UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5156
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANDREW TERRELL JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(1:05-cr-01223)
Submitted: April 19, 2007 Decided: April 23, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Christopher Todd Hagins, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Terrell Jenkins pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition
after having been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one
year of imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000),
and one count of possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(j) (2000). In the plea agreement, Jenkins stipulated
that he qualified for sentencing as an armed career criminal based
on three prior convictions for burglary. The district court
sentenced Jenkins to 188 months of imprisonment. Jenkins timely
appealed.
On appeal, counsel filed an Anders1 brief, in which he
states there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questions
whether the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in
accepting Jenkins’ guilty plea, and whether the sentence imposed
was unreasonable or otherwise in violation of law. Jenkins was
advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has
not filed a brief. The Government declined to file a brief. We
affirm.
Jenkins did not move in the district court to withdraw
his guilty plea, therefore this court reviews his challenge to the
adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. See United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Prior to
1
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure the defendant
understands the nature of the charges against him, the mandatory
minimum and maximum sentences, and other various rights, so it is
clear that the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily entering his
plea. The court must also determine whether there is a factual
basis for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1), (3); United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). Counsel
does not specify any deficiencies in the district court’s Rule 11
inquiry, and our review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that
the court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy that assured
Jenkins’ plea was made both knowingly and voluntarily.
We review a district court’s sentence for reasonableness.
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005).
“Consistent with the remedial scheme set forth in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court shall first calculate
(after making the appropriate findings of fact) the range
prescribed by the guidelines.” Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. Counsel
does not assert that the district court erred in determining the
applicable Guidelines2 range, and our review of the record reveals
no error. Next, the district court must consider the Guidelines
range in conjunction with other relevant factors under the
Guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and
impose a sentence. “A sentence within the proper advisory
2
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2005).
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Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v.
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2006). If a court imposes
a sentence outside the Guidelines range, the court must state its
reasons for doing so. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The sentence must
be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.”
Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted). In this case, Jenkins was
sentenced to the minimum of the Guidelines range, and we conclude
that his sentence is reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Jenkins’ convictions and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Jenkins, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Jenkins requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jenkins.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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