UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4100
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROSCOE ABELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:97-cr-00319-FDW-1)
Submitted: September 23, 2010 Decided: November 10, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James S. Weidner, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF JAMES S. WEIDNER, JR.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roscoe Abell appeals the twenty-four month sentence
imposed by the district court after revoking his supervised
release. Abell’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), noting no meritorious issues
for appeal, but questioning whether the sentence imposed was
plainly unreasonable. Abell was advised of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but has not done so. Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release to ensure that it is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th
Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires us to
determine whether the sentence is unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This
initial inquiry takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than
reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439). Only if the sentence is unreasonable
do we proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
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advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors applicable to supervised release revocation. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. Such a
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “A court need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a
statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595
F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court sufficiently considered the advisory policy
statement range of thirty to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment
and the statutory sentencing factors in imposing a sentence
below the policy statement range and within the statutory
maximum set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West Supp. 2010).
We therefore conclude that the sentence imposed upon revocation
of supervised release is not unreasonable, much less plainly so.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
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of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such filing would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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