UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5231
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DARREN ARNESS STATON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
District Judge. (4:05-cr-00096-D)
Submitted: June 20, 2007 Decided: July 12, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
James R. Saunders, HARRINGTON, SAUNDERS & JONES, P.A., Greenville,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darren Arness Staton appeals his conviction and 200-month
sentence imposed after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine and more than fifty
grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).
Staton timely appealed. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the sentence
imposed by the district court was greater than necessary to achieve
the purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
Staton was advised of his right to file a pro se supplement brief,
but he did not file one. The government has moved to dismiss the
appeal, asserting that Staton validly waived the right to appeal
his sentence in the plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss
in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver
is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162,
169 (4th Cir. 2005). Generally, if the district court fully
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal
during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid
and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 461 (2005); United States v.
Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). The question of
whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a
question of law that we review de novo. Blick, 408 F.3d at 168.
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Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Staton
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his sentence.
Moreover, the sentencing issue raised on appeal falls within the
scope of the waiver. We therefore grant, in part, the government’s
motion to dismiss and we dismiss this portion of the appeal.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
precludes our review of the sentence, the waiver does not prevent
our review of any errors in Staton’s conviction that may be
revealed by our review pursuant to Anders. Thus, we deny in part
the government’s motion to dismiss. Our review of the transcript
of the plea colloquy leads us to conclude that the district court
complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Staton’s guilty
plea.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues not
covered by the waiver. We therefore affirm Staton’s conviction and
dismiss the appeal of his sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
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are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
DISMISSED IN PART
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