UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4872
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
STEVEN GREGORY RICHARDSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00298-F)
Submitted: August 15, 2007 Decided: August 23, 2007
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Jennifer May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Gregory Richardson appeals his 180 month sentence
after pleading guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) (2000).
Richardson was sentenced as an armed career criminal pursuant to 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.4 (2005). On appeal,
Richardson argues that the district court erred in sentencing him
as an armed career criminal. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
A defendant with three prior convictions for violent
felony offenses committed on separate occasions is subject to
treatment as an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1);
USSG § 4B1.4. Though Richardson did not dispute in the district
court the fact of his prior convictions or the sentences he
received or object to the accuracy of the source material in the
presentence report, he contends on appeal that he was improperly
designated an armed career criminal because specific attributes of
his prior convictions, specifically the dates they were committed
and whether they were violent, remained unproven.
However, contrary to Richardson’s argument, the district
court was not required to make any factual findings concerning
Richardson’s prior record, and the district court could rely on
“the conclusive significance” of his record, see Shepard v. United
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States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005), as set out in the presentence
report. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 285 (4th Cir.
2005) (sentencing judge entitled to rely on undisputed information
in presentence report that “bears the earmarks of derivation from
Shepard-approved sources such as the indictments and state-court
judgments from [defendant’s] prior convictions”), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 1463 (2006).
In this case, the district court properly relied on the
presentence report in concluding that Richardson’s prior
convictions occurred on different occasions. Notably, the offenses
occurred on different dates, in different geographical locations,
and involved different criminal objectives and victims. See
Thompson, 421 F.3d at 284-86; United States v. Williams, 187 F.3d
429, 431 (4th Cir. 1999). Moreover, it is readily ascertainable
from the presentence report that Richardson was convicted of
violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54, the state statute proscribing
breaking and entering buildings. Because this Court has previously
determined that a violation of § 14-54 constitutes a violent felony
for ACCA purposes, see Thompson, 421 F.3d at 284-85, the
convictions were properly used as ACCA predicate offenses.
Richardson also contends that his sentence is
unconstitutional after Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),
because it was enhanced based on prior convictions that were
neither alleged in the indictment nor found by a jury beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Richardson’s argument is foreclosed by
controlling precedent. In United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349,
352-54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 640 (2005), we held
that prior convictions used as a basis for ACCA enhancement need
not be charged in the indictment or established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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