. As constrained by the mandate
rule, we have, as required by Anders, reviewed the record and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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