UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4612
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROSS ALEXANDER NORTHWAY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (CR-03-18)
Submitted: April 11, 2005 Decided: April 25, 2005
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jane E. Pearce, Research and
Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank
DeArmon Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne Margaret Hayes,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ross Alexander Northway appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking a probation sentence on his conviction for
passing counterfeit United States currency in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 472 (2000), and resentencing him to twenty-four months in
prison followed by twelve months of supervised release. Northway’s
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), asserting, in his opinion, there are no
meritorious legal issues but arguing the district court abused its
discretion because a sentence within the range established by the
Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements would have provided
adequate punishment. Northway has been informed of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. Because our
review of the record convinces us the district court did not abuse
its discretion, we affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking a
probation sentence for abuse of discretion. Burns v. United
States, 287 U.S. 216, 222 (1932). Upon finding a probation
violation, the district court may revoke probation and resentence
the defendant to any sentence within the statutory maximum for the
original offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2000); United States v.
Schaefer, 120 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). Although Northway’s
sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, it did exceed the
applicable range under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a)
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(2003). However, while the applicable sentencing range is one of
the factors to be considered, it is advisory only. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4)(B) (2000); United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 640-41
(4th Cir. 1995). We find the district court properly considered
Northway’s need for intensive drug treatment when determining his
sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2) (2000).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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