UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4194
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROSS ALEXANDER NORTHWAY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:03-cr-00018-F)
Submitted: September 12, 2007 Decided: September 20, 2007
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Banumathi Rangarajan, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ross Alexander Northway appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a twenty-four
month prison term. On appeal, Northway contends his revocation
sentence was plainly unreasonable because it exceeded his policy
statement range of three to nine months. We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range
and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1813 (2007). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the sentence
is unreasonable. Id. at 438. This initial inquiry takes a more
deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines
sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).
While the district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements as “helpful assistance,” and the statutory
requirements and factors applicable to revocation sentences under
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583 (2000), the court has broad discretion
to revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39 (citations
omitted). The court must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but
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this statement need not be as specific as has been required for
departing from a traditional guideline range. Moulden, 478 F.3d at
657 (citations omitted). Only if this modified reasonableness
analysis leads us to conclude that the sentence was unreasonable,
do we ask whether it is “plainly” so. Id.
After Northway admitted violating the conditions of his
probation sentence by using cocaine and failing to participate as
directed in a urinalysis program, the district court revoked his
probation sentence and resentenced him to twenty-four months in
prison, with a recommendation that he participate in the intensive
drug treatment program, followed by twelve months of supervised
release. On April 5, 2006, Northway was released from custody and
began his supervised release term. On July 10, 2006, he tested
positive for cocaine use. The probation officer petitioned the
district court for modification of Northway’s supervised release,
and Northway agreed to the modifications. On August 2, 2006, the
district court continued Northway’s supervised release.
However, between September 8, 2006 and November 8, 2006,
Northway missed five scheduled urine tests. When confronted about
the violations and asked to submit to a drug test, Northway tested
positive for cocaine and admitted to its use. The probation office
began immediate efforts to get him into a residential treatment
program, but he again tested positive for cocaine use on November
20, 2006. On November 30, 2006, the probation officer moved to
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revoke Northway’s release. As before, Northway was charged with
violating the conditions that he not use a controlled substance and
that he participate as directed in a urinalysis program. Northway
admitted the violations and requested a sentence within his policy
statement range of three to nine months. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2003). The district court sentenced
Northway to his statutory maximum sentence of twenty-four months.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000).
On appeal, Northway concedes that his conduct merited
punishment but contends the substantial increase in his sentence
above the policy statement range was plainly unreasonable. We
disagree. The district court considered the range under Chapter 7
but sentenced Northway at the statutory maximum based on his
continued pattern of violations. Northway argues his sentence was
not justified by the district court’s stated reason. However, it
was reasonable for the district court to take into account not only
the severity of Northway’s most severe violation, but also the
number of violations. See Moulden, 478 F.3d at 658.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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