UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4864
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ADRIAN GAMBRELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:03-cr-01092-HMH-6)
Submitted: March 28, 2013 Decided: May 23, 2013
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Leesa Washington,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIUM:
Adrian Gambrell appeals the district court’s
revocation of his term of supervised release and his resulting
sentence of sixty months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel
for Gambrell has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious
issues but asking whether the district court’s sentence was
procedurally erroneous. Gambrell has not exercised his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the statutory range and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439–40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first determine whether the sentence
is unreasonable. Id. at 438. A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considered the Sentencing
Guidelines range and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
applicable to supervised release revocation. Id. at 438–40. A
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Id.
at 440. We take a more deferential appellate posture concerning
issues of fact and the exercise of discretion for revocation
sentences than for review of sentences imposed after a criminal
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conviction. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Gambrell’s revocation sentence is not
unreasonable, much less plainly so. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439–40.
The district court correctly calculated the applicable
Guidelines range, considered relevant § 3553(a) factors,
explained its reasons for sentencing Gambrell in excess of his
30-37 months advisory Guidelines sentencing range, and imposed a
sentence within the statutory maximum. We have reviewed the
entire record pursuant to our obligation under Anders, and we
discern no meritorious issue for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of Gambrell’s
supervised release and his sentence. This court requires
counsel to inform Gambrell, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Gambrell requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
such petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Gambrell. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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