UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1040
SHIRLEY MANN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (8:05-cv-00791-HMH)
Submitted: October 26, 2007 Decided: December 10, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Daniel Mayes, MAYES LAW FIRM, Aiken, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Marvin J.
Caughman, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina; Deana R. Ertl-Lombardi, Regional Chief Counsel, Dorrelyn
K. Dietrich, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shirley Mann appeals the district court’s order denying
her motion for attorney’s fees and costs filed pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000). For
the following reasons, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
Mann filed an application for widow’s insurance
disability benefits and supplemental security income benefits. The
applications were denied and reconsideration was denied. Mann
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
After a hearing, the ALJ denied Mann’s applications and the Appeals
Council denied her request for review. Mann filed a complaint in
the district court against the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”), alleging that the Commissioner’s conclusions and
fact findings were not supported by substantial evidence and were
contrary to law and regulations.
The magistrate judge determined that the ALJ’s findings
were supported by substantial evidence and recommended the ALJ’s
decision be affirmed. The district court declined to adopt the
magistrate judge’s report, determined that the ALJ failed to follow
the regulations and erred in discounting the opinions of Drs. Baker
and Hunter, and reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded
the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. After the case was
remanded to the ALJ, Mann filed a motion for attorney’s fees and
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costs. The district court denied the motion for attorney’s fees,
stating:
[t]he court’s decision to reverse and remand for
additional proceedings was based on its finding that the
ALJ failed to provide valid reasons for discrediting Dr.
Hunter and Dr. Baker’s opinions and failed to properly
evaluate Mann’s residual functional capacity. While the
court found that the ALJ’s analysis was incorrect, the
Commissioner’s position was not unreasonable or
inconsistent with established authority. Because the
Commissioner’s position was substantially justified, the
court denies Mann’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.
The EAJA provides that, in actions brought by or against
the United States, attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the other
party if it prevails, unless the United States’ position was
“substantially justified” or special circumstances make an award
unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1). It is the government’s burden to
demonstrate that its position was substantially justified.
Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1991). A
district court’s determination that the government’s position was
substantially justified is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557-59 (1988). For a position
to be substantially justified, it must be “more than merely
undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness,” it must be justified
to a degree as to satisfy a reasonable person. Id. at 565-66.
We conclude that the district court erred by not
providing an explanation for its conclusion that the Commissioner’s
position was substantially justified. See Libas, Ltd. v. United
States, 314 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that for
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appellate review of an EAJA fee award, “it is imperative that the
court explain its rationale supporting its conclusion that the
government’s position was substantially justified”); Kerin v.
United States Postal Serv., 218 F.3d 185, 193 (2d Cir. 2000)
(vacating EAJA fee award because the “lack of a clear explanation
of the reasons for the fee award” handicapped appellate review and
remanding “for a thorough explanation of the reasons”); United
States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 200 F.3d 1076, 1081 (7th Cir. 2000)
(remanding denial of an EAJA fee award for “a thorough explanation
of the reasoning behind the district court’s decision”); United
States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000)
(vacating EAJA fee award and remanding “to the district court for
an explanation of its reasons for the fee award”). While the
district court may be correct in its conclusion that the
Commissioner’s position was substantially justified, we cannot
properly review the district court’s decision without an
explanation of how it reached that decision.
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the district court
and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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