UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4687
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RICKY MCKINLEY INGRAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00460-JAB)
Submitted: November 20, 2007 Decided: November 28, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Senior
Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna
Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, David Paul Folmar, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ricky McKinley Ingram appeals his conviction and 262-
month sentence for distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2000). Ingram’s attorney has filed
a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), certifying there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
Ingram has been notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but has not done so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Ingram raises the issue of whether the district court
erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “[T]he
district court has discretion to decide whether a ‘fair and just
reason’ exists upon which to grant a withdrawal.” United States v.
Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 2003). The district court’s
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th
Cir. 1996).
In determining whether a defendant has shown a “fair and
just reason” to withdraw his guilty plea, a court examines the
following six factors: (1) whether the defendant has offered
credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or not voluntary;
(2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal
innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay between the entering
of the plea and the filing of the motion; (4) whether defendant has
had close assistance of competent counsel; (5) whether withdrawal
- 2 -
will cause prejudice to the government; and (6) whether it will
inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. United
States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). The most
important consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a plea,
however, is whether the Rule 11 plea colloquy was properly
conducted. Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414. We closely scrutinize the
Rule 11 hearing and attach a strong presumption that the plea is
final and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding is adequate. United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992). We have
reviewed the transcripts of the Rule 11 proceeding and the
sentencing hearing, and we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Ingram’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
Counsel also suggests that Ingram’s sentence is
unreasonable. In imposing a sentence post-Booker,* courts still
must calculate the applicable guideline range after making the
appropriate findings of fact and consider the range in conjunction
with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). United States v. Moreland, 437
F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).
This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the
statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Rita v. United
*
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
- 3 -
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007). The district court
properly calculated the guideline range and appropriately treated
the sentencing guidelines as advisory. We find that Ingram’s
sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable.
Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the entire record
and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the district court. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 4 -