UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1671
GUY R. METTLE, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District
Judge. (1:05-cv-01285-WMN)
Submitted: January 24, 2007 Decided: March 7, 2007
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mitchell A. Kaye, Lawrence Alan Katz, COFFEY, KAYE, MYERS & OLLEY,
Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Stephen B. Caplis, Emily
A. Daneker, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, L.L.P., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Guy Mettle, Sr. filed a complaint against Appellee
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), alleging violations of the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. (West
1986 & Supp. 2006). CSXT filed a motion for summary judgment,
which was granted by the district court. Finding no error in the
district court’s well-reasoned opinion, we affirm.
I.
CSXT is a class one railroad engaged in interstate commerce.
Mettle was employed in CSXT’s signal department for approximately
thirty-six years. Mettle alleged that he was injured on December
23, 2004, while working as a signal maintainer in North East,
Maryland. His job required him to inspect and repair the railroad
signal system.
On the day in question, which was characterized as rainy and
wet, a CSXT dispatcher called Mettle to report a problem at the
Harbison Walker Intermediate Signal. Mettle was informed that a
“track circuit pumping” problem existed, which meant that the track
was indicating it was occupied even though there was no train in
the area. (J.A. at 56-57.) At approximately 11:00 a.m., Mettle
went to the problem location and determined that a number of “rail
slivers” were shorting the track. Mettle explained that “rail
slivers” are caused “[t]hrough train movement and the shifting,
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especially in curves.” (J.A. at 59.) The train “applies a lot of
friction on [the] rail and will actually wear the rail down, the
size on the head, so metal slivers come off in all different sizes
and widths, but most of them are kind of thin.” (J.A. at 59-60.)
Mettle was able to successfully remove the problematic
slivers. He then decided to test the track to determine if he had
fixed the problem. To test the track, he squatted down and leaned
forward to take a track reading with a volt meter. At that point,
Mettle’s right foot slipped off the railroad tie. He was able to
regain his balance, but in doing so, Mettle alleged that he was
forced to awkwardly twist his body. Mettle worked the remainder of
his shift, but was forced to seek medical attention a few days
later because of back pains. He believes that it was the above-
described twisting motion that injured his back.
On April 21, 2005, Mettle filed suit against CSXT in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case was later transferred
to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
Mettle’s theory of the case was that CSXT’s negligence caused, at
least in part, his injuries, in violation of FELA. Specifically,
he claimed that CSXT was negligent in allowing mud and rail slivers
to accumulate between the rails, and that this negligence
proximately caused his injuries.
On May 18, 2006, the district court entered summary judgment
in favor of CSXT. The district court found that Mettle had made
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“nothing more than conclusory assertions as to [CSXT’s] alleged
negligence.” (J.A. at 229.) The district court noted that in
support of his negligence claim, Mettle had offered only his
unsupported opinions that an unacceptable amount of mud and slivers
were at the accident site, and Mettle failed to offer any evidence
showing that the conditions at the track were unsafe. Thus, even
accepting his statements as true, the district court found that
Mettle failed to put forth evidence explaining that CSXT had a duty
to remove mud and slivers from the tracks for safety reasons and
had failed in exercising such a duty. Relying on Hurley v.
Patapsco & Back Rivers R.R. Co., 888 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam), the court found that Mettle’s assertions were insufficient
to meet his burden of proving CSXT’s negligence and that “absent
speculation, a jury could not conclude that [Mettle] slipped
because of the mud and not because of the rain, which [Mettle]
described as a ‘heavy downpour.’” (J.A. at 231); see Hurley, 888
F.2d at 329 (affirming directed verdict in favor of railroad
because the plaintiff’s evidence was such that “the jury could have
reached a verdict in his favor only by speculating”).
Moreover, the court found that even assuming Mettle could show
negligence on the part of CSXT, he could not show the existence of
a “causal connection between the presence of either the mud or
slivers and [Mettle’s] misfortune of injuring his back,” (J.A. at
231), in part because Mettle had admitted that CSXT “would not have
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wanted him to do anything unsafe, that he had the freedom to stay
in his truck if he believed the conditions outside were unsafe, he
did not need anyone’s approval to temporarily refrain from working,
and . . . he thought it was safe to perform the track reading,”
(J.A. at 233.) In other words, the court found that Mettle’s
actions were the sole proximate cause of his injury. See Hurley,
888 F.2d at 330 (“Given the evidence presented, the district court
properly concluded that plaintiff . . . was the sole proximate
cause of the accident.”).
On June 6, 2006, Mettle timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006).
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to CSXT. See, e.g., Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 415
(4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate when
“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R.
Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986). We must construe the facts in the light most favorable to
Mettle, and we may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
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(1986); Edell & Assoc., P.C. v. Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos,
264 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2001).
We have reviewed the record, briefs, and applicable case law
on this matter. Our careful review persuades us that the district
court’s ruling was correct. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s order on the reasoning of the district court. See Mettle
v. CSX Transp., Inc., Civil No. WMN-05-1285 (D. Md. May 18, 2006).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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