UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4629
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LAJUAN JOESA DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:05-cr-00285-HEH-1)
Submitted: April 11, 2007 Decided: May 29, 2007
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Acting Federal Public Defender, Robert J.
Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States
Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant United States Attorney,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a bench trial, Lajuan Davis was convicted of
one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000);
one count of conspiracy to commit flight to avoid prosecution, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2000); one count
of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and 2 (2000); one
count of use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000); one count of interstate
transportation of a stolen automobile, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2312, 2313 (2000); two counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1344 (2000); and two counts of wire fraud, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). The district court sentenced Davis to
life imprisonment. Davis appeals his convictions and sentence.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Davis first claims the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress. This court reviews legal
conclusions involved in a district court’s suppression
determination de novo, but reviews factual findings underlying the
legal conclusions under a clearly erroneous standard. See United
States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1992).
The ultimate due process test for confessions is one of
voluntariness. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225
(1973). A confession violates due process and must be suppressed
only if it was obtained by tactics which overbore a suspect’s will
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and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination. Id.
at 225-26. Whether a confession is voluntary must be determined
from an examination of “the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.” Id. at 226.
A review of the record reveals that Davis’ March 28, 2001
and April 17, 2002 statements were voluntary. Moreover, the fact
that the March 28 statement was made under the grant of state use
immunity does not render it involuntary. See Taylor v. Singletary,
148 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998) (“A voluntarily-entered
informal immunity agreement does not, by virtue of its existence,
override a witness’ free will such that the witness’ testimony is
involuntary under the Due Process Clause.”) Accordingly, the
district court properly denied Davis’ motion to suppress.
Davis next asserts that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of carjacking because (1) there was no evidence that
the victim’s car was taken from his person or presence and
(2) there was no evidence of intent to cause death or serious
harm.* A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
faces a heavy burden. See United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064,
1067 (4th Cir. 1997). “[A]n appellate court’s reversal of a
*
The carjacking statute requires proof of five elements:
(1) taking a motor vehicle (2) that had been transported, shipped,
or received in interstate or foreign commerce (3) from the person
or presence of another (4) by force or intimidation (5) with the
intent to cause death or serious harm. 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
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conviction on grounds of insufficiency of evidence should be
‘confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.’”
United States v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978)). In reviewing a
sufficiency challenge, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained
if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient
to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
does not “weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the
witnesses.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.
1997). When the evidence supports differing reasonable
interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe.
Id. Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court has admonished that we not
examine evidence in a piecemeal fashion, but consider it in
cumulative context.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 863 (citations omitted).
“The focus of appellate review, therefore, . . . is on the complete
picture, viewed in context and in the light most favorable to the
Government, that all of the evidence portrayed.” Id.
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Davis first contends that there was not substantial
evidence to support the conclusion that the victim’s car was taken
from his person or presence. The presence requirement of the
carjacking statute can be satisfied when the victim was inside a
building and the stolen vehicle was parked outside the building.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 486 (3rd Cir.
2001) (holding that the presence requirement of the carjacking
statute was satisfied when the victims were attacked and beaten
inside their house and keys to a van parked outside the house were
taken); United States v. Moore, 198 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the presence requirement of the carjacking statute
was satisfied when keys were taken from a bank employee whose car
was parked in a parking lot outside the bank); United States v.
Kimble, 178 F.3d 1163, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
presence requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfied when
keys were taken from a restaurant employee whose car was parked
outside the restaurant). These cases also make clear that the
presence requirement has limits. In the carjacking context,
“courts have required the victim to have both a degree of physical
proximity to the vehicle and an ability to control or immediately
obtain access to the vehicle.” United States v. Servarese, 385
F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2004).
In the present case, although the victim was not inside
or immediately next to his car, the vehicle remained proximate to
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him in the driveway just outside his home, and the victim retained
an ability to control the area in which the vehicle was located.
The victim was induced to relinquish his keys only as a result of
Davis’, and his co-defendant’s, acts of violence. The vehicle was
sufficiently proximate to the victim and within his control. Thus,
were it not for Davis’ and his co-defendant’s actions and their use
of fear and intimidation, the victim could have maintained control
of his vehicle. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence to
support a finding that the victim’s vehicle was taken from his
person or presence.
Davis also argues that there was not substantial evidence
to support a finding that he took the victim’s car with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily harm as required by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119. The intent requirement of § 2119 is satisfied when the
government proves that, at the moment the defendant demanded or
took control of the vehicle, the defendant possessed the intent to
seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car.
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999). The government
need not prove that the defendant actually intended to cause the
harm; it is sufficient that the defendant was conditionally
prepared to act if the person failed to relinquish the vehicle.
United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 467, 470 (4th Cir. 1999).
With regard to the intent element, the district court
determined that Davis was a principal in the carjacking, and found
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that “[w]hile Mr. Davis with his own hands did not kill [the
victim], he knew that violence was an integral part of what they
were going to do. There was no other reason to take the shotgun,
there was no other reason to forcibly take custody of [the victim]
or to forcibly take his keys from him. So I think they have shown
a specific intent to cause bodily injury or murder.”
This finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Although Davis may not have been the primary aggressor in the
carjacking, this does not lessen his culpability. His own actions,
and the concerted efforts of his co-defendant, support the court’s
finding that Davis shared an intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm. In sum, the evidence at trial established that Davis
and his co-defendant carried a weapon as they set off in search of
someone to carjack. When they came upon the victim’s house, Davis
checked the front of the house and saw the victim was in his living
room. Davis then entered the victim’s house through the rear
kitchen door, followed by his co-defendant, who was carrying the
shotgun, and assisted in overpowering the victim and stealing his
keys and personal effects. Davis’ co-defendant subsequently killed
the victim in an adjacent field. Davis’ actions in assisting his
co-defendant sufficiently show that he shared the intent to harm or
kill the victim if necessary to steal his car.
Davis also appeals his sentence on the ground that it is
unreasonable. After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
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a district court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the
sentencing guidelines. However, in imposing a sentence
post-Booker, courts must still calculate the applicable guideline
range after making the appropriate findings of fact and consider
the range in conjunction with other relevant factors under the
guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). We will affirm a post-Booker
sentence if it is both reasonable and within the statutorily
prescribed range. Id. at 433. “[A] sentence within the proper
advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006).
Here, the district court sentenced Davis post-Booker,
appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory, and considered
the § 3553(a) factors. Hence, we reject Davis’ contention that the
district court applied erroneous legal standards in determining his
sentence. Rather, the district court properly calculated the
guideline range and appropriately treated the guidelines as
advisory. The district court expressly noted that it considered
“all the facts and circumstances set forth in [18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)],” and expressly acknowledged the difficulties in Davis’
background and the seriousness of his crime. After considering
Davis’ arguments, the district court reasonably concluded that a
sentence in the guideline range was appropriate. Based on these
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factors, and because the court sentenced Davis within the
applicable guideline range and below the statutory maximum, Davis’
sentence of life imprisonment is reasonable.
Davis further argues that the district court erred in
failing to apply a variance sentence of no more than fifty years’
imprisonment because the district court misunderstood its authority
to impose a variance sentence. However, the record, read in its
entirety, reveals that the district court understood its authority
to impose a variance sentence, but declined to do so. See United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2006) (sentences
within guidelines range are presumptively reasonable in part due to
incorporation of § 3553(a) factors into the guidelines). The
district court concluded that the evidence presented by Davis at
sentencing was not sufficient to diverge from the guidelines range,
as was appropriate given the presumption of reasonableness afforded
to a sentence within the guidelines range. See United States v.
Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2006) (variance must be
supported by the facts of the particular case); Moreland, 437 F.3d
at 434 (divergence from guidelines range must be based on plausible
reasons for doing so).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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