United States v. Singh

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SURENDRA D. SINGH, a/k/a Sam;  No. 06-4338
DILIPKUMAR SOMABHAI PATEL, a/k/a
Dan; JALARAM, INCORPORATED,
Defendants-Appellees.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
 No. 06-4812
DILIPKUMAR SOMABHAI PATEL, a/k/a
Dan,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.  No. 06-4883
SURENDRA D. SINGH, a/k/a Sam,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.
W. Craig Broadwater, District Judge.
(3:05-cr-00006-WCB)
Argued: October 30, 2007
Decided: February 8, 2008
2 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded by
published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Michael and Judge Motz joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stefan Dante Cassella, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laun-
dering Section, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C.; Michael D. Stein, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling,
West Virginia, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Dale P. Kelberman,
MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland; Stephen
Henry Kaufman, OFFIT & KURMAN, Owings Mills, Maryland; Paul
Gregory Taylor, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellees/Cross-
Appellants. ON BRIEF: Thomas E. Johnston, United States Attor-
ney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Katharine Goepp, Asset Forfeiture and
Money Laundering Section, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Timothy
M. Monahan, OFFIT & KURMAN, Owings Mills, Maryland; Robert
C. Stone, Jr., Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Surendra D. Singh.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

These appeals arise from a criminal proceeding in the Northern
District of West Virginia in which defendants Surendra "Sam" Singh,
Dilipkumar "Dan" Patel ("Patel"), and Jalaram, Incorporated (collec-
tively, the "Defendants"), were convicted by jury of a total of fourteen
offenses, including conspiracy to violate the Mann Act, in contraven-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the "Mann Act conspiracy"), ten counts of
violating the Mann Act, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (the
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 3
"Mann Act counts"), conspiracy to commit money laundering, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (the "money laundering conspiracy"),
and two money laundering offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (the "money laundering counts"). More specifi-
cally, each of the Defendants was convicted of eight offenses:

• Singh was convicted of the Mann Act conspiracy (Count
1), five Mann Act counts (Counts 2 through 6), the
money laundering conspiracy (Count 12), and a money
laundering count (Count 13); and

• Patel and Jalaram were each convicted of the Mann Act
conspiracy (Count 1), five Mann Act counts (Counts 7
through 11), the money laundering conspiracy (Count
12), and a money laundering count (Count 14).

The jury also made a criminal forfeiture award to the Government
against the Defendants, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) and § 2253,
of $670,720.36, plus two motels in Martinsburg, West Virginia.

Each of the fourteen offenses of conviction arose from the Defen-
dants’ involvement in an interstate prostitution scheme. After the
jury’s April 2005 verdict, the court, on August 1, 2005, vacated the
Defendants’ convictions on the money laundering conspiracy and
money laundering counts and awarded them a new trial on these
charges. See United States v. Singh, No. 3:05-cr-00006-WCB (N.D.
W. Va. Aug. 1, 2005) (the "August 1 Order"). Additionally, the
August 1 Order vacated Jalaram’s convictions on the Mann Act con-
spiracy and Mann Act counts and granted it a new trial on these
charges as well.1 This Order also vacated the jury’s forfeiture award
as it related to Jalaram. On March 15, 2006, after the Government
sought reconsideration of the August 1 Order, the court granted
reconsideration in part and denied it in part. See United States v.
Singh, No. 3:05-cr-00006-WCB (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 15, 2006) (the
"March 15 Order"). The March 15 Order supplanted the new trial
award to the Defendants on the money laundering conspiracy and
1
After the court’s August 1 Order, the verdict remained intact only as
to the convictions of Singh and Patel on the Mann Act conspiracy and
Mann Act counts.
4 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
money laundering counts with entry of judgments of acquittal. By this
Order, the court declined to reconsider its new trial award to Jalaram
on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act counts.

The Government has appealed the post-trial rulings made against
it by the district court in the August 1 Order and the March 15 Order,
seeking reinstatement of those aspects of the verdict that were set
aside and replaced with judgments of acquittal and a new trial. Singh
and Patel have also appealed, seeking relief from their convictions
and sentences on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act counts. As
explained below, we reverse the post-trial rulings being challenged in
the Government’s appeal, and we reject the appeals of Singh and
Patel. We thus reinstate the verdict as to Singh and Patel on the
money laundering conspiracy and money laundering counts, and as to
Jalaram on the Mann Act conspiracy, the Mann Act counts, the
money laundering conspiracy, and the money laundering counts. We
affirm the convictions of Singh and Patel on the Mann Act conspiracy
and Mann Act counts, reinstate the forfeiture award as to Jalaram, and
remand.

I.

A.

From 2000 to 2003, a prostitution ring known as the "Gold Club"
operated out of the Economy Inn and Scottish Inn motels in Martins-
burg, West Virginia.2 The Gold Club was operated by Susan Powell,
who has pleaded guilty to a federal tax offense and who testified at
trial on behalf of the Government. During the Gold Club’s two-and-
one-half years of operation, Powell employed approximately fifty
prostitutes, using as many as nine motel rooms per day on peak days,
and four or five rooms on average days. All together, the Gold Club
received proceeds from its operations that totalled more than
$670,000. Powell recruited female prostitutes for the Gold Club from
West Virginia and the neighboring states of Maryland and Virginia by
advertising in newspapers in the three states. Each of the out-of-state
2
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as
the prevailing party at trial. See United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301,
304 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005).
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 5
prostitutes who testified acknowledged that, when she travelled to
work in West Virginia, she did so for the purpose of engaging in pros-
titution.

The Gold Club began operating out of the Martinsburg Economy
Inn in approximately March 2000. Powell negotiated a deal in that
regard with Singh, the owner and manager of the Economy Inn and
a Gold Club customer. The basic agreement was that the Economy
Inn would rent rooms to Gold Club prostitutes at a discounted rate of
$40 per day, with the understanding that the rooms would be vacated
by 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. each evening. This arrangement allowed Singh
to rent these rooms again, to legitimate overnight customers who
arrived late in the evening. On some occasions, the Economy Inn
would rent the same room to two different prostitutes on the same day
— one working early in the day and the other coming in later. Powell
would usually communicate with Gold Club prostitutes about their
upcoming appointments by telephoning them through the Economy
Inn’s switchboard. Singh normally operated the switchboard himself
and, before connecting Powell to a prostitute’s room, would discuss
with Powell the appointments of the day.

Initially, the foregoing arrangement between Singh and Powell was
satisfactory to everyone involved with the Gold Club. As the Gold
Club’s operations progressed, however, several prostitutes com-
plained to Powell about paying the Economy Inn for rooms on days
when they had no customers. To mitigate this financial burden, Pow-
ell began to delay booking rooms at the Economy Inn until after cus-
tomers made appointments. These delays caused scheduling problems
for Singh, who needed to know how many rooms to set aside for the
Gold Club’s business on a given day. Accordingly, Singh sought and
secured from Powell a modification of the Gold Club’s rental arrange-
ment: on days the Gold Club’s prostitutes had no customers, they did
not have to pay for their rooms, provided they did not disturb the
rooms and left them in rentable condition; on days that prostitutes had
at least one customer, they would pay after the first customer
departed. Pursuant to this revised arrangement, which became stan-
dard practice, the first daily customer would pay a prostitute in cash
for her services (generally $150 an hour), and the prostitute would in
turn pay $40 to Singh for an Economy Inn room for the balance of
the day, regardless of how many additional customers she had.
6 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
In 2001, Powell decided to transfer the Gold Club’s operations
from the Economy Inn to a new location. Patel, another regular Gold
Club customer, was the manager of the Scottish Inn, a motel in Mar-
tinsburg owned by Jalaram. While Singh was travelling, Powell vis-
ited the Scottish Inn to discuss moving the Gold Club’s operations
there. Suresh Patel was present, identified himself as the Scottish
Inn’s owner, and talked with Powell about the Gold Club.3 Powell
explained to Suresh that she ran an "adult entertainment company"
and was looking for rooms to rent for that purpose. Suresh advised
Powell that she should address the issue with Patel, the Inn’s man-
ager, and scheduled a meeting between Powell and Patel for the next
day.

At the meeting the next day, Patel and Powell discussed the Gold
Club’s arrangement with the Economy Inn, specifically that Singh
gave the Gold Club’s prostitutes a discounted rate of $40 per day at
the Economy Inn and waived the daily fee when a prostitute had no
customers. Patel and Powell discussed the matter further, and then
agreed that the Scottish Inn would match the Economy Inn’s terms
with the Gold Club. As a result, Powell moved the Gold Club’s opera-
tions to the Scottish Inn. When Singh learned of the Scottish Inn’s
arrangement with the Gold Club, he urged Powell to return its busi-
ness to the Economy Inn, but she declined.

Powell ran the Gold Club’s operations at the Scottish Inn as she
had at the Economy Inn. She communicated with the prostitutes
through the Inn’s switchboard and discussed their appointments with
Patel. Like Singh at the Economy Inn, Patel would monitor the Gold
Club’s customers at the Scottish Inn to ensure that the prostitutes paid
for their rooms after their first customer. The prostitutes paid for their
rooms at the Scottish Inn as they had at the Economy Inn: using $40
of the receipts from the first daily customer to pay for a room for the
balance of the day.

As the manager of the Scottish Inn, Patel was responsible for its
daily operations. He registered guests, accepted room rental pay-
ments, and cleaned rooms after they had been occupied. In carrying
3
Suresh Patel was the President of Jalaram and, along with his wife,
was one of its two stockholders.
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 7
out these duties, Patel and his wife lived and worked at the Scottish
Inn seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. Suresh Patel, the
Inn’s owner, visited the Scottish Inn a few times each month, and
would assist at the Inn when, for example, Patel went to the bank.
With the exception of his visits to the bank, Patel was generally pres-
ent at the Scottish Inn and in charge of its operations.

The Gold Club operated out of the Scottish Inn for about six
months in late 2001 and early 2002, but its prostitutes were not happy
there. With Powell’s approval, several of the Gold Club’s prostitutes
returned to the Economy Inn. Consequently, for a short period of time
the Gold Club operated at both motels simultaneously. Eventually,
Powell moved the Gold Club’s operations back to the Economy Inn,
primarily in response to problems involving Patel and the Gold Club’s
prostitutes.4 Patel may well have kept for himself a substantial portion
of the cash payments he received from the prostitutes for the Scottish
Inn rooms. During the period the Gold Club operated at the Scottish
Inn, however, Jalaram received a minimum of $700 from the Gold
Club’s operations. The prosecution contends that, under the evidence,
the payments actually received by Jalaram were several times that
amount.5

After Powell returned the Gold Club’s operations to the Economy
Inn, Patel pleaded with her to bring them back to the Scottish Inn,
stating: "I’m in a lot of trouble. . . . My owner said I had to get your
business back. I’ll even go $38 a day instead of $40, but I must get
your business back." J.A. 245.6 Powell declined this proposal and
4
According to Powell, Patel had propositioned the prostitutes to trade
sex for the $40 room payments and, on certain occasions, used his master
key to enter rooms at the Scottish Inn when a prostitute was with a cus-
tomer.
5
The prosecution contends that Jalaram received substantially more
than $700 from the Gold Club’s operations because that estimate was
reached by using registration forms that the prostitutes completed at the
Scottish Inn. Under the evidence, those forms were only occasionally
filled out by Gold Club prostitutes and probably account for only a small
portion of the payments made by the prostitutes.
6
Citations to "J.A. ____" refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the par-
ties in this appeal.
8 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
continued to operate the Gold Club out of the Economy Inn. The Gold
Club’s operations ceased after a police raid that occurred on July 4,
2003, when Powell was arrested.

B.

On March 14, 2005, a grand jury in the Northern District of West
Virginia returned its fourteen-count superseding indictment charging
the Defendants, plus Suresh Patel, with offenses arising out of the
Gold Club’s operations at the two Martinsburg motels.7 As spelled out
above, the Defendants were charged with two separate conspiracy
offenses: first, the Mann Act conspiracy, in contravention of 18
U.S.C. § 371,8 and, second, the money laundering conspiracy, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).9 Additionally, each defendant was
7
Suresh Patel, the President of Jalaram, was charged in the indictment,
but the jury found him not guilty on all charges.
8
Section 371 of Title 18, under which Count 1 arose, makes it a federal
crime to conspire to commit an offense against the United States. The
Mann Act, the object of the Count 1 conspiracy, and the basis of the
charges in Counts 2 through 11, provides that "[w]hoever knowingly per-
suades [or] induces . . . any individual to travel in interstate . . . com-
merce, . . . to engage in prostitution," shall be fined or imprisoned or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).
9
Pursuant to the conspiracy provision of the money laundering statute,
under which Count 12 was alleged, "[a]ny person who conspires to com-
mit any offense defined in this section . . . shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for . . . the object of the conspiracy." 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h). The promotion money laundering statute, the object of
the Count 12 conspiracy, and the basis of the charges in Counts 13 and
14, provides:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transac-
tion which in fact involves the proceeds of a specified unlawful
activity . . . with the intent to promote the carrying on of speci-
fied unlawful activity [shall be fined or imprisoned, or both].
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The Mann Act is an offense included in the
money laundering statute’s designation of what constitutes a "specified
unlawful activity." See id. at §§ 1956(c)(7)(A) and 1961(1)(B).
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 9
10
charged with five Mann Act counts, plus a money laundering count.
The indictment also contained a criminal forfeiture allegation, made
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) and § 2253, seeking forfeiture of
the Economy Inn and the Scottish Inn, plus the sum of $673,020.11

A jury trial was conducted in Martinsburg over a six-day period in
April 2005, and the jury, on April 20, 2005, returned a guilty verdict
against the Defendants on all fourteen counts. On April 21, 2005, the
jury responded to a special interrogatory on the criminal forfeiture
allegation, finding that $670,072.36 (the aggregate proceeds from the
Gold Club’s operations), plus the Economy Inn and the Scottish Inn,
were subject to forfeiture. The Defendants thereafter filed post-trial
motions and, on August 1, 2005, the district court entered its Order
that first addressed those motions.

By its August 1 Order, the court vacated the Defendants’ convic-
tions on the money laundering conspiracy and money laundering
counts for insufficiency of evidence, and granted the Defendants, pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a new trial on those
charges.12 The money laundering counts flowed from the financial
arrangements made between the two motels, on the one hand, and
Powell and the Gold Club, on the other, whereby a prostitute paid for
10
The Mann Act, named for its sponsor, Congressman Mann of Illi-
nois, was enacted in 1910 as the White Slave Traffic Act. See Judith Res-
nik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale L.J. 1564, 1660-61
(2006). The original Mann Act made it illegal to transport interstate "any
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution, debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose." White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No.
61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424
(2000)). The Mann Act was amended in 1986 to its current version.
11
Section 982(a)(1) is the criminal forfeiture statute for money launder-
ing offenses, including § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (h). At the time of the
offenses alleged in the indictment, § 2253 was the criminal forfeiture
provision for violations of the Mann Act. Insofar as it applies to the
Mann Act, § 2253 has since been repealed and replaced with another for-
feiture provision. That amendment has no bearing on this appeal.
12
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides that "[u]pon the
defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new
trial if the interest of justice so requires."
10 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
her motel room on a given day with a portion of the funds received
from her first customer. The prosecution’s theory was that such room
rental payments constituted financial transactions involving criminal
proceeds intended to promote the carrying on of a "specified unlawful
activity" — i.e., violations of the Mann Act — in contravention of
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). In awarding a new trial to the Defendants on the
money laundering conspiracy and money laundering counts, the court
ruled that, as a matter of law, money laundering had not occurred
because the room rental payments did not involve the "proceeds" of
Mann Act violations.13

In its August 1 Order, the district court also vacated Jalaram’s con-
victions on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act counts, and
granted it a new trial on those charges. Jalaram’s convictions were
based on the prosecution’s theory of corporate criminal liability, i.e.,
that Jalaram was criminally liable for the acts of Suresh Patel, as its
owner, and Patel, as the Scottish Inn’s manager. The court concluded,
however, that there was insufficient evidence to render Jalaram crimi-
nally liable, and ruled that it had erred at trial in failing to instruct the
jury on Patel’s possible status as an independent contractor.

On August 19, 2005, the Government sought reconsideration of the
court’s August 1 Order, asserting that the court had erred in its post-
trial rulings, requesting that the convictions on the money laundering
conspiracy and money laundering counts be reinstated, and urging
that Jalaram’s convictions on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act
counts also be reinstated. On March 15, 2006, the district court
granted partial reconsideration of its August 1 Order. First, on the
money laundering conspiracy and money laundering counts, the
court’s March 15 Order replaced its earlier award of a new trial to the
Defendants with judgments of acquittal, entered pursuant to Rule
29(c).14 Second, on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act counts
13
The district court explained the reasoning for its August 1 Order
orally in a proceeding it conducted on July 22, 2005. See J.A. 610-11.
Although this proceeding was docketed as a post-trial "motions hearing,"
the court referred to it as a "status conference." As a result, we also refer
to the July 22 proceeding as a status conference.
14
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) provides that a defendant
may move for judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, and "the court
may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal."
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 11
against Jalaram, the court declined to reconsider its prior ruling in the
August 1 Order, leaving intact its award of a new trial to Jalaram on
those charges.15

On March 24, 2006, the Government filed a notice of appeal from
the adverse post-trial rulings made by the district court. On July 17,
2006, the district court conducted sentencing proceedings for Singh
and Patel, and sentenced them to fifteen months on each of their six
convictions, with those sentences to run concurrently. Final judg-
ments were entered in the district court on July 28, 2006, and Singh
and Patel have filed timely notices of appeal. On August 28, 2006, we
consolidated these three appeals, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We first assess the contentions made by the Government in its
appeal. In that regard, the Government has appealed (1) the district
court’s March 15 Order granting judgments of acquittal to the Defen-
dants on the money laundering conspiracy and the money laundering
counts, and (2) the court’s earlier award, made in its August 1 Order,
of a new trial to Jalaram on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act
counts.

A.

The Government first contends that it was error for the district
court to award judgments of acquittal to the Defendants on the money
laundering conspiracy and money laundering counts because of an
insufficiency of evidence. We review de novo an award of judgment
of acquittal. See United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 199 (4th Cir.
2004). In assessing such an issue, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, and inquire whether a rational trier
15
The judgments of acquittal on the money laundering conspiracy and
money laundering counts rendered the special interrogatory on criminal
forfeiture moot to the extent it was based on these offenses. Because all
of Jalaram’s convictions were vacated in the post-trial proceedings, the
court could neither impose a forfeiture award against Jalaram nor order
the forfeiture of any of its property.
12 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

The Defendants were each charged, in Counts 13 and 14, with a
single substantive count of money laundering. The statute underlying
those offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), renders it unlawful to
conduct a financial transaction with the intent to promote the commis-
sion or the continuation of a "specified unlawful activity," an offense
commonly referred to as "promotion money laundering." See United
States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 n.14 (4th Cir. 2005) (contrasting
"promotion money laundering" with "concealment money launder-
ing," which may be committed by transfer of funds "to conceal or dis-
guise" their illegal origins). The Defendants were also charged in
Count 12 with the money laundering conspiracy, in contravention of
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

1.

In order to secure a conviction on a promotion money laundering
charge, the prosecution is obliged to prove four elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant conducted or attempted to con-
duct a financial transaction; (2) the transaction involved the proceeds
of a specified unlawful activity; (3) the defendant knew at the time
of the transaction that the property involved proceeds of an unlawful
activity; and (4) the defendant intended to promote the carrying on of
the specified unlawful activity. See United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d
471, 486-87 (4th Cir. 2003). Although the jury convicted the Defen-
dants on the money laundering counts, the trial court, in its August
1 Order, vacated these convictions, as well as the Defendants’ convic-
tions on the money laundering conspiracy, and granted a new trial. On
reconsideration, the court, on March 15, 2006, granted judgments of
acquittal to the Defendants on all three charges. The court’s explana-
tion for the judgments of acquittal was brief, and its March 15 Order
simply referenced its August 1 Order. In the August 1 Order, the court
concluded that the evidence failed to support the guilty verdict on
these counts for the reasons spelled out in the status conference of
July 22, 2005.

At the conference of July 22, 2005, the court, relying primarily on
our decisions in United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826 (4th Cir. 2000),
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 13
and United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1994), addressed
the money laundering issues and orally explained its view that

based upon [these decisions], the payment for the room did
not represent proceeds. And the Court further concludes
under the Government’s theory of the prostitute giving
money to a coconspirator for the room, actually dividing
money amongst the coconspirators, that there was no finan-
cial transaction involved. Butler and Heaps emphasized that
the money laundering statutes were to create a new and dis-
tinct offense away from the underlying crime. Here, the spe-
cific Mann Act violations. The Butler case also held that the
laundering of funds cannot occur in the same transaction
through which the funds first became tainted by a crime.

J.A. 610-11.

As explained below, the Butler and Heaps decisions are readily
distinguishable from this case, and they provide scant support for the
post-trial money laundering rulings of the trial court. In Butler, the
defendant had been convicted of money laundering as well as bank-
ruptcy fraud. See 211 F.3d at 827. On appeal, Butler contended that
his money laundering convictions were defective because they were
premised on the same transactions that had resulted in his bankruptcy
fraud conviction. Id. We concluded that, although "the laundering of
funds cannot occur in the same transaction through which those funds
first become tainted by crime," that legal principle did not assist But-
ler, in that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove
that, at the time the money laundering offense occurred, Butler had
already completed a phase of the bankruptcy fraud. Id. at 830. Ulti-
mately, these facts were sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the
property used in the money laundering transaction was "criminally
derived." Id.

As the Butler decision shows, the district court was correct on July
22, 2005, in explaining that a money laundering offense "cannot
occur in the same transaction through which those funds first became
tainted by crime." J.A. 611. The court was incorrect, however, in con-
cluding that this legal principle somehow nullified the convictions of
the Defendants on the money laundering conspiracy and the money
14 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
laundering counts. In a money laundering offense, the property
involved in the transaction must represent the proceeds of "an already
completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense." But-
ler, 211 F.3d at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this
evidence, a prostitution offense was complete when a Gold Club pros-
titute received money from her customer in exchange for her services.
At the moment the prostitute received those funds, they represented,
on this evidence, the criminally derived proceeds of a Mann Act
offense. From then on, if the other elements of money laundering
were satisfied, a financial transaction involving those funds and pro-
moting the Gold Club’s operations constituted a money laundering
offense.

In response, the Defendants assert that the district court got it right
— a Mann Act violation could not be completed until the prostitute
paid her $40 room charge to the motel, thus precluding any such pay-
ment from constituting a money laundering offense. Unfortunately for
the Defendants, this contention does not pass muster. Put simply,
prostitution offenses can occur in multiple locations, and the use of
motel rooms is not an essential aspect thereof. Because a motel room
is not necessary for prostitution, the Mann Act had already been vio-
lated when the Gold Club prostitutes paid for rooms at the Economy
Inn and Scottish Inn, and these payments were thus made with crimi-
nally derived proceeds.16

In explaining its ruling, the district court also relied on our decision
in Heaps. There, Heaps had delivered drugs on consignment to a third
party, who sold them at retail and paid Heaps from the proceeds. See
16
Even if we were to conclude that a Mann Act violation was not com-
plete until a motel room had been paid for, the Defendants could not pre-
vail. As we recognized in Bolden, "the key inquiry is not whether the
specified unlawful activity was completed prior to the alleged money
laundering transaction," but "whether the specified unlawful activity gen-
erated proceeds prior to the money laundering, and whether the money
laundering actually involved those criminally-derived proceeds." 325
F.3d at 488. Under Bolden, only an identifiable "phase" of the unlawful
activity must be completed prior to the money laundering transaction.
And, at minimum, such a phase of the Mann Act violation was complete
when the first customer of the day paid the prostitute for her services.
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 15
39 F.3d at 484. The jury found Heaps guilty of promotion money
laundering on the basis of such payments, and we reversed. As the
majority explained, the transaction constituted a one time payment on
an antecedent debt that would not support a conviction for promoting
the "carrying on" of a specified unlawful activity. Id. at 485-86. The
Heaps ruling relied on the fact that no evidence had been presented
to show that such payments were made to create goodwill for subse-
quent drug transactions. Id. at 484. Furthermore, we observed that

[n]ot only were there no subsequent drug transactions, but
neither [was there evidence] that the purpose of the payment
was to encourage the defendant to supply more drugs.
Rather, the payment was merely to satisfy a debt of a com-
pleted and, as far as the record shows, the final transaction.

Id.

Contrary to the facts of Heaps, the payments made by the Gold
Club’s prostitutes to Singh and Patel for rooms at the Economy Inn
and Scottish Inn were not one time payments on an antecedent debt.
These payments occurred after a prostitute’s first daily customer,
making the payments part of the prostitution scheme that the Gold
Club operated for more than two years. Moreover, such payments
were made with receipts from the first daily customers, and allowed
the prostitutes to service other customers thereafter. Heaps is thus
readily distinguishable on its facts, and any reliance thereon is mis-
placed.

As a result, the Government presented ample evidence to satisfy
the elements of the money laundering counts. First, a financial trans-
action occurred when a prostitute paid the Inn manager (Singh or
Patel) $40 in cash for the daily use of a room at the Economy Inn or
the Scottish Inn. Second, the $40 payment constituted the criminally
derived proceeds of a Mann Act offense. Third, Singh and Patel both
knew that the $40 payments came from prostitution activities, and had
agreed that the Gold Club’s prostitutes would pay for rooms with cash
received from their first customer each day. Fourth, Singh and Patel
(as well as Suresh Patel) intended to promote the carrying on of
unlawful Mann Act activities, by providing the Gold Club’s prosti-
tutes with discounted room rates. Importantly, Singh and Patel had
16 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
agreed not to require payment from the prostitutes if they had no daily
customers, in order to encourage the Gold Club’s continued use of the
Martinsburg motels. Viewed in the proper light, the evidence satisfies
the elements of promotion money laundering and the court erred in
awarding judgments of acquittal on the money laundering counts.
2.
As mentioned above, the Government’s appeal also challenges the
judgments of acquittal awarded to the Defendants on the money laun-
dering conspiracy. In order to prove that conspiracy, alleged under 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h), the prosecution was obliged to establish that: (1) an
agreement to commit money laundering existed between one or more
persons; (2) the defendant knew that the money laundering proceeds
had been derived from an illegal activity; and (3) the defendant know-
ingly and voluntarily became part of the conspiracy. See Alerre, 430
F.3d at 693-94. As the evidence demonstrated, and pursuant to our
discussion of the money laundering counts, the elements of money
laundering conspiracy were satisfied. Under the evidence, agreements
existed between Powell and the Economy Inn (through Singh), and
also between Powell and the Scottish Inn (through Patel and Suresh
Patel), concerning the Gold Club’s operations and the involvement of
those motels therein. Singh and Patel (as well as Suresh Patel) each
knew the details of the Gold Club’s operations, and they had arranged
with Powell for discounted room rates at the Economy Inn and the
Scottish Inn. Under the evidence, Singh, Patel, and Jalaram thus
entered knowingly and voluntarily into the money laundering conspir-
acy. As a result, the judgments of acquittal on the money laundering
conspiracy must also be vacated.
3.

Because a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, was entitled to find that the money
laundering conspiracy and the money laundering counts had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the convictions of the Defendants
on those offenses, as set forth in Counts 12, 13, and 14, must be reinstat-
ed.17 We are therefore obliged to remand for resentencing on these
counts.
17
The validity of the convictions of Jalaram on the money laundering
conspiracy and money laundering counts (as well as our reinstatement of
them) is dependent upon our resolution of the corporate criminal liability
issue being pursued in the Government’s appeal. See infra Part II.B.
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 17
B.

Next, the Government maintains that the district court erred in
granting a new trial to Jalaram on its convictions on the Mann Act
conspiracy and Mann Act counts. A district court may, in its discre-
tion, award a new trial "if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 33(a). Thus, we review an award of a new trial for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 219 (4th Cir.
2004). Despite this deferential standard, however, we have recognized
that, "[u]nder the applicable legal principles, a trial court ‘should
exercise its discretion to award a new trial sparingly,’ and a jury ver-
dict is not to be overturned except in the rare circumstance when the
evidence ‘weighs heavily’ against it." United States v. Smith, 451
F.3d 209, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Perry, 335
F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003)). We also review a trial court’s jury
instructions for abuse of discretion. See Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens
Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 n.11 (4th Cir. 2003).

In its August 1 Order, the district court concluded that "the evi-
dence adduced at trial does not support the jury’s finding that Dan
Patel was acting in furtherance of the corporation." Prior to issuing
that Order, at the status conference of July 22, 2005, the court
observed that "something of an independent contractor exception
should have occurred," because the evidence showed that "Patel was
acting on his own behalf [and] not for the benefit of the corporation
Jalaram." J.A. 613. As a result, the court, by its August 1 Order,
awarded Jalaram a new trial on its convictions.

We have recognized that "a corporation is liable for the criminal
acts of its employees and agents done within the scope of their
employment with the intent to benefit the corporation." Mylan Labs.,
Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1993). The appropriate
"scope of employment" of such an employee or agent has been
defined to include all those acts falling within the employee’s or
agent’s general line of work, when they are motivated — at least in
part — by an intent to benefit the corporate employer. See United
States v. Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d 399, 406-07 (4th Cir. 1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted).18
18
The terms "employee" and "agent" sometimes have been used inter-
changeably in the context of corporate criminal liability. See Automated
18 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
In this situation, the district court apparently perceived that the evi-
dence failed to establish Jalaram’s corporate criminal liability based
on the conduct of Patel. The court also perceived that, but for instruc-
tional error, Jalaram would have been acquitted. In so ruling, the court
erred, first, in determining, that the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain the finding of corporate criminal liability against Jalaram, and,
second, in concluding that instructional error had occurred. As
explained above, a corporate accused is liable for the criminal acts of
its "employees and agents" acting "within the scope of their employ-
ment" for the "benefit [of] the corporation," Mylan Labs., 2 F.3d at
63, and such liability arises if the employee or agent has acted for his
own benefit as well as that of his employer, see Automated Med.
Labs., 770 F.2d at 407.

Under the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, the court erred in failing to recognize that Patel, as manager
of the Scottish Inn, was an agent of Jalaram, and was acting within
the scope of that relationship when he rented rooms to the Gold
Club’s prostitutes. The court also misperceived the importance of the
fact that Powell first spoke with Jalaram’s President, Suresh Patel,
about moving the Gold Club’s operations to the Scottish Inn —
explaining to him that she ran an "adult entertainment company" and
was looking for rooms to rent for that purpose — and that, in
response, Suresh advised Powell to speak to his manager (Dan Patel)
about this issue. Suresh Patel then actually set up the meeting between
Powell and Dan Patel.19 The evidence demonstrates that Patel thereaf-

Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 406-07. It has been consistently recognized,
however, that an important aspect of a corporate criminal liability issue
is whether the employer or agent (by whichever term utilized) was acting
within the scope of his duties. See id.; see also United States v. Basic
Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1983); Old Monastery Co.
v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945).
19
From this evidence, the jury was entitled to find that Jalaram’s
involvement in the Gold Club’s operations had actually been initiated
and agreed to by Suresh Patel (Jalaram’s President and part owner). As
the Government contends, such an agreement between Suresh and Pow-
ell itself rendered Jalaram criminally liable, without regard to the fact
that Suresh was indicted and acquitted. See United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) ("Whether the jury’s verdict was the result of
carelessness or compromise . . . is immaterial. Juries may indulge in pre-
cisely such motives or vagaries.").
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 19
ter received funds from the Gold Club prostitutes with the intent —
at least in part — of benefitting Jalaram. Jalaram received, by its own
admission, at least $700 from the Gold Club’s prostitution enterprise.
And the jury was entitled to find, under the evidence, that such
receipts substantially exceeded that sum. In these circumstances, the
evidence of Jalaram’s corporate criminal liability did not at all weigh
heavily against the verdict as to Jalaram, but was wholly sufficient to
support it.

Moreover, contrary to the district court’s conclusion that it erred in
instructing the jury, the instructions properly explained the controlling
legal principles on the issue of corporate criminal liability. In this
regard, the jury was instructed on three important legal points:

• A corporation may be responsible for the actions of its
agents done or made within the scope of their authority;

• The term "scope of employment" refers to acts on the
corporation’s behalf in performance of an agent’s gen-
eral line of work. To be acting within the scope of his
employment, those acts must be motivated, at least in
part, by an intent to benefit the corporation; and

• An agent may act for his own benefit while also acting
for the benefit of the corporation.

See J.A. 564-66. As a result, the court made an error of law —
thereby abusing its discretion — in concluding, during the July 22,
2005 status conference, that an independent contractor instruction
should have been given to the jury. See RZS Holdings AVV v. PDVSA
Petroleo S.A., 506 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2007) ("By definition, a
district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.").20
20
Because of our disposition of the corporate criminal liability issue,
we need not reach and dispose of the Government’s alternative conten-
tion that, from a legal standpoint, there is no independent contractor
exception to corporate criminal liability. We note, however, that the
Government makes a compelling argument in that regard, asserting that
the leading treatises recognize, for purposes of imposing crimi-
nal liability, [that] "a court may be unconcerned with technical
20 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
The court further abused its discretion by relying on the perceived
instructional error to award a new trial to Jalaram in the face of trial
evidence that fully supported (rather than weighed heavily against)
the jury’s verdict. See Smith, 451 F.3d at 216-17; Perry, 335 F.3d at
320. The award of a new trial to Jalaram is thus vacated and the ver-
dict is reinstated on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act counts
against Jalaram.21 We remand on those convictions for the appropriate
sentencing proceedings.

III.

Having disposed of the Government’s appeal, we now turn to the
contentions of defendants Singh and Patel in their separate appeals.
They maintain, first of all, that the district court erred in denying their
motions for judgments of acquittal on the Mann Act conspiracy and
Mann Act counts. They also contend that the court erred in declining
to sever their trials, in denying their Batson challenge to the prosecu-
tion’s exercise of a peremptory juror strike, and in excluding evidence
regarding Powell’s daughters’ involvement in the Gold Club’s opera-
tions. We address these contentions in turn.22

distinctions between agents and independent contractors." 1
Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability § 3:05, at 104 (2d ed.
1991) ("The lines of reasoning used to support imposition of cor-
porate liability for criminal misconduct of subordinate employ-
ees have also been advanced to impose liability on a corporation
for acts of those who are not, strictly speaking, its employees.");
see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 13.5(c), at 390-91 (describing limits
on corporate criminal liability, but making no mention of an
independent contractor defense). The rule "prevent[s] corpora-
tions from avoiding liability by simply contracting-out the more
risky elements of their business." Joseph S. Hall, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 549, 553 (1998).
Br. of Appellant 52.
21
As a result of this ruling, sustaining Jalaram’s criminal liability for
the acts of its agents, the money laundering conspiracy and money laun-
dering counts against Jalaram must also be reinstated. See supra note 17.
22
Singh initially presented on appeal a contention concerning the con-
stitutionality of the forfeiture award made against him. The dispute
underlying the forfeiture issue has recently been resolved by the parties,
however, and their joint suggestion of partial mootness, docketed as a
motion for partial dismissal of appeal, is hereby granted. Singh’s chal-
lenge to the forfeiture award is thus dismissed as moot.
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 21
A.

First and foremost, Singh and Patel contend that the district court
erred in failing to award them judgments of acquittal on the Mann Act
conspiracy and Mann Act counts. Again, we review de novo a trial
court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the Government. See United
States v. Midgett, 488 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2007).

In pursuing this contention, Singh and Patel maintain that there was
insufficient evidence to convict them on these charges because there
was no evidence that they had induced the Gold Club’s prostitutes to
travel in interstate commerce, or that they had any knowledge of Pow-
ell’s inducements in that regard.23 The Government’s primary argu-
ment against this contention is that, notwithstanding whether Singh
and Patel had knowledge of such inducements, they had conspired
with Powell and are thus criminally liable on the substantive Mann
Act counts on the principles of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640, 647-48 (1946) (concluding that acts in furtherance of conspiracy
are "attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them respon-
sible for the substantive offense," when those acts are reasonably
foreseeable as necessary or natural consequence of unlawful agree-
ment).

1.

In order to prove the Mann Act conspiracy, alleged under § 371 of
Title 18, the prosecution was obliged to produce evidence that: (1)
there was an agreement to violate the Mann Act; (2) the defendants
knowingly and willingly participated in that conspiratorial endeavor;
and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
See 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also United States v. Tucker, 376 F.3d 236,
238 (4th Cir. 2004). Singh and Patel contend that, although they
agreed with Powell to participate in a prostitution scheme, they were
unaware of the interstate component of the Gold Club’s operations
and thus cannot be convicted of the Mann Act conspiracy.
23
A Mann Act offense has occurred when an accused has knowingly
induced an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in pros-
titution. See supra note 8.
22 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
a.

Contrary to Singh and Patel’s assertion, the evidence established
that they had actual knowledge of the interstate component of the
Gold Club’s operations. The prosecution presented evidence that, on
multiple occasions, Singh and Patel required Gold Club prostitutes to
complete room registration forms, and that, in completing such forms,
the prostitutes listed their out-of-state addresses. For Patel at the Scot-
tish Inn, such registration forms covered the period from July 2001
to January 2002. For Singh at the Economy Inn, such forms were
completed over the period from December 2002 to April 2003.

Singh and Patel maintain, however, that the mere existence of these
registration forms is insufficient proof of their knowledge, because
there is no evidence that either of them actually looked at such forms.
In their view, the lack of such direct evidence is fatal to their Mann
Act conspiracy convictions. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, however, a reasonable jury was entitled
to conclude that, under the circumstances, both Singh and Patel had
examined such forms and were aware of the fact that the Gold Club’s
prostitutes were travelling interstate to engage in prostitution. The
dates of these registration forms show that Patel knew of the interstate
component of the Gold Club’s operations by July 25, 2001, and that
Singh possessed such knowledge by December 21, 2002. As a result,
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Singh and Patel
had knowledge of the interstate component of the Gold Club’s activi-
ties.24
24
Although not at issue on appeal, there may have been a variance
between the allegation and the proof on when the Mann Act conspiracy
began. The indictment specifies that "[f]rom in or about May 2000, and
continuing through about July 4, 2003," the Defendants conspired with
Powell to induce individuals to travel in interstate commerce to engage
in acts of prostitution, in violation of the Mann Act. The date of the first
registration form involving Patel is July 25, 2001, and the date of the first
registration form involving Singh is December 31, 2001. Any variance
between the indictment and the proof was nonprejudicial, however,
because such a variance would not, in these circumstances, "modify the
elements of the charged offense." United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 212,
216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2000).
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 23
b.

Although there was sufficient evidence to establish that Singh and
Patel had knowledge of the interstate component of the Gold Club’s
operations, the lack of such knowledge would not necessarily have
been dispositive in their favor. See United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d
1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993) ("It is of course elementary that one may
be a member of a conspiracy without knowing its full scope, or all its
members, and without taking part in the full range of its activities or
over the whole period of its existence."). As the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized in an analogous case, in order to convict a defendant of conspir-
acy to violate the Mann Act, there must be sufficient evidence to
prove that he

directly agreed to a scheme in which it was known that the
likelihood of illegal interstate transportation was great (it
being understood that such agreement need not be overt, and
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence; and that
directness refers not to face-to-face dealings, but to the
extent of his knowledge of the purpose and scope of the
conspiracy).

Twitchell v. United States, 313 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1963), vacated
in part sub nom. Rogers v. United States, 376 U.S. 188 (1964),
remanded to sub nom. Twitchell v. United States, 330 F.2d 759 (9th
Cir. 1964).

In the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence demon-
strated that it was likely that Powell would be inducing Gold Club
prostitutes to travel in interstate commerce. Both the Economy Inn
and the Scottish Inn are located in Martinsburg, West Virginia, less
than fifteen miles from Virginia and Maryland, and less than thirty
miles from Pennsylvania. The Martinsburg location alone made it
entirely reasonable to conclude that Powell would be soliciting prosti-
tutes from nearby states in the Gold Club’s operations. Because such
inducements to cross state lines were readily foreseeable, this conten-
tion on the Mann Act conspiracy must also be rejected.

2.

We next assess Singh and Patel’s contention that they should have
been awarded judgments of acquittal on the substantive Mann Act
24 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
counts. Based on Pinkerton principles, Singh and Patel, as cocon-
spirators, were responsible for any substantive acts that Powell and
the other conspirators committed that were reasonably foreseeable
and in furtherance of the Mann Act conspiracy. See United States v.
Bonetti, 277 F.3d 441, 447 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that defen-
dant’s "conspiracy conviction makes him liable for all substantive
offenses of his coconspirator that are both reasonably foreseeable and
in furtherance of the conspiracy"). Clearly, Powell’s leading role in
the Gold Club’s operations made her a primary conspirator in the
Mann Act conspiracy. And she acknowledged that she had advertised
in newspapers in both Maryland and Virginia, seeking women to
serve as "escorts" in Martinsburg for the Gold Club. She also
explained that the use of such out-of-state prostitutes was essential to
the Gold Club’s operations, because they were more experienced and
thus easier to manage than in-state prostitutes. Under this evidence,
Powell conspired with both Singh and Patel to violate the Mann Act,
and committed numerous substantive Mann Act offenses, by know-
ingly inducing women to cross state lines for the purpose of engaging
in prostitution. Thus, under Pinkerton principles, the jury was entitled
to find that Singh and Patel were criminally responsible for the
charges alleged in the Mann Act counts.

B.

Singh and Patel next maintain that the district court erred in
excluding evidence of Powell’s bias against them, by precluding their
use of evidence that Powell’s juvenile daughters were involved in the
Gold Club’s operations. At trial, Singh and Patel sought to show that
Powell had agreed to cooperate with the Government in order to pro-
tect her daughters from being prosecuted for their participation in the
Gold Club’s activities. The court, however, barred the use of any such
evidence.

We review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir.
2001). Viewed in this light, this claim of evidentiary error lacks merit.
Powell’s plea agreement was available to the defense, and it does not
include an immunity agreement for Powell’s daughters. Singh and
Patel were thus unable to demonstrate a good faith basis for question-
ing Powell or other witnesses about Powell’s daughters’ possible
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 25
involvement in the Gold Club, and the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in ruling as it did.

C.

Singh and Patel also contend that the prosecution improperly uti-
lized one of its peremptory strikes to remove an African American
juror from the jury panel, in contravention of the principles of Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that Equal Protection Clause
precludes prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on
account of their race). "A finding by the district court concerning
whether a peremptory challenge was exercised for a racially discrimi-
natory reason is given great deference and is thus reviewed only for
clear error." United States v. Blanding, 250 F.3d 858, 860 (4th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the jury selection pro-
ceedings in this trial, an African American woman, the only remain-
ing potential minority juror on the panel, was struck by the
prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge. The Defendants
contend that, in so doing, the Government violated the Batson princi-
ples.

When a party pursues a Batson challenge, the trial court is obliged
to conduct a three-part inquiry. See Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 239
(4th Cir. 2003). First, the objecting party must make a prima facie
showing that the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge on the
basis of race. Id. Second, if such a showing is made, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the
juror. Id. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the objecting
party has carried its burden of proving purposeful racial discrimina-
tion. Id.

At trial, Singh and Patel maintained that the prosecution had
stricken the black female juror for reasons of race. As a result, the
court directed the prosecution to explain the basis for its peremptory
strike. In response, the court was advised that the juror appeared to
be too "anxious to serve on the panel," and that "anybody who really
wants to serve on a panel, we’re worried about." J.A. 114. The court
deemed this explanation to be race-neutral, and thus ruled that the
juror strike did not contravene Batson.
26 UNITED STATES v. SINGH
Singh and Patel contend on appeal that the prosecution’s explana-
tion for the juror strike is not plausible, and thus was a pretext. As we
recognized in United States v. Grimmond, however, the "explanation
need not be persuasive or even plausible, as long as it is neutral." 137
F.3d 823, 834 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
prosecution’s explanation for peremptorily challenging the African
American juror was, on its face, race-neutral. As the trial court recog-
nized, Singh and Patel thus failed to carry their burden of proving that
the explanation was pretextual. As a result, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Batson contention.

D.

Finally, Singh and Patel contend that their trial should have been
severed from their other codefendants, and from each other, and that
the district court erred in denying their severance requests. More spe-
cifically, Singh maintains that the court improperly denied his motion
for a severance because the evidence relating to Patel and Suresh
Patel resulted in severe prejudice to him. Patel, on the other hand,
argues that his trial should have been severed from the prosecution of
Suresh Patel and Jalaram because their defenses were pursued in a
manner prejudicial to him. For example, Suresh Patel and Jalaram
maintained at trial that Patel had been skimming cash from the
receipts of the Scottish Inn for his own benefit, and thus not acting
for the benefit of Jalaram.

We review a district court’s denial of a severance for abuse of dis-
cretion. See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 490 (4th Cir. 2006).
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment if
they are alleged to have "participated in the same act or transaction
or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
offenses." Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Generally, we adhere to the principle
that defendants indicted together should be tried together, and an
appellant must show that he was prejudiced by the denial of a sever-
ance motion in order to establish that the trial court abused its broad
discretion in that regard. See United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d
368, 384 (4th Cir. 2001). "[T]he mere presence of hostility among
defendants . . . or a desire of one to exculpate himself by inculpating
another [are] insufficient grounds to require separate trials." United
States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 474 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
 UNITED STATES v. SINGH 27
marks omitted). In this instance, Singh and Patel failed to show preju-
dice from the denial of their severance motions. They have simply
asserted that some of the evidence concerning their codefendants was
unfavorable to them. As we explained in Najjar, such a situation does
not mandate the award of a trial severance, and the court thus did not
abuse its discretion in denying the severance requests.

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgments of acquittal
awarded to the Defendants on the money laundering conspiracy and
money laundering counts (Counts 12 through 14), as well as the new
trial award made to Jalaram on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann
Act counts (Counts 1 and 7 through 11). We also affirm the convic-
tions of Singh and Patel on the Mann Act conspiracy and Mann Act
counts (Counts 1 through 11). Finally, we dismiss Singh’s challenge
to the forfeiture award as moot. The verdict is hereby reinstated, and
we remand for appropriate sentencing proceedings and for such other
proceedings as may be warranted.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART, AND REMANDED