[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-14231 MAY 18, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 94-00002-CR-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BOBBY LEE INGRAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(May 18, 2009)
Before BIRCH, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bobby Ingram, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence, filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). Ingram’s § 3582(c)(2) motion was based on Amendment 706 to the
Guidelines, which reduced base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine. On
appeal, Ingram argues the district court erred in finding he was not eligible for a
sentence reduction because he was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum
sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Ingram asserts a sentence reduction was
warranted in his case because (1) mitigating circumstances surrounded his offense
and (2) there are unwarranted disparities between the sentences imposed for crack
and powder cocaine offenses, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Kimbrough v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). Finally, Ingram argues that, at his original
sentencing, the district court erred in finding he was responsible for more than 50
grams of crack cocaine.
“We review de novo a district court’s conclusions about the scope of its legal
authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” United States v. James, 548 F.3d 983,
984 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the
case of a defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Any reduction, however, must be
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“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” Id. A reduction of a term of imprisonment is not consistent with
applicable policy statements – and, therefore, not authorized under § 3582(c)(2) –
if the retroactive amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s
applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). This occurs where a
defendant was sentenced to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10, cmt. n.1 (A); United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337, 1339-42 (11th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2008).
Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we determine Ingram’s
arguments are foreclosed by precedent. We have held a district court lacks
authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2), which was set
pursuant to a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Thus the
district court correctly determined a sentence reduction was not warranted because
Ingram was sentenced pursuant to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, which
was not affected by the application of Amendment 706. Williams, 549 F.3d at
1339-42. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and Kimbrough did not provide the district court with an
independent jurisdictional basis to reduce Ingram’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2).
United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2005). Finally, even if
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the district court had possessed jurisdiction to reduce Ingram’s sentence, it would
have been improper for the court to reconsidered the amount of crack cocaine for
which he was held responsible at his original sentencing. United States v. Bravo,
203 F.3d 778, 780-81 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that all other guideline decisions
made during the original sentencing remain unchanged with the sole exception of
the guideline range that has been amended since the original sentencing). For the
foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying Ingram’s motion to
reduce his sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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