UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4000
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DAREN GADSDEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-05-297-WDQ)
Submitted: December 22, 2006 Decided: January 31, 2007
Before WILKINSON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc L. Resnick, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Stephanie A. Gallagher,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daren Gadsden was convicted after a jury trial of one
count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) & (f)
(2000), and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison. Gadsden
timely appealed and asserts the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress, his motion for judgment of acquittal and his
motion for a jury view of the crime scene. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Gadsden contends the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress statements he made while being interrogated by
police following his arrest. Gadsden claims his admission he was
in the 1st Mariner Bank just prior to the robbery--but claiming he
went there to make a deposit--was the result of coercion. This
court reviews legal conclusions underlying a district court’s
suppression determination de novo, but reviews factual findings
under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Rusher,
966 F.2d 868, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1992).
The ultimate due process test for confessions is one of
voluntariness. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225
(1973). A confession violates due process and must be suppressed
only if it was obtained by tactics that overbore a suspect's will
and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination. Id.
at 225-26. Whether a confession is voluntary must be determined
from an examination of “the totality of all the surrounding
- 2 -
circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.” Id. at 226.
The characteristics of the suspect that should be
considered include his age, education and intelligence. Id. The
setting and details surrounding the taking of the confession should
also be considered, such as the length and conditions of detention
and the frequency and duration of the questioning. Id.; United
States v. Wertz, 625 F.2d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1980). The
administration of Miranda warnings is also a significant factor.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S.
737, 739-40 (1966). While heavy weight must also be given to the
use of physical mistreatment, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440
(1961), the use of psychological pressure may also render a
confession involuntary. See Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873, 877
(4th Cir. 1977) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206
(1960)). Ultimately, “none of these various factors is to be
considered in isolation, nor may the determination [of
voluntariness] rest solely upon any one circumstance.” Wertz, 625
F.2d at 1134. When a confession is challenged at trial, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the confession was voluntary. Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
We conclude the district court correctly denied Gadsden’s
motion to suppress. During the suppression hearing, Detective Carl
- 3 -
Klapaska testified that the police interrogation of Gadsden was
voluntary and non-coercive. In fact, Gadsden does not deny he was
read Miranda warnings before he gave his statement and then
voluntarily signed a Miranda card waiving those rights and
asserting his statements were voluntary. Gadsden also informed
police during the interrogation that he had completed two years of
college.
Gadsden claims on appeal that his statement was
inherently coercive, because police removed his clothing. The
record confirms Gadsden’s outer clothing was legitimately taken
from him as evidence of his crime, he was given a hospital gown and
booties to wear during the interrogation, another hospital gown
with which to cover his lower body, and that the interrogation
lasted only a little more than one hour. The record also reveals
that police removed Gadsden’s handcuffs during the interview and
inquired of Gadsden whether he desired anything to drink or eat, to
which he responded he needed nothing. Accordingly, we conclude the
district court did not err in denying Gadsden’s motion to suppress
his statement admitting he entered the 1st Mariner Bank just prior
to the robbery.
Gadsden also claims the district court erred in denying
his motions for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was
insufficient to submit the case to the jury. This court reviews
the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion de novo. United States
- 4 -
v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). Where, as here, the
motion was based on a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he
verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
This court “ha[s] defined ‘substantial evidence’ as evidence that
a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient
to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Alerre, 430 F.3d at 693 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
This court “must consider circumstantial as well as
direct evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982). This court “may not weigh the evidence or review the
credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d
228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997). If evidence “supports different,
reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation
to believe.” United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.
1994). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
faces a heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064,
1067 (4th Cir. 1997).
A review of the trial transcript reveals the evidence was
sufficient to establish Gadsden aided and abetted Tyrone Jefferson
- 5 -
in the robbery of the 1st Mariner Bank. The Government produced
numerous witnesses who testified Gadsden drove Jefferson to rob the
1st Mariner Bank and that Gadsden “cased” both the 1st Mariner and
Sandy Springs Banks prior to the robbery. Although Jefferson
testified Gadsden had no knowledge of the robbery that was about to
occur, the jury’s disregard of this testimony was a credibility
determination that should not be disturbed on appeal. See Wilson,
118 F.3d at 234. Accordingly, because the Government’s evidence
was sufficient to support a guilty verdict, we conclude the
district court did not err in denying Gadsden’s Rule 29 motions.
Gadsden also claims the district court erred in denying
his motion for a jury view of the crime scene because the
audiovisual presentation of the crime scene by the Government was
“absolutely useless in informing the jury as to the witnesses’
ability to actually identify Gadsden from their vantage points.”
This court has held that the trial court’s decision to permit a
jury to view the premises where criminal activity allegedly
occurred is “a matter resting in his sound discretion.” Massenberg
v. United States, 19 F.2d 62, 64 (4th Cir. 1927). The fact that
photographs of the scene are available for the jury to review is
important in sustaining the trial judge’s discretion. See United
States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 30-1 (1st Cir. 1984); United States
v. Gallagher, 620 F.2d 797, 801 (10th Cir. 1980).
- 6 -
We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Gadsden’s motion for a jury view. The
Government produced an audiovisual presentation of the crime scene
and allowed witnesses to describe the crime and their various
vantage points before, during and after the commission of the
robbery. Although Gadsden claims there was confusing testimony at
trial about the various positioning of witnesses during their
observations of him on March 1, 2005, a review of the record
reveals that witnesses clearly indicated where they were when they
observed Gadsden driving a red convertible in the banks’ parking
lots.
Moreover, the Sandy Springs Bank teller who positively
identified Gadsden was only a few feet away from him when he
entered the bank and approached the teller’s station. Given the
numerous photographs of the crime scene presented by the Government
and the close proximity of witnesses to the crime, we conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gadsden’s
motion for a jury view.
Accordingly, we affirm Gadsden’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 7 -