Townes v. Jarvis

ON REHEARING

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CARL MELVIN TOWNES, 
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
LARRY W. JARVIS, Warden; GENE  No. 05-7382
M. JOHNSON, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections,
Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge.
(CA-04-582)

Argued: December 3, 2008

Decided: August 19, 2009

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Gregory joined. Judge Shedd wrote a dis-
senting opinion.

ARGUED: Justin Sanjeeve Antonipillai, Carl Ezekiel Ross,
ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appel-
2 TOWNES v. JARVIS
lant. Richard Carson Vorhis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appel-
lees. ON BRIEF: Erika K. Woods, ARNOLD & PORTER,
L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Robert F. McDon-
nell, Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

The Virginia Parole Board found Carl Melvin Townes inel-
igible for discretionary parole. After a state court denied him
habeas relief, Townes filed a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in federal court, claiming that the parole ineligibility
determination violated his due process and equal protection
rights. The district court dismissed the petition. We granted a
certificate of appealability on both constitutional claims.
Because the state released Townes from prison during the
pendency of this appeal, it initially contends that Townes’s
claims are now moot. Alternatively, the state asserts that the
district court properly dismissed the claims. Although we do
not find the claims moot, we agree with the district court that
Townes has failed to state any claim upon which relief can be
granted and so affirm its dismissal of the case.

I.

During a ten-day period in February 1991, Townes robbed
three fast-food restaurants in different Virginia counties. For
two of these crimes, the state specifically convicted Townes
of using or displaying a firearm as part of the felony offenses.
But for the third, Townes pled guilty to common law robbery
in exchange for the government declining to prosecute the
additional firearm charge with which it charged Townes. As
a result of these various convictions, the state committed
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 3
Townes to the custody of the Virginia Department of Correc-
tions.

In Virginia, a prisoner generally becomes eligible for
parole after serving a specified portion of his sentence. See
Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(A) (2005). However, the state’s
"three-strikes" statute provides that "[a]ny person convicted of
three separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ii) rape or (iii)
robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon
. . . when such offenses were not part of a common act, trans-
action or scheme shall not be eligible for parole." Id. § 53.1-
151(B1). After the Department of Corrections makes a deter-
mination of parole ineligibility under this statute, the Virginia
Parole Board ("the Board") may review that decision. Id.

The Board considered and rejected Townes’s parole appli-
cation, finding him ineligible for parole consideration pursu-
ant to the three-strikes statute. Townes then filed a habeas
corpus petition in the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that
the Board violated his due process rights in its method of
counting his predicate offenses and violated his equal protec-
tion rights by discriminating against him because of his race.
The state court promptly dismissed his habeas petition as
"frivolous." Townes v. Dir. of the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 032123
(Va. Nov. 5, 2003).

Townes next filed this habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (2006), naming as respondents Larry W. Jarvis,
the warden of his prison, and Gene M. Johnson, the Director
of the Virginia Department of Corrections (collectively "the
Warden"). Townes again asserted that the Board’s parole inel-
igibility determination violated his due process and equal pro-
tection rights. The district court granted the Warden’s motion
to dismiss. Townes timely appealed.

While this appeal was pending, Virginia released Townes
from prison on mandatory parole pursuant to Va. Code Ann.
§ 53.1-159 (2005). In addition to the conditions imposed by
4 TOWNES v. JARVIS
his parole, Townes must also serve a period of probation
administered by the state courts.

II.

Initially, the Warden contends that Townes’s release from
custody moots this case. "[T]he doctrine of mootness consti-
tutes a part of the constitutional limits of federal court juris-
diction . . . . [A] case is moot when the issues presented are
no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable inter-
est in the outcome." United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280,
283 (4th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Partic-
ularly relevant here, "[m]ootness has been described as ‘the
doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite per-
sonal interest that must exist at the commencement of the liti-
gation (standing) must continue throughout its existence
(mootness).’" Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)).

Thus, for a controversy to be moot, it must lack at least one
of the three required elements of Article III standing: (1)
injury in fact, (2) causation, or (3) redressability. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The War-
den does not suggest that Townes lacked standing when he
filed this complaint, but instead contends that Townes’s
release from prison moots this action. For the reasons that fol-
low, however, Townes demonstrates that the Board’s parole-
ineligibility finding continues to result in collateral conse-
quences with respect to the duration of his parole and proba-
tion. Thus, we cannot find this action moot.

First, Townes still asserts an injury-in-fact. Although his
release from prison has foreclosed the possibility of a shorter
period of incarceration, the parole ineligibility finding still
may affect the length of his parole. See Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (describing collateral consequences).
Therefore, because Townes could receive a shorter period of
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 5
parole if he receives a discretionary parole hearing, he has
properly asserted an injury-in-fact. See Mujahid v. Daniels,
413 F.3d 991, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005).1

Second, Townes continues to satisfy the causation prong of
the standing requirement. Article III requires "a ‘causal con-
nection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’
meaning that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s
actions." Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charles-
ton, 493 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560). Here, the Board’s parole ineligibility finding
precludes Townes from an opportunity to obtain a shortened
period of parole.

Finally, Townes has alleged an injury that still satisfies the
redressability prong. "[F]or an injury to meet the redressa-
bility standard, ‘it must be likely, as opposed to merely specu-
lative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.’" In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 529 F.3d 207, 216-17
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). In some
cases, like the one at hand, a plaintiff will seek immediate
relief from a federal court as a necessary antecedent to the
ultimate relief he seeks from a different entity, like an admin-
istrative agency. In these situations, to meet the redressability
prong, a party must demonstrate that a favorable decision
from the federal court likely would provide him immediate
relief, but need not demonstrate that it likely would provide
1
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, although Townes’s release from
prison has altered the ultimate relief he hopes the Board will grant (a
shortened term of parole as opposed to a shortened sentence), the relief he
seeks from the federal courts has remained constant. That is, Townes still
requests a judgment that the Board’s parole-ineligibility finding violated
his constitutional rights and an order directing the Board to rescind this
finding. Moreover, also contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Townes need
not again seek relief from the Board, which has already adjudicated
Townes as statutorily ineligible for parole. The law does not require such
a futile act. Cf. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 436-37 n.4 (1997); Tesoro
Refining & Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 552 F.3d 868, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
6 TOWNES v. JARVIS
him the ultimate, discretionary relief sought from the agency.
See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998).

In Akins, the Supreme Court specifically addressed this
very issue. There the FEC contended that plaintiffs lacked
standing because even if the agency "agreed with [the plain-
tiffs’] view of the law," it was "possible" that the FEC could
"still have decided in the exercise of its discretion" not to
grant them relief. Id. According to the FEC, plaintiffs had
failed to show that their alleged harm was (1) fairly traceable
to the FEC’s decision and (2) redressable by judicial action.
The Supreme Court flatly rejected this argument, explaining
that it could not "know that the FEC would have exercised its
. . . discretion" to deny plaintiffs relief. Id. (emphasis added).
The Court further explained:

Agencies often have discretion about whether or not
to take a particular action. Yet those adversely
affected by a discretionary agency decision generally
have standing to complain that the agency based its
decision upon an improper legal ground. If a review-
ing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the
law, it will set aside the agency’s action . . . even
though the agency . . . might later, in the exercise of
its lawful discretion, reach the same result for a dif-
ferent reason. Thus [plaintiffs’] "injury in fact" is
"fairly traceable" to the FEC’s decision . . . , even
though the FEC might reach the same result exercis-
ing its discretionary powers lawfully. For similar
reasons, the courts in this case can "redress" [plain-
tiffs’] "injury in fact."

Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). Thus, the Court in
Akins held that a plaintiff could establish redressability simply
by demonstrating that an agency "misinterpreted the law,"
even though the agency might ultimately "reach the same
result." The Court recognized that, in this situation, a plaintiff
can establish redressability without demonstrating that the
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 7
agency would likely grant the ultimate relief sought; to
require a showing of likelihood of ultimate relief in this situa-
tion would involve courts in the speculative (if not impossi-
ble) task of predicting how an agency will exercise its
discretion.

Of course, Akins also indicates that if a court "know[s]"
that an agency will not grant the ultimate relief the plaintiff
seeks, the plaintiff lacks standing. Id. Or, put another way, if
"no realistic possibility" exists that a plaintiff can obtain the
ultimate relief, he will fail to satisfy the redressability prong.
See Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49, 56
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Ranger Cellular v. FCC, 348 F.3d 1044,
1048-50 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court has applied this same standing analysis
to cases in which plaintiffs challenge government racial set-
aside policies. Such plaintiffs need not show a likelihood that
they would gain the ultimate relief sought. Rather, they need
only show that they are "able and ready" to seek the opportu-
nity and "that a discriminatory policy prevents [them] from
doing so on an equal basis." Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated
Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656,
666 (1993); see also W.H. Scott Constr. Co. v. City of Jack-
son, 199 F.3d 206, 212-15 (5th Cir. 1999); Lac Vieux Desert
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming
Control Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 403-06 (6th Cir. 1999).2
2
Contrary to the dissent’s claim, Townes is "able and ready" to obtain
the ultimate relief he seeks—a shortened period of parole. Moreover, our
standing holding is not an "advisory opinion" but simply a straight-
forward application of Akins and the racial preference cases. Indeed,
Townes’ claim mirrors those of the plaintiffs in the racial preference cases.
Like them, he alleges that "a discriminatory policy" (the Board’s allegedly
discriminatory parole ineligibility determination) "prevents" him from
seeking something (a shortened period of parole) "on an equal basis" with
other persons. Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 666. Thus, as one of our
sister circuits has recently held, the standing framework set forth in the
racial preference cases applies in the present context. See Settles v. U.S.
Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1101-03 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying
Northeastern Florida to a parole regulation to find that "[a] decision from
this court finding the regulation unlawful and requiring a new parole hear-
ing with representation would redress [plaintiff’s] injury").
8 TOWNES v. JARVIS
The immediate relief sought by Townes is a judgment that
the state’s parole-ineligibility determination was unconstitu-
tional, necessitating a remand to the district court to order the
Parole Board to rescind that determination. We have previ-
ously granted similar relief. See Fender v. Thompson, 883
F.2d 303, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1989) (remanding to the district
court for entry of an order directing the Virginia Department
of Corrections to rescind its parole ineligibility determina-
tion). Therefore, if Townes prevails on the merits before us,
he likely will obtain the immediate relief he seeks.

Of course, Townes hopes that this immediate relief will
result in a hearing before the Board and a reduction in the
length of his parole. The Warden’s contention that "[u]nder
Virginia law, the Virginia Parole Board has absolute discre-
tion in matters of parole," Supp. Br. of Appellees at 9, belies
any suggestion that the Board lacks power to provide Townes
relief. Given the wide discretion the Board enjoys, see Vann
v. Angelone, 73 F.3d 519, 523 (4th Cir. 1996), we do not
"know" it would refuse to exercise its discretion to shorten
Townes’s period of parole. Akins, 524 U.S. at 25. Like the
Supreme Court in Akins, we refuse to speculate as to how an
independent agency would exercise its discretion. See id.
Thus, Townes has set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate that
his claims are not moot, and we accordingly turn to the merits
of his appeal.3
3
Our friend in dissent attempts to find support for his position in a num-
ber of cases holding a claim moot because the plaintiff failed to allege that
the challenged act resulted in continuing collateral consequences. See
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-16 (parole revocation does not have collateral
consequences that survive prisoner’s release); Hardy, 545 F.3d at 283-85
(prisoner completed term of supervised release); Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507
F.3d 281, 286-89 (4th Cir. 2007) (prisoner no longer subject to challenged
condition of confinement); Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1051 (4th
Cir. 1986) (same); Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 561-63 (4th Cir.
1977) (same). These cases are inapposite because Townes clearly does
allege continuing collateral consequences: he claims that the parole-
ineligibility finding improperly extends his period of parole and probation.
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 9
III.

Townes contends that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s
rejection of both his equal protection and due process claims
provide a basis for habeas relief in this court.4 We can grant
habeas relief only when an underlying state-court adjudication
was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law," or "was based on an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2006); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

The dissent also seeks to rely on United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53,
58-60 (2000), which simply held that, under federal law, an error in a pris-
oner’s release date does not automatically shorten the duration of that pris-
oner’s term of supervised release. Mootness, however, was not at issue in
Johnson. The dissent relies on one circuit’s holding that Johnson renders
such attacks on supervised release moot. See Burkey v. Marberry, 556
F.3d 142, 148-51 (3d Cir. 2009). Not only does Burkey constitute out-of-
circuit precedent interpreting the very different federal supervised release
scheme, but it also represents a minority interpretation of Johnson. Two
other circuits have held Johnson does not render such claims moot. See
Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2006); Mujahid, 413 F.3d at
993-95. We need not enter this fray because Johnson has no bearing on
how the Virginia Parole Board chooses to exercise its "absolute" discre-
tion over parole. See Garrett v. Commonwealth, 415 S.E.2d 245, 247 (Va.
Ct. App. 1992).
4
We note that after Townes filed his complaint but prior to the filing of
appellate briefs in this case, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000) provides a proper vehicle for challenges to state parole ineligibility
determinations. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). It is not
entirely clear whether a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)
may also provide an avenue for such a challenge. See Benchoff v. Col-
leran, 404 F.3d 812, 815 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting lack of clarity and cit-
ing cases); Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 86-87 (Scalia, J., concurring). However,
Wilkinson does not expressly foreclose the use of § 2254 to bring such a
challenge. Moreover, neither the state nor Townes’s appointed counsel has
suggested to us in briefs or at oral argument that a habeas petition is an
improper vehicle for Townes’ claim. Nor has any party ever urged that we
construe the complaint as having been brought under § 1983 rather than
§ 2254. Accordingly, we treat Townes’s claims as titled by him—the basis
for habeas relief pursuant to § 2254.
10 TOWNES v. JARVIS
362, 412-13 (2000). Townes expressly acknowledges the
applicability of this rigorous standard of review. See Brief of
Appellant at 9. With it in mind, we examine first his due pro-
cess claim and then his equal protection claim.

A.

Townes alleges that the Board denied him due process
rights when it found him ineligible for parole under the Vir-
ginia three-strikes parole ineligibility statute, Va. Code Ann.
§ 53.1-151(B1) (2005). He contends that this provision
applies only if the state has proven that a person has commit-
ted three armed robberies, and he asserts that only two of his
convictions meet this requirement. Townes concedes that the
state convicted him of firearm offenses in connection with
two of his robbery convictions. But he argues that because the
state did not convict him of a firearm offense in connection
with the third robbery, the Board erred in holding that that
third crime counted as an armed robbery for purposes of the
three-strikes statute.

Townes has not identified any clearly established federal
law that prohibits the Board from considering conduct unnec-
essary to a conviction as part of its three-strikes determina-
tion. Nor has he demonstrated that the state unreasonably
determined any facts in applying the governing legal princi-
ples to his case. This claim cannot, therefore, provide a basis
for habeas relief. See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166
(2000) (Kennedy, J., plurality op.).

B.

Townes, an African American, also maintains that the
Board violated his equal protection rights by discriminating
against him because of his race. Specifically, he alleges that
the Board violated these rights by declining to provide him
the benefit of the "common act" exception to the three-strikes
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 11
parole eligibility statute, when it did provide such a benefit to
a Caucasian woman.

Townes contends that the "district court failed . . . to prop-
erly apply the [12(b)(6)] standard of review" in rejecting his
equal protection claim. Brief of Appellant at 29, 30; see also
id. at 31-35; Reply Brief at 16-19. When "assessing whether
a § 2254 claim has been ‘properly dismissed without an evi-
dentiary hearing or discovery,’" a court "must evaluate its
underlying allegations pursuant to the principles of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d
140, 160 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d
567, 582 (4th Cir. 2006)). Therefore, a court must accept as
true a habeas petition’s well-pleaded allegations (but not its
"legal conclusions," see Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178
F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). Of course, when a state court
has adjudicated a habeas claim on the merits (Townes con-
cedes that, under controlling circuit precedent, the state court
adjudicated his claim on the merits, Brief of Appellant at 9
n.3), the petitioner must allege facts sufficient to meet the
exacting standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). See
Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir. 2000). Townes
maintains that the allegations in his complaint, when taken as
true, establish the Supreme Court of Virgina’s decision as
"based on an unreasonable determination of the facts." 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).5 For the following reasons this argument
fails.

The Virginia three-strikes statute is race neutral. See Va.
Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B1) (2005). Therefore, to succeed on
any equal protection challenge to it, a litigant must allege
facts demonstrating "[1] that he has been treated differently
5
Townes also briefly asserts that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s rejec-
tion of his equal protection claim "was contrary to and an objectively
unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law. Brief of
Appellant at 29. But he never offers any rationale for this assertion and we
see none.
12 TOWNES v. JARVIS
from others with whom he is similarly situated and [2] that
the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purpose-
ful discrimination," i.e., in this case, discrimination on the
basis of race. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th
Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).

Relying only on a single newspaper article, Townes alleges
that he is similarly situated to Sue Kennon, reportedly a white,
"upper middle-class housewife," who committed four rob-
beries with a broken toy pistol over the course of eight days.
See Bill Baskervill, Convicted Bank Robber Finds Unlikely
Allies, Richmond Times Dispatch, July 28, 2003, at B5.
According to the newspaper article, the Board ruled that Ken-
non’s four crimes in eight days constituted "a single criminal
act," exempting her from the three-strikes statute. Id. Kennon
thus became eligible for discretionary parole, which the Board
granted. Id.

Clearly, in some respects Townes’s and Kennon’s crimes
differ. Kennon committed four robberies in eight days with
the same toy pistol while Townes, accompanied by various
accomplices, committed three robberies in ten days with dif-
ferent real guns. Just as clearly, however, in some respects
their crimes are similar. Both robbed a series of retail estab-
lishments. Both completed these robberies in less than two
weeks. And both displayed a weapon during the robberies.
But even assuming Townes alleged, and the state court unrea-
sonably rejected, facts sufficient to satisfy the first element of
an equal protection claim—unequal treatment of similarly sit-
uated persons6—he has failed to allege facts sufficient to sat-
6
The district court suggested that "[i]n light of the myriad of factors
involved in a parole decision, ‘[i]t is difficult to believe that any two pris-
oners could ever be considered ‘similarly situated’ for the purpose of judi-
cial review of an equal protection claim.’" Townes v. Jarvis, No.
1:04cv582 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Reffitt v.
Nixon, 917 F. Supp. 409, 414 (E.D. Va. 1996)). This analysis seems some-
what inapposite to the case at hand because Townes does not challenge the
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 13
isfy the second element of such a claim—intentional
discrimination.

To satisfy this second element in a habeas petition, Townes
must provide allegations sufficient to hold that the state court
unreasonably determined the facts against him when it
rejected his claim that the Board intentionally or purposefully
discriminated against him on the basis of race. This is so
because "[t]o prove that a statute has been administered or
enforced discriminatorily," and so violates equal protection
rights, a plaintiff must show "more . . . than the fact that a
benefit was denied to one person while conferred on another."
Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th
Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). He must also allege that the
state intended to discriminate against him. Id. Townes alleges
no facts that, if proved, would demonstrate that the Board
intentionally discriminated against him. See Rivera-Powell v.
N.Y. City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 470 (2d Cir. 2006).
A fortiori, Townes has failed to allege a basis for us to hold
that the state court unreasonably determined his claim to be
frivolous.

Of course, Townes alleges that "[i]n a similar case, (Sue
Kennon), a white upper-middle-class woman in similar cir-
cumstances and facts was given consideration not given to
this black male." But his sole allegation as to the Board’s
motive is:

Board’s ultimate decision to deny him parole based on any of a "myriad
of factors." Rather he challenges the Board’s refusal to provide him the
benefit of the exception to the three-strikes statute, which rendered him
ineligible for parole consideration. The three-strikes statute provides that
this inquiry turns only on whether a person’s crimes constitute "a common
act, transaction or scheme." Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B1) (2005). Two
persons with identical criminal histories who committed identical crimes
(perhaps co-conspirators) would surely be "similarly situated" for pur-
poses of determining parole eligibility.
14 TOWNES v. JARVIS
The arbitrary and [capricious] refusal of the Board to
grant Petitioner the same form of consideration can
be seen as deliberate discrimination: Ms. Kennon’s
crimes have received different treatment from Peti-
tioner’s crimes. Petitioner was a 16 year old, black
male from the projects in Richmond while Ms. Ken-
non is a white, middle-class female.

Thus, Townes only alleges that his case "can be seen as
deliberate discrimination" (emphasis added). Not only does he
never allege that the Board actually did intentionally discrimi-
nate against him, but more significantly, Townes never
alleges any of the factors that "have been recognized as pro-
bative of whether a decisionmaking body was motivated by a
discriminatory intent." Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 819. For
example, Townes does not allege a "consistent pattern" of
intentional discrimination by the Parole Board, a "history of
discrimination" by the Board, a "specific sequence of events"
leading up to the Board’s ineligibility finding, or "contempo-
rary statements by decisionmakers" evidencing intentional
discrimination by the Board. Id. In sum, Townes sets forth no
facts—indeed no allegations—supporting the contention that
the Board intentionally discriminated against him because of
his race, let alone that the state court acted unreasonably in
rejecting this claim.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing
Townes’s equal protection claim.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.

AFFIRMED

SHEDD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Carl Melvin Townes commenced this habeas action in 2004
while he was a prisoner confined in a Virginia correctional
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 15
center. In his petition, Townes argued that the state erred by
classifying him as ineligible for discretionary parole, and he
asked for an order directing the Virginia Parole Board (the
"Board") to grant him parole. However, after the district court
dismissed his petition on the merits as frivolous, the Board
paroled Townes pursuant to Virginia’s mandatory parole law.
While the majority concludes that Townes’ mandatory parole
does not render his appeal moot, I conclude that it does
because his claims no longer satisfy Article III’s redressability
requirement.

In essence, what Townes wants and what the majority pro-
vides is an advisory opinion. Townes does not argue that we
can provide him with any relief that would directly remedy
his alleged injury. Rather, he asserts that he would use an
opinion from us stating that the Board erred in its parole eligi-
bility determination to help him persuade the Board to exer-
cise its discretion and shorten his current term of parole,
thereby obtaining a remedy for his injury. However, the
Board’s decision to terminate a period of parole is guided by
discretionary considerations that are wholly distinct from the
factors that guided its decision to classify Townes as ineligi-
ble for discretionary parole from his earlier incarceration.
Therefore, there is nothing in this record to support the con-
clusion that the Board would be likely to remedy Townes’
injury by shortening his parole if we issued a decision in his
favor — a conclusion that we must reach before we can exer-
cise jurisdiction over the merits of his appeal. Accordingly, I
dissent.

I

While Townes was incarcerated for robbing three different
restaurants, the Virginia Department of Corrections (the
"VDOC") determined he was ineligible for consideration for
discretionary parole because he had three qualifying convic-
tions within the meaning of Virginia’s three-strikes law. See
Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B1). Townes appealed that deter-
16 TOWNES v. JARVIS
mination to the Board, which affirmed the VDOC’s decision.
Townes then challenged the Board’s decision by filing a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus with the Virginia Supreme
Court, but that court dismissed his petition as frivolous in
November 2003.

Townes then commenced this habeas action in 2004, chal-
lenging the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision. After the dis-
trict court dismissed his petition as frivolous, we granted
Townes a certificate of appealability. Before we decided his
appeal, however, the Board paroled Townes pursuant to Vir-
ginia’s mandatory parole law. See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-159.1
In light of his release from prison, we ordered the parties to
file supplemental briefs on mootness. In his supplemental
brief, Townes argues that his appeal still satisfies Article III
requirements because (1) he continues to suffer collateral con-
sequences or an injury-in-fact in the form of certain restric-
tions on his freedom that are associated with his current term
of parole,2 and (2) his injury is redressable because there is a
"possibility" that the Board would exercise its discretion and
shorten his parole if we issued an opinion stating that the
Board erred in its earlier parole eligibility determination. See
Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 2-3, 8-9 (emphasis added).

II

As the majority recognizes, we must resolve the threshold
jurisdictional question of whether Townes’ release from
prison moots his challenge to the Board’s parole eligibility
determination. In answering this question, we need not
resolve any novel issues of law. We have consistently held
that a prisoner’s transfer or release from prison moots his
1
According to a stipulation submitted by the parties, Townes is cur-
rently serving a term of parole and a separate term of probation.
2
Under the terms of his parole, Townes must inter alia maintain regular
employment, permit the Parole Officer to visit his home, and follow the
Parole Officer’s instructions.
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 17
challenge to a determination that affected his confinement,
including a determination that, according to the plaintiff,
unlawfully deprived him of consideration for parole. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1986).
Applying this well-established precedent here, I conclude that
Townes’ appeal is moot.

A.

The mootness doctrine is a limit on our jurisdiction that
"originate[s] in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language."
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
Generally speaking, mootness can be described as "the doc-
trine of standing set in a time frame," Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) (quotation
marks omitted), and it recognizes that under Article III the
plaintiff normally bears the burden of establishing throughout
all stages of litigation (1) that he is suffering an injury-in-fact
or continuing collateral consequence,3 (2) that his injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action or decision, and (3)
that a favorable decision would be likely to redress his injury.
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, 10-14; Hardy, 545 F.3d at 283-84.

B.

Mindful of these Article III requirements, we have recog-
nized that "[m]ootness questions often arise in cases involving
inmate challenges to prison policies or conditions," and we
have consistently held "that the transfer of an inmate from a
unit or location where he is subject to the challenged policy,
practice, or condition, to a different unit or location where he
is no longer subject to the challenged policy, practice, or con-
3
When a plaintiff like Townes has been released from prison during the
pendency of an action, the Supreme Court has used the concept of contin-
uing "collateral consequences" as an alternative to the injury-in-fact
requirement. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8, 14 (1998); see also
United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283-84 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2008).
18 TOWNES v. JARVIS
dition moots his claims." Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281,
286-87 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Hardy, 545 F.3d at 283-85;
Taylor, 781 F.2d at 1049, 1051 (dismissing claim that plain-
tiffs were unlawfully denied consideration for parole as
moot); Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562 (4th Cir. 1977).
The reasons for finding mootness in such a context are clear:

Any declaratory or injunctive relief ordered in the
inmate’s favor in such situations would have no
practical impact on the inmate’s rights and would not
redress in any way the injury he originally asserted.
And the newly situated inmate has no further need
for such declaratory or injunctive relief, for he is free
of the policy or practice that provoked his lawsuit in
the first place.

Incumaa, 507 F.3d at 287 (emphasis added).

I conclude that these precedents control our analysis and
render the claims Townes presented in his habeas petition and
in his opening brief on appeal moot. As indicated above,
Townes originally asserted that the Board erred by classifying
him as ineligible for discretionary parole and thus keeping
him incarcerated. However, in light of his release from prison,
Townes is no longer ineligible for parole because of the deter-
mination he challenged in his habeas petition. Indeed, he has
already obtained the relief he sought in his petition — release
from incarceration — because he is now on parole and is no
longer in prison. Thus, any relief ordered in his favor "would
not redress in any way the injury he originally asserted," and
he "has no further need for . . . relief, for he is free of the pol-
icy or practice that provoked his lawsuit in the first place."
Id.; see also Taylor, 781 F.2d at 1048-49, 1051. Therefore, his
claims are moot.4
4
Our precedents in this area of law are in accord with cases from other
circuits that apply the mootness doctrine and dismiss habeas cases like this
one when an inmate challenges his parole eligibility and is then paroled
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 19
In attempting to distinguish our precedents in this area of
law, the majority suggests that they are inapposite because
they all involved actions that were dismissed as moot "be-
cause the plaintiff failed to allege that the challenged act
resulted in continuing collateral consequences." Maj. Op., at
8 n.3 (emphasis added). Contrary to the majority’s suggestion,
however, our opinions in Incumaa, Taylor, and Inmates did
not dismiss the plaintiffs’ actions as moot for failure to allege
continuing collateral consequences. In Incumaa, for example,
it is apparent that we dismissed that action as moot in part
because of our inability to "redress" the plaintiffs’ claimed
injuries — not because of the plaintiffs’ failure to allege con-
tinuing collateral consequences or an injury-in-fact. Incumaa,
507 F.3d at 283, 286-87 ("conclud[ing] that Incumaa no lon-
ger stands to benefit from the declaratory and injunctive relief
he seeks" and noting that any "relief ordered in the inmate’s
favor in such situations would have no practical impact on the
inmate’s rights and would not redress in any way the injury
he originally asserted" (emphasis added)).

Moreover, to the extent the majority is suggesting that I
would dismiss Townes’ action as moot for failure to allege
collateral consequences, see Maj. Op., at 8-9 n. 3, this is sim-
ply not correct. As indicated above, I conclude that Townes’
appeal is moot because a decision in his favor would not be
likely to redress his alleged injury and therefore would fail to
satisfy this separate and independent Article III requirement.
I express no opinion on whether he has proved collateral con-
sequences or satisfied the other Article III requirements.

while his case is on appeal. See, e.g., Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142,
146-51 (3d Cir. 2009); Fendler v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550,
555 (9th Cir. 1988); Vandenberg v. Rodgers, 801 F.2d 377, 378 (10th Cir.
1986); Graham v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 732 F.2d 849, 850 (11th Cir.
1984); Granville v. United States, 613 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1980);
Brady v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 600 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1979).
20 TOWNES v. JARVIS
C.

Perhaps because Townes recognizes that Incumaa and our
other precedents render his original claim moot, he presents
a new argument in his supplemental brief.5 There, he argues
that his appeal continues to satisfy the Article III redressa-
bility requirement — notwithstanding his release from prison
— because, if we hold that the Board erred by classifying him
as ineligible for discretionary parole, it is "possib[le]" that the
Board will redress his alleged injury by exercising its discre-
tion and shortening his current term of parole. See Supple-
mental Brief of Appellant at 8-9 (emphasis added).

1.

As previously stated, the Article III limits on our jurisdic-
tion include a requirement that the plaintiff’s injury be
redressable, and it has long been settled that the normal stan-
dard for measuring whether an injury is redressable is whether
a decision in the plaintiff’s favor would be likely to remedy
his injury. See, e.g., Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Here, Townes
does not argue that a decision in his favor would be "likely"
to remedy his injury. In fact, Townes does not argue that a
decision in his favor would in any way directly remedy his
injury. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 8-9. Instead,
Townes contends that he only needs to show that there is a
"possibility" that a decision in his favor would redress his
injury, and he asserts that he has made this showing because
5
Compare Brief of Appellant at 12-35 (arguing that Townes should be
classified as eligible for parole), with Supplemental Brief of Appellant at
1-9 (arguing that Townes should be given a shorter period of parole).
While the majority asserts that "the relief [Townes] seeks from the federal
courts has remained constant," Maj. Op., at 5 n.1, this assertion is incor-
rect. In his federal habeas petition, Townes asked the court to provide
three specific forms of relief, including an order directing the Board to
parole Townes. Given that the Board has already paroled Townes, he is
no longer seeking this form of relief and therefore the relief he is seeking
from the federal courts has not remained constant.
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 21
the Board might shorten his current term of parole if we issue
a decision in his favor. Id.

In essentially agreeing with this argument, the majority
concludes that Townes does not need to show that his asserted
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision from
this Court. This is so, the majority states, because this case
falls within a special category of cases where the plaintiff
needs relief from a federal appeals court as a "necessary ante-
cedent" to obtaining the ultimate relief he wants. Maj. Op., at
5, 7. However, this is not one of those cases. As Townes
acknowledged during oral argument, he does not need any
merits-based relief from us to obtain a remedy for his injury.
Indeed, Townes currently is (and has been) capable of asking
the Board to shorten his parole, and the Board currently pos-
sesses authority to grant him this relief. See, e.g., Va. Code
Ann. § 53.1-136.6 Accordingly, any asserted restriction on
Townes’ freedom can currently be adjusted through existing
state legal and administrative processes regardless of whether
he obtains favorable merits-based relief from us.7

The majority also states that the redressability analysis
applied by the Supreme Court in racial set-aside cases sup-
ports its position because in those cases the plaintiff does not
need to show that he is likely to obtain the ultimate relief he
wants. See Maj. Op., at 6-7. Contrary to the majority’s sug-
gestion, however, the Supreme Court’s racial set-aside cases
do not eliminate the requirement that a favorable decision be
likely to remedy the plaintiff’s injury. See, e.g., Ne. Fla.
Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 666 (1993).
6
Further, Virginia law authorizes a state court to shorten his term of pro-
bation. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-304.
7
Townes may understandably want an advisory opinion which he
believes would assist him in obtaining the ultimate relief he wants, but that
would be true of any number of litigants in federal court, and we simply
are not empowered to issue such opinions.
22 TOWNES v. JARVIS
Moreover, the majority’s reliance on set-aside cases is
inapposite because in those case, as the majority recognizes,
the plaintiff must include a showing that he is "able and
ready" to seek the ultimate benefit he wants, Maj. Op., at 7,
and Townes cannot make this showing. He is not "able and
ready" to obtain the ultimate relief he sought in his habeas
petition — which was an order declaring him eligible for dis-
cretionary parole and the shortening of his term of incarcera-
tion — because he is no longer incarcerated and is now on
parole. Therefore, the redressability analysis that applies in
set-aside cases does not apply here.8

The majority also asserts that FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11
(1998), supports its new approach to redressability, stating
that the Akins "Court recognized that . . . a plaintiff can estab-
lish redressability without demonstrating that the agency
would likely grant the ultimate relief sought." Maj. Op., at
6-7. However, Akins did not state that a plaintiff can establish
redressability without showing that the agency would likely
grant the ultimate relief sought. Rather, when discussing an
entirely different Article III requirement — causation — the
Akins Court stated that the plaintiff’s injury was fairly trace-
able to the agency’s determination even though the agency
might reach the same decision on remand. Akins, 524 U.S. at
25.

In addition, the majority’s reliance on Fender v. Thompson,
883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989), does not support the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case because, unlike Townes, the petitioner
8
The majority cites Settles v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 429 F.3d 1098 (D.C.
Cir. 2005), in support of its assertion that the jurisdictional framework set
forth in racial set-aside cases applies in Townes’ case and supports finding
that this action is still live. Maj. Op., at 7 n.2. However, the mootness
analysis that the D.C. Circuit applied in Settles is entirely different than
the analysis that applies here. In Settles, the D.C. Circuit determined that
the action was "not moot because Settles has not yet been released" from
prison. Settles, 429 F.3d at 1101. It is precisely because Townes has been
released from prison that his appeal is now moot.
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 23
in Fender was still in prison when we decided that appeal.
Thus, Fender provides no basis for exercising jurisdiction
over an appeal when the petitioner has been paroled.

2.

Viewing Townes’ new argument under the proper redressa-
bility standard makes it clear that his claims are moot.
Townes has not established (and it is not at all apparent to me)
that a decision in his favor (i.e. one stating that the Board
erred in classifying him as ineligible for parole) would be
likely to result in the Board exercising its discretion and short-
ening his current period of parole.

When the Board classified Townes as ineligible for parole,
it made that determination based on its application of Virgin-
ia’s discretionary parole eligibility statute, which provides
that a person shall not be eligible for parole if he has three
qualifying convictions. See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151. In
contrast, when determining whether to shorten Townes’
parole, the Board must apply its own regulations and weigh
entirely different considerations, including the best interests
of society.9 In other words, while the body that determined
Townes’ eligibility for discretionary parole is the same as the
one vested with authority to shorten his current term of
parole, the Board’s determination in each instance is based on
entirely different considerations, and there is simply nothing
in the record to support the conclusion that the Board would
likely shorten Townes parole if we issued a decision stating
that it erred in interpreting and applying Virginia’s discretion-
ary parole eligibility statute to Townes. Indeed, there is not
9
The Board has adopted rules and procedures governing the parole pro-
cess. See Virginia Parole Board Policy Manual (Oct. 2006). As relevant
here, the Board’s guidelines provide that "[t]he Board may terminate
active parole supervision pending completion of the parole period at any
time upon a finding that such termination would be in the best interest of
society and the parolee." Id. at 24-25.
24 TOWNES v. JARVIS
even any evidence that the Board would consider the propri-
ety vel non of its parole eligibility determination when deter-
mining whether to shorten Townes’ parole.10

In short, determining whether Townes’ injury is likely to be
redressed depends upon choices that would be made by the
Board — an independent actor not before the Court whose
exercise of legitimate discretion we cannot presume to control
or predict. Indeed, my view is consistent with ASARCO, Inc.
v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989), where a plurality of justices
determined that a party failed to satisfy Article III’s redressa-
bility requirement. There, the plurality stated that "[w]hether
the association’s claims of economic injury would be
redressed by a favorable decision in this case depends on the
unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the
courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion
the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict." Id.
at 614.11
10
In determining whether the Board would be likely to reduce Townes’
parole if we decided that it erroneously denied him consideration for dis-
cretionary parole and thereby possibly extended his period of active incar-
ceration, the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Johnson, 529
U.S. 53 (2000), is instructive. There, the Court rejected the concept of
interchangeability of supervised release and incarceration, holding that a
supervised release term begins to run on the day the prisoner is released
from prison — not the date on which he lawfully should have been
released — because "[s]upervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, dis-
tinct from those served by incarceration," and "[t]he objectives of super-
vised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and
reduce terms of supervised release." Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59. This is also
apparently true under Virginia law. See Virginia Parole Board Policy
Manual, at 1. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, see Maj. Op., at 8-9
n.3, I discuss Johnson, not to establish mootness, but, to illustrate one rea-
son why I believe Townes has not shown that the Board would be likely
to shorten his parole if we issued a decision stating that he was errone-
ously classified as ineligible for discretionary parole.
11
This is not to say that the Board’s decision to classify Townes as ineli-
gible for parole is necessarily insulated from review. It may be that a court
would have jurisdiction to review the Board’s determination if Townes
 TOWNES v. JARVIS 25
III

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. I would dismiss
Townes’ appeal as moot and not address the merits of his
claims.

brought an action for damages, for example a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248-49 (4th
Cir. 2005) (holding that former detainee’s request for injunctive relief is
moot, but his "request for monetary relief is not moot even though [he] has
been released from Jail"). Here, however, Townes filed a habeas action,
not a claim for damages.