UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4821
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL COFIELD,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (7:07-cr-00128-D-2)
Submitted: June 3, 2010 Decided: July 1, 2010
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Deborrah L. Newton, NEWTON LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Cofield pled guilty to conspiring to knowingly
and intentionally possess with intent to distribute and to
distributing five kilograms of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The
district court sentenced Cofield to 213 months’ imprisonment,
and Cofield timely appealed. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which counsel
concluded that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal.
Cofield did not file a pro se supplemental brief, despite
receiving notice of his right to do so. The Government elected
not to file an answering brief, nor did it move to dismiss the
appeal based on the waiver provision in Cofield’s plea
agreement. *
The purpose of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy is to
ensure that the defendant enters the plea of guilty knowingly
and voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58
(2002). Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must
inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands, the
nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any
mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he
*
Because the Government has not moved to dismiss the
appeal, we decline to enforce the waiver. See United States v.
Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
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faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by pleading
guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine
whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
There is a strong presumption that a defendant’s
guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was
adequate. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th
Cir. 1995). Additionally, in the absence of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for
plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under
Rule 11. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
2002). “To establish plain error, [Cofield] must show that an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Cofield satisfies
these requirements, “correction of the error remains within [the
court’s] discretion, which [the court] should not exercise . . .
unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Cofield has not presented any evidence or argument to
demonstrate plain error. Indeed, the record reveals that the
district court fully complied with the Rule 11 requirements
during the plea colloquy, ensuring that Cofield’s plea was
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knowing and voluntary, that he understood the rights he was
giving up by pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that
he committed the offenses to which he was pleading guilty.
Cofield also attested during the hearing that he fully
understood the ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one
made promises to him outside those made by the Government in his
plea agreement. We conclude that Cofield’s plea was knowing,
voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
Accordingly, we affirm Cofield’s conviction.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330,
335 (4th Cir. 2009). In addition, this court presumes a
sentence within a properly determined advisory Guidelines range
is substantively reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338 (2007); United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th
Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Cofield’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court
properly calculated Cofield’s Guidelines range, treated the
Guidelines as advisory, and considered the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d
468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). Moreover, the district court based
its sentence on its “individualized assessment” of the facts of
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the case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.
2009). Last, Cofield has not rebutted the presumption that his
within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. Thus,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
chosen sentence.
Having reviewed the record in this case and finding no
meritorious issues for review, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Cofield in
writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If Cofield requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Cofield. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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