UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5150
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LOGAN COFIELD, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00144-NCT)
Submitted: September 19, 2007 Decided: October 23, 2007
Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert Albert Jamison Lang, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Logan Cofield, III, was convicted
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). The district court sentenced Cofield to
120 months in prison. Cofield timely appealed. Cofield’s attorney
has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), identifying no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the district court erred by denying Cofield’s
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal and whether
Cofield was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.
Cofield was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but he did not file one.
Cofield contends that the district court erred by denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal. We review de novo a district
court’s decision to deny a Rule 29 motion for judgment of
acquittal. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 197 (2006). Where, as here, the motion
was based on a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a
jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the
view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); Smith, 451 F.3d at 216.
“‘Substantial evidence’ [is] ‘evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
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Smith, 451 F.3d at 216 (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence, this court “do[es] not review the credibility of
the witnesses and assume[s] the jury resolved all contradictions in
the testimony in favor of the government.” United States v. Sun,
278 F.3d 302, 213 (4th Cir. 2002). The court “must consider
circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and allow the government
the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to
those sought to be established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677
F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
In order to convict Cofield under § 922(g)(1), the
government had to establish that “(1) the defendant previously had
been convicted of a [felony] . . . ; (2) the defendant knowingly
possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce at some point during its
existence.” Id. at 395 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The parties stipulated as to the first and third
elements at trial; consequently, the only element in question is
the knowing possession of the firearm. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government and resolving all
contradictions in the testimony in favor of the government, the
evidence showed that Cofield fled from police when they asked him
if he had any weapons and stated that they wished to conduct a
patdown. Two officers saw Cofield reaching into his waistband
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while he was fleeing. Cofield was apprehended within three minutes
and a gun was discovered minutes later along the flight path. A
tracking dog sniffed the gun where it was discovered and followed
a trail that led to the patrol car where Cofield was being held.
We conclude that the jurors could reasonably infer from this
evidence that Cofield knowingly possessed the gun.
Turning to the second issue, claims of ineffective
assistance generally are not cognizable on direct appeal. United
States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Instead, to
allow for adequate development of the record, a defendant generally
must bring his ineffective assistance claims in a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2000), see id.; United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415,
418 (4th Cir. 1994), unless the record conclusively shows
ineffective assistance. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233,
239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1203 (2006). Because the
record does not conclusively show that Cofield was denied effective
assistance of counsel, we find that Cofield’s claim is not
cognizable on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this
case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Cofield’s conviction and sentence. Cofield’s counsel’s
motion to withdraw from representation is denied. This court
requires that counsel inform Cofield, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
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If Cofield requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Cofield. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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