PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
LUMUMBA KENYATTA INCUMAA, a/k/a
Theodore Harrison,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7824
JONATHAN E. OZMINT, Director,
SCDC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.
Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
(CA-03-2776-0)
Argued: September 25, 2007
Decided: October 29, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and
T. S. ELLIS, III, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Dismissed as moot by published opinion. Chief Judge Williams wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge Ellis joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Robert Alexander Schwartz, ARNOLD & PORTER,
L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Andrew Frederick Linde-
mann, DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia,
2 INCUMAA v. OZMINT
S.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Justin S. Antonipillai, C. Ezekiel
Ross, ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appel-
lant.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Chief Judge:
In 2003, Lumumba Kenyatta Incumaa, then an inmate in the South
Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") Maximum Security
Unit ("MSU"), brought this action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West
2003), alleging that an SCDC policy barring MSU inmates from
receiving publications via the mail violated his First Amendment
rights. Incumaa sought declaratory relief and an injunction against
enforcement of the publications ban, but he did not pursue money
damages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
SCDC, and Incumaa appealed.
In 2005, after Incumaa filed his appeal in this case, the SCDC
released him from the MSU, and he has not been returned to its con-
fines in over two years. Thus, the MSU publications ban no longer
applies to Incumaa, and given that an inmate must "earn" assignment
to the MSU through violent behavior or noncompliance with SCDC
prison policies, there is no indication that the MSU ban will ever
apply to him again, save some serious misstep on his part. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that Incumaa no longer stands to benefit from the
declaratory and injunctive relief he seeks in his complaint. We there-
fore dismiss the appeal as moot.
I.
A.
Incumaa is serving a life sentence for murder in the South Carolina
prison system. In April 1995, the SCDC placed Incumaa in the MSU
at Kirkland Correctional Institution ("Kirkland") after he participated
INCUMAA v. OZMINT 3
in a riot at Broad River Correctional Institution during which he took
several prison employees hostage and assaulted them.1
The SCDC maintains two specialized units for difficult inmates:
the MSU and the Special Management Unit ("SMU"). The SCDC
houses its most dangerous and recalcitrant inmates in the MSU. The
SMU is designed for prisoners who are in need of greater monitoring
and supervision than those in the general population but who do not
warrant placement in the MSU.
No inmate is assigned to the MSU "from the street." (Appellee’s
Br. at 3.) Rather, placement in the MSU is based exclusively on an
inmate’s conduct while incarcerated. An inmate must commit some
violent act, engage in some criminal behavior, or otherwise pose a
risk to prison safety to "earn" assignment to the MSU. The most com-
mon reasons for assignment to the MSU are violent escape attempts,
aggravated assault on staff or other inmates, murder or attempted
murder, violent participation in a riot, hostage-taking, a history of vio-
lent behavior, or circumstances that pose an extraordinary threat to
operation of the institution. These reasons are not exhaustive; other
types of misbehavior can result in assignment to the MSU. Before
admitting an inmate to the MSU, the SCDC gives the inmate a chance
to respond at a formal hearing before the MSU Review Board.
The SCDC classifies each MSU inmate as a Level I, Level II, or
1
A Richland County, South Carolina grand jury subsequently indicted
Incumaa on three counts of hostage-taking and two counts of assault and
battery with intent to kill in relation to his involvement in the prison riot.
Incumaa pleaded guilty to the charges, and the state court sentenced him
to concurrent 20-year terms on each of the assault-and-battery counts and
20-year terms for each of the hostage-taking counts, consecutive to the
life sentence being served and to each other. A post-conviction relief
("PCR") court vacated Incumaa’s riot-related convictions and remanded
for a new trial. The PCR court concluded that Incumaa would have gone
to trial had it not been for his counsel’s ineffective assistance in incor-
rectly representing to him that he would not lose his eligibility for parole
as a result of the guilty pleas.
Although his riot-related convictions were vacated, Incumaa neverthe-
less concedes his involvement in the prison riot.
4 INCUMAA v. OZMINT
Level III inmate. Level I inmates face the most severe restrictions;
Level II inmates retain more privileges than Level I inmates; and
Level III inmates enjoy the maximum privileges available in the
MSU. Even at Level III status, however, an MSU inmate is greatly
restrained in activity as compared to his general population counter-
parts, for all three levels of MSU seriously restrict an inmate’s ordi-
nary prison privileges. For instance, MSU inmates may not participate
in prison employment, education, or other organized activity; are con-
fined to their cells twenty-three hours a day during the week and
twenty-four hours a day on the weekend; and are severely limited in
the amount and kind of personal property that they may keep in their
cells.
An inmate’s movement within the MSU classification system is not
solely dependent on the number of disciplinary infractions the inmate
commits. It also depends on the inmate’s conformity to the standards
set out by MSU officials, his commitment to self-improvement
actions, his relationships with staff, the results of daily cell inspec-
tions, and his personal grooming and appearance. The minimum term
of confinement in the MSU is eighteen months, at which point the
SCDC evaluates the inmate’s behavior to determine whether reloca-
tion to the SMU is warranted. If an inmate believes that his release
from the MSU has been wrongfully denied, he may seek review of the
decision by the SCDC Director. The Director’s decision is subject to
immediate judicial review by an administrative law judge and then,
if necessary, by the South Carolina Court of Appeals and South Caro-
lina Supreme Court.
B.
On January 1, 2002, the SCDC adopted Policy OP-22.11 to govern
the MSU. Among many other things, Policy OP-22.11 restricts an
MSU inmate from receiving magazines, books, and other publications
by mail. The restriction does not apply to magazine or periodical sub-
scriptions paid for by the inmate before assignment to the MSU; the
inmate may continue to receive these materials until the expiration of
the subscription(s). But once these pre-MSU subscriptions expire,
they cannot be renewed, and the MSU inmate may not receive any
more magazines, books, or publications — whether paid for or free
— by mail.
INCUMAA v. OZMINT 5
The publications ban does not deprive MSU inmates of all reading
materials. MSU prison officials make books and periodicals from the
Kirkland library available to the inmates by way of a book cart. Pol-
icy OP-22.11 provides that a Level I inmate may possess one paper-
back book or periodical at a time and may advance to possession of
as many as three paperback books or periodicals at a time at Level III.
In addition to these materials, an inmate may always possess the pri-
mary source book for his religion (Bible, Qur’an, etc.).
On August 29, 2003, Incumaa, then a nearly eight-year resident of
the MSU and a Level III inmate, brought the present § 1983 action
in the District of South Carolina alleging that Policy OP-22.11’s pub-
lications ban violated his First Amendment right to receive informa-
tion and ideas. Incumaa sought declaratory relief and an injunction
against enforcement of the ban, but he did not seek any money dam-
ages. Incumaa styled his challenge to the MSU publications ban as an
as-applied challenge.
On March 25, 2004, the SCDC filed a motion for summary judg-
ment. Based on its agreement with a magistrate judge’s conclusion
that "[i]t is not a violation of [Incumaa’s] constitutional rights to not
be allowed to subscribe to and receive any magazine or periodical he
desires," (J.A. at 213),2 the district court granted summary judgment
to the SCDC on October 24, 2004.3 Incumaa timely appealed, and on
April 15, 2005, we appointed counsel to handle his appeal.
Incumaa filed his opening appellate brief on June 15, 2005. Shortly
thereafter, Kirkland prison officials released Incumaa from the MSU,
and on August 2, 2005, the SCDC moved this Court to suspend the
2
Citations to "(J.A. at ___.)" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix
filed by the parties in this appeal.
3
The magistrate judge’s recommendation references a case in which
we previously upheld Policy OP-22.11’s publications ban against a First
Amendment challenge, albeit in an unpublished opinion. See Corey v.
Reich, et al., 103 F. App’x 753 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
Pursuant to D.S.C.R. 73.02(B)(2)(d), the clerk of the district court
refers to a magistrate judge "[a]ll pretrial proceedings in prisoner peti-
tions for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id.
6 INCUMAA v. OZMINT
briefing order and dismiss this case as moot. Incumaa opposed the
motion.
On February 15, 2006, the SCDC withdrew its motion to dismiss
the case as moot. The SCDC informed this Court that Incumaa was
likely to be transferred to the SMU and that the SCDC had amended
Policy OP-22.12, the SCDC policy setting forth the policies and pro-
cedures for the SMU, to include similar restrictions on the receipt by
mail of books, publications, and magazines as are contained in MSU
Policy OP-22.11. Shortly thereafter, the SCDC transferred Incumaa to
the SMU.
Around that time, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006), a case in which a Pennsylva-
nia inmate, on behalf of himself and similarly situated inmates,
brought a First Amendment challenge to a Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections policy restricting access to newspapers, magazines,
and photographs by inmates placed in the most restrictive level of the
Commonwealth’s long-term segregation unit. On February 15, 2006,
in the same filing in which it withdrew its motion to dismiss, the
SCDC moved to stay briefing in the appeal to await the decision in
Banks. Over Incumaa’s opposition, we granted the SCDC’s motion to
stay on March 2, 2006.
The Supreme Court decided Banks on June 28, 2006, upholding the
Pennsylvania policy restricting inmate access to written materials in
the Commonwealth’s long-term segregation unit. On November 20,
2006, we lifted the stay in this case and ordered Incumaa to submit
a new opening brief. According to the parties’ representations at oral
argument, Incumaa has not returned to the MSU since his release in
June 2005 and, instead, remains housed in the SMU.
II.
Although the SCDC previously withdrew its motion to dismiss this
case as moot, it now argues that the case is indeed moot and that we
are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Incumaa’s challenge
to Policy OP-22.11’s publications ban. In the SCDC’s view, no "live"
Article III case or controversy has survived to this stage in the pro-
ceedings because Incumaa is no longer housed in the MSU, and there
INCUMAA v. OZMINT 7
is no indication that he will ever be subject to the challenged policy
again, absent some sufficiently recalcitrant behavior on his part. Incu-
maa, of course, resists the SCDC’s suggestion of mootness. He argues
that his challenge to Policy OP-22.11’s publications ban was not
mooted by his transfer out of the MSU because: (1) the SCDC can
reassign him to the MSU at any time (and, according to Incumaa, on
a whim); and (2) he is subject to a publications ban in the SMU that,
if not identical in language, is identical in effect to the MSU ban.
The mootness question would be front and center even if the par-
ties did not alert us to its presence, for "[e]very federal appellate court
has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdic-
tion, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even
though the parties are prepared to concede it." Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "The doctrine[ ] of mootness . . . originate[s] in Article III’s
‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language, no less than standing does." Daim-
lerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1867 (2006). Because the
requirement of a continuing case or controversy stems from the Con-
stitution, it may not be ignored for convenience’s sake. See United
States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920) (stating that a
moot question cannot be decided, "[h]owever convenient it might
be"); Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990)
("[R]easonable caution is needed to be sure that mooted litigation is
not pressed forward . . . solely in order to obtain reimbursement of
sunk costs.").
"Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no
longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the out-
come." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969); see also
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam) (stating
that federal courts are "without power to decide questions that cannot
affect the rights of litigants in the case before them"). Litigation may
become moot during the pendency of an appeal. See United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). "[I]f an event occurs
while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the
court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the
appeal must be dismissed," for federal courts have "no authority to
give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in
8 INCUMAA v. OZMINT
issue in the case before it." Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see,
e.g., Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 545 (3d Cir. 2004)(stating
that a case is moot if "changes in circumstances that prevailed at the
beginning of the litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaning-
ful relief" (internal quotation marks omitted)). "The requisite personal
interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation . . . must
continue throughout its existence." Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)(internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
All agree that this case was "live" when Incumaa first brought his
§ 1983 action while still confined in the MSU. At that time, Incumaa
could not receive books, magazines, or other publications by mail
because of the operation of Policy OP-22.11, the policy he challenges
in his complaint. His interest in the outcome of the litigation was
more than an abstraction; if ultimately successful on his First Amend-
ment claim, he would have been able to receive magazines, books,
and other publications by mail. It is the supervening event of his
release from the MSU — which, we note, occurred after the district
court granted summary judgment to the SCDC — that puts the moot-
ness doctrine in play.
Mootness questions often arise in cases involving inmate chal-
lenges to prison policies or conditions, and courts, including our own,
have held that the transfer of an inmate from a unit or location where
he is subject to the challenged policy, practice, or condition, to a dif-
ferent unit or location where he is no longer subject to the challenged
policy, practice, or condition moots his claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief, even if a claim for money damages survives. See,
e.g., Smith v. Hundley, 190 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing
as moot a prisoner’s First Amendment claim for declaratory relief
after prisoner was transferred to a different prison); Abdul-Akbar v.
Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1993) (vacating injunctive relief
ordered by district court in favor of inmate in Delaware’s Maximum
Security Unit ("DMSU") who had been released from the unit five
months prior to trial, because after the date of the inmate’s release
from the DMSU, "the district court could not provide [him] with
meaningful relief by entering an injunctive order respecting the MSU
in which [he] no longer was incarcerated"); Williams v. Griffin, 952
INCUMAA v. OZMINT 9
F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a prisoner transfer mooted
a request for declaratory and injunctive relief). The reasons for find-
ing mootness in such a context are clear. Once an inmate is removed
from the environment in which he is subjected to the challenged pol-
icy or practice, absent a claim for damages, he no longer has a legally
cognizable interest in a judicial decision on the merits of his claim.
Any declaratory or injunctive relief ordered in the inmate’s favor in
such situations would have no practical impact on the inmate’s rights
and would not redress in any way the injury he originally asserted.
And the newly situated inmate has no further need for such declara-
tory or injunctive relief, for he is free of the policy or practice that
provoked his lawsuit in the first place. See Martin-Trigona v. Shiff,
702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The hallmark of a moot case or
controversy is that the relief sought can no longer be given or is no
longer needed.").
The same remedial problems would obtain here if we were to con-
sider the merits of Incumaa’s First Amendment challenge to Policy
OP-22.11’s publications ban. Incumaa’s challenge to the MSU policy
is of the as-applied variety, but, critically, the publications ban no lon-
ger applies to him. "As applied" does not mean "as it used to apply,"
but rather "as it continues to apply." Now that he has progressed out
of the MSU, Incumaa would no more benefit from our declaring that
the publications ban was unconstitutional as it applied (past tense) to
him and enjoining its enforcement than he would benefit from our
declaring any other aspect of MSU policy (or, for that matter, any
aspect of the former Alcatraz prison’s policy) unconstitutional and
enjoining its enforcement. Incumaa does not "continue to have a ‘per-
sonal stake in the outcome’" of this case, Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78,
which means that this case is no longer the "‘live’ controversy of the
kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract
propositions of law," Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969)(per
curiam).
That Incumaa remains subject to a similar publications ban in the
SMU is of no moment. Incumaa’s complaint only challenges MSU
Policy OP-22.11, not SMU Policy OP-22.12, which is unsurprising
given that the SMU publications ban did not even exist at the time
Incumaa brought this action. And, contrary to Incumaa’s suggestion,
the MSU and SMU policies are not one in the same. The operative
10 INCUMAA v. OZMINT
language in MSU Policy OP-22.11 establishing that unit’s publica-
tions ban is nowhere to be found in SMU Policy OP-22.12. Indeed,
the SMU publications ban is not even an explicit "ban" as it is in the
MSU, but rather derives from the SMU policy’s restrictions on the
kinds of property an inmate in the unit may possess. More fundamen-
tally, the MSU and SMU serve distinct purposes in the South Carolina
prison system, so we must assume that the SCDC’s inclusion of an
explicit publications ban in the MSU policy and exclusion of such an
explicit ban from the SMU policy expresses some qualitative differ-
ence between the MSU policy and the SMU policy. No matter how
hard he tries, Incumaa cannot recast the MSU and SMU policies as
one overarching policy.4
Putting aside the qualitative differences in the policies, however,
there remains the problem of redressability. Given that the MSU and
SMU policies are not one in the same and that there is no reasonable
indication that Incumaa will ever feel the sting of the MSU policy
again, it would be unconstitutional (as an advisory opinion), not to
mention odd, for us to declare the MSU publications ban unconstitu-
tional and enjoin its enforcement based on Incumaa’s exposure to the
SMU publications ban. Mootness has in some contexts been referred
to as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame." U.S. Parole
Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). But see Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180
(2000) (noting some differences between standing and mootness).
There is little question that if Incumaa had brought an action in the
first instance as an SMU inmate challenging the MSU policy, we
would have dismissed that case for lack of standing. The result is not
changed here simply because Incumaa became an SMU inmate mid-
way through the litigation. If Incumaa wishes to challenge the SMU
publications ban, he must file a new action in the district court.5
4
We also wish to point out that the district court has never considered
the SMU policy, and the court’s decision below, as well as the parties’
filings before the district court, focused exclusively on Policy OP-
22.11’s publications ban.
5
Of course, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1997e (West 2003), Incumaa must exhaust all administrative remedies
before bringing any challenge in the district court to the SMU policy.
INCUMAA v. OZMINT 11
Incumaa raises two more related arguments against mootness, nei-
ther of which seems to us well taken. First, he argues that the SCDC’s
removal of Incumaa from the MSU did not moot this case because,
put simply, the SCDC could place him back in the MSU at any time.
It is true that "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activity does not
deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does
not make the case moot," United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 632 (1953), but this "voluntary cessation" doctrine does not
apply where "there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will
be repeated, id. at 633 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there
is no indication in the record, nor was there any indication from Incu-
maa at oral argument, that the SCDC removed him from the MSU in
an effort to avoid judicial review of Policy OP-22.11’s publications
ban or that his release from the MSU was the result of anything but
normal operation of the review procedures used in making the deter-
mination to move an inmate out of the MSU. Indeed, we must
assume, from the lack of any evidence to the contrary, that the SCDC
promoted Incumaa to the SMU because he ceased his bad behavior.
Clearly, this is not the kind of "voluntary cessation" that the exception
covers. More to the point, it is clear that if Incumaa is ever returned
to the MSU, it will be of his own doing, and not because the SCDC
believes that the specter of litigation has passed.
Incumaa also invokes a closely related exception to the "voluntary
cessation" doctrine that permits federal courts to consider disputes,
although moot, that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2652, 2663 (2007)(internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence
of a class action, jurisdiction on the basis that a dispute is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" is limited to the "exceptional situa-
tion[ ]," Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983), in which "(1)
the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expecta-
tion that the same complaining party will be subject to the same
action again," Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (internal quo-
tation marks and alteration omitted). Incumaa bears the burden of
demonstrating that the exception applies, see, e.g., Brooks v. Vassar,
462 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2006), and in this instance, it is a burden
that he cannot carry. Unless we are to assume that Incumaa will flout
SCDC standards and codes of conduct in such a manner as to warrant
12 INCUMAA v. OZMINT
reassignment to the MSU, there is nothing in the record to support the
proposition that he is likely to be subjected to the MSU publications
ban again in the future. There is no evidence in the record that the
SCDC arbitrarily places inmates in the MSU. Instead, assignment to
the MSU is directly tied to an inmate’s bad behavior, so Incumaa thus
"holds the keys" to his remaining free from the unit.
For us to find the exception for cases "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" applicable here, then, we would have to forecast bad
behavior on Incumaa’s part. We surely cannot base our mootness
jurisprudence in this context on the likelihood that an inmate will fail
to follow prison rules. Such "conjecture as to the likelihood of repeti-
tion has no place in the application of this exceptional and narrow
grant of judicial power" to hear cases for which there is in fact a rea-
sonable expectation of repetition. Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 207. There
must be a "demonstrated probability" that the challenged action will
recur again, and to the same complainant. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 483 (1982) (per curiam). Because Incumaa will only find himself
in the MSU again if he bucks prison policy, and because we presume
that he will abide by those policies, we conclude that the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness does not apply
in this case. See Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243,
249 (4th Cir. 2005) (presuming, in deciding a mootness question, that
individuals will abide by the law in the future).
III.
Federal courts are not comprised of philosopher-kings or legislative
aides, and the Constitution forbids us from pontificating about
abstractions in the law or merely giving advice about the potential
legal deficiencies of a law or policy when no ongoing controversy
exists with respect to that law or policy. Given that Incumaa no longer
is subjected to the MSU publications ban and there is every indication
that Incumaa controls his own fate so far as the prospects for his
return to the MSU are concerned, any opinion that we offered in this
case about the MSU publications ban’s constitutionality would be
advisory in the truest sense. And we cannot avoid a mootness conclu-
INCUMAA v. OZMINT 13
sion here just because Incumaa is subject to a similar, but not identi-
cal, policy in the SMU.6
Accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, Incumaa’s appeal is
DISMISSED AS MOOT.
6
Although he never presented the argument to the district court, Incu-
maa also asserts on appeal that the MSU publications ban likely violates
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"),
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a) et seq. (West 2003). "Generally issues that
were not raised in the district court will not be addressed on appeal."
Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1997);
see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) ("It is the general
rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue
not passed upon below."). We see no need to diverge from the general
practice here and thus do not pass on Incumaa’s RLUIPA argument.