UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4776
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER SHANE JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Loretta Copeland
Biggs, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00367-LCB-1)
Submitted: May 31, 2016 Decided: July 20, 2016
Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Graham Tod Green, Angela Hewlett Miller,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Shane Jenkins appeals his prison sentence after
pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The district court imposed a sentence of 40 months in prison,
which was above Jenkins’ advisory Guidelines range of 27 to 33
months. Jenkins’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but raising the issue of whether
the district court erred in varying upwards and imposing a
sentence 7 months above the top end of the Guidelines range.
Jenkins has filed a pro se supplemental brief also challenging
the upward variance and making two arguments. We affirm.
We review “the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of
‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v.
Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We “must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error, such
as failing to . . . adequately explain the chosen sentence—
including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we consider its substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances,
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including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.”
Id. If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, we “may
consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.
The district court “must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented when imposing a sentence,
apply[ing] the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific
circumstances of the case and the defendant, and must state in
open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen
sentence.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “In imposing a variance sentence, the
district court must consider the extent of the deviation and
ensure that the justification is significantly compelling to
support the degree of the variance.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation of
its sentence need not be lengthy, but the court must offer some
individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and
rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on
§ 3553.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The “court’s stated rationale must be tailored to the particular
case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate
review.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that Jenkins’
sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable, and the
district court did not err or abuse its discretion in sentencing
him above his Guidelines range. The district court made an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented, applied
the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific circumstances of
the case and the defendant, and adequately explained the
particular reasons supporting its sentence. We therefore give
due deference to the court’s reasoned and reasonable decision
that the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence. See United
States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 357 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). We have also reviewed
Jenkins’ pro se supplemental brief and conclude that his
arguments are without merit. To the extent that he is arguing
that he should have received advance notice of the Government’s
request for a variance, no such notice is required. See
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713-14 (2008).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform his or her client, in writing, of his or her
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
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frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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