UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4400
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TODD ALLEN ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (2:05-cr-00106)
Submitted: October 24, 2007 Decided: November 16, 2007
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T.
Miller, United States Attorney, Kristina D. Raynes, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Todd Allen Robinson was sentenced to twenty-two months of
imprisonment following his guilty plea to violating his supervised
release. On appeal he argues that his revocation proceedings were
conducted in violation of the notice requirements of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32.1(b)(2), and that his sentence is plainly unreasonable. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We find no reversible error committed by the district
court regarding Rule 32.1. Moreover, we do not find that
Robinson’s sentence was plainly unreasonable. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006) (providing review
standard), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1813 (2007). Although the
district court failed to specifically mention by name the 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) factors applicable to
supervised release, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007), the court gave reasons for the sentence, which are mirrored
in § 3553(a), and explained sufficiently why Robinson was given a
sentence outside his advisory sentencing range. See Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007) (noting that “[w]here a
[sentencing] matter is . . . conceptually simple” and the record
makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and
arguments, “we do not believe the law requires the judge to write
more extensively”); United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345
(4th Cir. 2006) (stating sentencing courts need not “robotically
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tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” or “explicitly discuss
every § 3553(a) factor on the record”) (internal quotation and
citations omitted).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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