UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4184
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TRAVIS SENTEL GRANGER, a/k/a Wacko,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District
Judge. (2:06-cr-00046-RBS)
Submitted: September 26, 2007 Decided: October 11, 2007
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James S. Ellenson, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck
Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Darryl J. Mitchell, Assistant
United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Travis S. Granger of conspiracy to
commit carjacking, carjacking, and use of a firearm in furtherance
of a carjacking. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was
insufficient to satisfy the intent elements of his crimes. We
affirm.
The carjacking statute requires proof of five elements:
(1) taking a motor vehicle (2) that had been transported, shipped,
or received in interstate or foreign commerce (3) from the person
or presence of another (4) by force or intimidation (5) with the
intent to cause death or serious harm. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000).
In order to satisfy the intent element, the Government must prove
that “at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the
driver’s automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously
harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car.”
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999). A defendant is
guilty of aiding and abetting when he knew the crime charged was to
be or was being committed, knowingly did some act for the purpose
of aiding and encouraging the commission of that crime, and acted
with the intent of causing that crime to be committed. See United
States v. Winstead, 708 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1983). A defendant
can be found guilty of aiding and abetting under § 2119 if he
“consciously shared some knowledge of the principal’s criminal
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intent.” United States v. Otero-Mendez, 273 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.
2001).
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
faces a heavy burden. See United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064,
1067 (4th Cir. 1997). “[A]n appellate court’s reversal of a
conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence should be ‘confined
to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.’” United
States v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984). In reviewing
a sufficiency challenge, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained
if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942).
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish
Granger’s specific intent. The evidence showed that Granger and
his accomplices decided together to rob the victim; that Granger
handed a firearm to one accomplice; that that accomplice and a
third man carjacked the victim while Granger waited in the car; and
that Granger, along with the others, shared in the spoils and
helped strip the car. From this evidence, the jury could certainly
conclude that Granger intended to aid his accomplices in stealing
the car, by deadly force if necessary. While Granger relies on the
testimony of his accomplices that they did not initially intend to
commit a carjacking and did not decide to steal the car until they
had walked away from the van in which Granger was waiting, the jury
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was free to reject their description of their intent and their
agreement with Granger.* See United States v. Arache, 946 F.2d
129, 138 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[J]ury is free to accept some part of a
witness’s testimony while rejecting other parts of the same
testimony.”).
Accordingly, we affirm Granger’s convictions. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Granger does not separately discuss the intent element for
each count in his brief. However, he does not dispute that a
finding that he intended to carjack would be sufficient to satisfy
the intent elements of his conspiracy charge, his carjacking
charge, and his firearm charge.
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