UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4811
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARL ANTONIO ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (6:06-cr-00012-NKM-2)
Submitted: April 2, 2013 Decided: April 9, 2013
Before KING and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender for the Western
District of Virginia, Christine Madeleine Lee, Research and
Writing Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J.
Heaphy, United States Attorney, Donald R. Wolthuis, Assistant
United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carl Antonio Robinson appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
eighteen months in prison. Robinson asserts that his sentence
is procedurally unreasonable because the district court was not
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006) to consider, as it
did, whether the sentence reflected the seriousness of the
revocation offenses, promoted respect for the law, and provided
just punishment. Having considered this argument, we affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a
district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. B, and
the statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences under
§ 3583(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), the district court
ultimately has broad discretion to revoke supervised release and
impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors
applicable to supervised release revocation and explained its
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reasons for the sentence imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e);
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. Section 3553(a)(2)(A) is not among
the factors cited in § 3583(e) for consideration. A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court “then
decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at
439 (emphasis omitted).
Here, the district court did mention the §
3553(a)(2)(A) factors—the need for the sentence “to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment”—in explaining the sentence imposed.
But the court also specifically relied on other § 3553(a)
factors—“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” and implicitly
referenced the need to protect the public from Robinson's
violent behavior. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). Thus, the
district court’s statement of reasons is not contrary to our
decision in Crudup, 461 F.3d 439-40. The district court
primarily based the revocation sentence on permissible factors,
rendering the resulting sentence not plainly unreasonable. See
United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir. 2007)
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(rejecting per se rule that consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A)
results in unreasonable sentence, plainly or otherwise, and
instead interpreting § 3583(e) as requiring consideration of the
enumerated factors in § 3553(a) without forbidding consideration
of other relevant factors); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d
35, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); cf. United States v. Miqbel,
444 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating in dicta that,
though it did “not suggest that a mere reference to promoting
respect for the law would in itself render a sentence
unreasonable,” it could result in reversible error if the record
failed to establish that permissible factors were properly
considered and formed basis of sentence).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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