UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONDELL HAMMONDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:10-cr-00110-FL-1)
Submitted: August 28, 2012 Decided: October 18, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Samuel A. Forehand, LAW OFFICE OF SAMUEL A. FOREHAND, P.A.,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V.
Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rondell Hammonds pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to
163 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
On appeal, Hammonds alleges the district court erred by
sentencing him as an armed career criminal, and by imposing a
five-year term of supervised release with conditions. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm Hammonds’ conviction and
sentence.
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) a
defendant is an armed career criminal and subject to a fifteen-
year mandatory-minimum sentence if he violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006) and has at least three prior convictions for
violent felonies or serious drug offenses “committed on
occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
(2006). Hammonds contests the use of his 1997 North Carolina
conviction for discharging a firearm into an occupied property
because he was not represented by counsel for that conviction.
More specifically, Hammonds argues that, although he waived
counsel in that state conviction and signed a waiver of counsel
form, such waiver was not done knowingly and intelligently.
We conclude that Hammonds has failed to meet his
burden of showing the invalidity of his prior conviction with
state court records or corroborating testimony from
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disinterested witnesses, as required to prevail on this claim.
United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Davenport, 884 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1989).
Moreover, we note that the district court examined the record,
United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1988), and
determined that, based on Hammonds’ extensive criminal history,
he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel in
the state conviction. The record as a whole must demonstrate
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. We have held that
no particular interrogation of the defendant is required in
order for him to waive counsel, United States v. King, 582 F.2d
888, 890 (4th Cir. 1978), and our examination of the entire
record reveals no reversible error.
Next, Hammonds contests the imposition of his five-
year term of supervised release and challenges some of the
conditions imposed with the term. District courts have broad
latitude to impose conditions on supervised release and we
normally review any conditions of supervised release for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186
(4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 259, 260
(4th Cir. 2003). Moreover, probation officers are authorized to
manage aspects of sentences and to supervise persons on
supervised release with respect to all conditions imposed by the
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district court. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3603 (2006); United States
v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995).
As conceded by appellate counsel, however, Hammonds
must establish plain error in the district court’s imposition of
his term of supervised release and the conditions imposed on
that term. We conclude that Hammonds has failed to meet the
demanding burden of establishing plain error for his term of
supervised release or the imposed conditions. See United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993).
Accordingly, we affirm Hammonds’ sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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