UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4186
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMIE LEE GROOMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:07-cr-01038-RBH-1)
Submitted: September 16, 2008 Decided: September 18, 2008
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary Sheppard
Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamie Lee Grooms pled guilty pursuant to a written plea
agreement to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). Grooms was sentenced to 180 months’
imprisonment. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court
fully complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
Counsel also questions whether Grooms’s classification as an armed
career criminal complies with the Sixth Amendment. Although Grooms
was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, he
did not do so, and the Government elected not to file a responding
brief.
Because Grooms did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea
in the district court, we review any alleged Rule 11 error for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-26 (4th
Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Grooms must show that an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights. United States v. White, 405 F.3d
208, 215 (4th Cir. 2005). We have reviewed the record and find no
error.
Grooms also contends that his classification as an armed
career criminal violated the Sixth Amendment because it was based
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on prior convictions that were not charged in the indictment and
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, nor admitted. After
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), sentencing courts are
still required to calculate the applicable advisory guideline range
based on appropriate findings of fact. United States v. Moreland,
437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2006). We have previously noted that
sentencing factors should continue to be evaluated based on the
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d
65, 72 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, in United States v. Cheek, 415
F.3d 349, 352-54 (4th Cir. 2005), we specifically determined that
prior convictions used as a basis for enhancement under the Armed
Career Criminal Act need not be charged in the indictment nor
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Grooms, appropriately treating the Sentencing
Guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and considering the
applicable Guidelines range, and weighing the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2000) factors. See United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d
366, 370 (4th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, Grooms’s 180-month
sentence, which is below the lowest end of the applicable
Guidelines range and the statutory minimum, may be presumed
reasonable. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th
Cir. 2007). Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
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discretion in imposing the chosen sentence. See Gall v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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