UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1312
ESTHER COLEMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LOUDOUN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; EDGAR B. HATRICK; ROBERT F. DUPREE,
JR.; MATTHEW BRITT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:07-cv-00091-CMH-TCB)
Submitted: August 28, 2008 Decided: September 29, 2008
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher E. Brown, BROWN, BROWN & BROWN, P.C., Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Julia B. Judkins, Allyson C. Kitchel,
TRICHILO, BANCROFT, McGAVIN, HORVATH & JUDKINS, P.C., Fairfax,
Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Esther Coleman appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Loudoun County School Board, Edgar B.
Hatrick, Robert F. DuPree, Jr., and Matthew Britt, her former
employer, on her wrongful termination charge, filed pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).1 Coleman, an African-American, was
employed as Director of Personnel Services for the Loudoun County
Public Schools (“LCPS”) for approximately two and a half months.
Coleman alleges that her former employer discriminated and
retaliated against her based on her race.
I.
We review the facts in the light most favorable to
Coleman, because this is an appeal from the district court’s
adverse grant of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (noting that all evidence must be
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment). Britt, Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Services
with LCPS, also an African-American, knew Coleman prior to her
application for employment, sat on the interview panel when she was
interviewed, and advocated for and recommended her hiring to
1
Although Coleman also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000), the district court held that she abandoned that claim and
Coleman does not contest this determination on appeal.
2
Hatrick, LCPS Superintendent. Hatrick submitted Coleman’s name to
the School Board and recommended her hiring. Coleman began her job
with LCPS on April 22, 2005. Shortly after Coleman began working,
Britt attested that he met with her to tell her that she was not
working long enough hours, as the Personnel Department was
typically busy hiring and replacing new employees during the month
of April. In addition, he sent Coleman a series of emails
beginning on May 5, 2005, expressing questions, concerns, or
comments suggestive of her failure to perform or complete duties
and assignments.
On June 8, 2005, Coleman participated as a member of an
interview panel for the Director of Elementary Education position,
at which two African-American females and two Caucasian males were
considered. One of the females had been solicited to apply for the
position by Coleman. During Coleman’s candidate’s interview, the
candidate told the panel that within a few days she was to be
announced as principal of a new school in a different school
system, and that if she were offered the LCPS position she would
prefer that the job offer be made to her prior to the announcement
of the other position to which she had committed herself.
In discussing the merits of the candidates and their
qualifications, some panel members expressed concern that Coleman’s
candidate was actively interviewing for their position when her
appointment as a principal for a new school had recently been
3
accepted and was about to be announced, as well as the fact that
they would be unable to complete the hiring process in the limited
time period prior to the announcement being made. Coleman
expressed to the panel members that she felt the votes were lining
up against the two African-American candidates and that the panel
had already pre-selected Dr. Martin, the then Assistant Director
for Elementary Education, who ultimately was given the Director
position. There is no dispute that Martin was qualified for the
position.
On June 10, 2005, Britt held a six-week review meeting
with Coleman to discuss her job performance. Britt had given
Coleman two to three-days’ notice of the meeting, and had prepared
a written document outlining the various issues of concern he
wished to address with Coleman at the meeting. During the meeting,
Britt expressed concerns about Coleman’s leadership abilities and
her promptness in responding to requests from superiors. Among the
issues he addressed with Coleman, he expressed concern that she had
been unable to provide him with continually updated data regarding
personnel hires, remaining vacancies, and outstanding offer
letters, which was crucial to the performance of her job.
Coleman, several days prior to her meeting with Britt,
and in apparent concern that Britt would terminate her employment
during the meeting, prepared a document titled “Respect,” which she
gave to a co-worker and which ultimately made its way to Hatrick,
4
Britt’s supervisor, and to Britt himself in mid-June, and caused
Britt to feel as though he had been “betrayed by [his] Director.”2
While both Britt and Coleman felt the June 10, 2005,
meeting went well, Britt continued to have concerns about Coleman’s
job performance as she remained unable to provide him with the
updated data he requested. On June 29, 2005, Coleman emailed Britt
asking for a meeting to discuss her employment. At the meeting on
June 30, 2005, she asked Britt whether he would give her a positive
reference if she resigned. After consulting with Hatrick, Britt
offered Coleman a severance package in exchange for her resignation
that day, which she appeared inclined to accept, making June 30,
2005, her last day on the job. Coleman thereafter chose not to
resign and termination proceedings were commenced. While she
remained on the payroll for several months thereafter, Coleman
actually was on the job for approximately two and a half months,
2
Coleman testified that she prepared the document as a list of
points to cover with Britt at their June 10th meeting, and gave it
to her co-worker to pass along to Hatrick, Britt’s supervisor, in
case she was terminated during her meeting with Britt. The
document reflects dissatisfaction Coleman had with Britt and
accused Britt of not having respect for “human resource learning
and development,” “human resource time,” “human capacity,” “human
unity,” or “human dignity.” In it, Coleman complains, among other
things, that Britt’s tone “can be harsh and threatening,” that he
needs to give “far more praise than criticism in order to motivate
people,” and intimates that he and his management style are
responsible for a lack of motivation by those subordinate to him.
Among the complaints Coleman listed in the document was that she
“[p]ersonally [] did not know until [she] got on the job] that
[she] was expected to regularly work nights and to be at school
board meetings several nights a month.”
5
from April 22 until June 30, 2005, as the Director of Personnel
Services.
Coleman filed a grievance under the Virginia grievance
procedures and, at the conclusion of an extensive fact-finding
hearing, a three member panel3 unanimously concluded that Coleman
had not been discriminated against based on her race or retaliated
against based on her comments made at the June 8, 2005, interview
panel, and that there were justified job performance issues which
formed the basis of Britt’s and Hatrick’s recommendation for her
termination from employment. Following review of the panel’s
report, the School Board met on June 20, 2006, and voted four-to-
one in favor of accepting the recommendation for termination of
Coleman’s employment. Following issuance of a right-to-sue letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Coleman filed the
instant action.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, applying the same standards that the district court was
required to apply. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 415 (4th
Cir. 2006) (en banc). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
3
The panel included a member selected by Coleman.
6
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c) (West 1992)). The party seeking summary judgment
has the initial burden to show absence of evidence to support the
non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986). The opposing party must demonstrate that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Mere allegations or denials are
insufficient. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case also is
insufficient. Id.; see also Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th
Cir. 1994). As noted above, we construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to Coleman, the non-moving party, and draw all
reasonable inferences in her favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
Coleman’s Complaint alleged that she was subjected to
retaliatory actions4 in violation of her rights under Title VII.
To establish a prima facie case under Title VII for retaliation,
Coleman’s evidence must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in
protected activity under Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse
employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity engaged in by the
plaintiff and the subsequent action taken by the defendant. See
4
Coleman also alleged claims of a hostile work environment,
which claims likewise were rejected by the district court.
However, she has not raised a challenge to this ruling on appeal.
7
Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). Assuming
that a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to
the employer “to rebut the presumption of retaliation by
articulating a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its actions.”
Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff “to show that the reason is mere pretext for
retaliation by proving both that the reason was false and that
discrimination was the real reason for the challenged conduct.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court concluded that Coleman failed to
establish the first and third elements of a prima facie case of
retaliation because there was no protected activity and no causal
connection. In addition, the district court determined that, even
if Coleman had established a prima facie case of retaliation, she
failed to rebut the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons her
employer had for terminating her. There is no dispute that
Coleman’s termination constitutes an adverse employment action.
Plaintiff asserts that she engaged in protected activity
when she complained to the June 8, 2005, hiring committee that she
believed African-American candidates were being treated unfairly,
and that Defendants retaliated against her complaint by terminating
her employment. To have engaged in a protected activity, a
plaintiff must oppose an “employer’s discriminatory activities.”
8
Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259
(4th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “[T]o show
‘protected activity,’ the plaintiff in a Title VI retaliation case
need ‘only . . . prove that he opposed an unlawful employment
practice which he reasonably believed had occurred or was
occurring.’” Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal citations omitted). This requires that the plaintiff:
(1) have a good faith belief that the employer is engaging in an
unlawful employment practice; and (2) that the belief is
objectively reasonable in light of the facts. Id. at 321.
Here, we agree with the district court that even
assuming, arguendo, that Coleman’s belief was in good faith that
the June 8, 2005, panel members considering the candidates for the
Director of Elementary Education position were discriminating
against the African-American candidates, such belief was not
objectively reasonable. There is no evidence whatsoever, other
than Coleman’s own self-serving, unsubstantiated opinions, which is
insufficient to stave off summary judgment,5 that the panel members
discriminated against the African-American candidates. First,
there is no dispute that Martin was qualified for the job,
particularly in light of the fact that he was then currently
employed as the Assistant Director of Elementary Education for
5
See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 455 (4th
Cir. 1989).
9
LCPS. Second, there is no evidence that any of the panel
participants had any racial motive in recommending Martin or in
preferring him over any of the other three candidates, whether
African-American or Caucasian, male or female. Finally, the non-
discriminatory reasons the panel chose not to recommend the hiring
of Coleman’s preferred candidate were clear, legitimate, and non-
discriminatory.6 As Coleman failed to establish that her belief
that the panel was discriminating against African-Americans was
objectively reasonable, and thus did not prove the first element of
her prima facie case of retaliation, we need not reach the question
of whether Coleman established the causation element.
Moreover, even if Coleman had established a prima facie
case of retaliation, we agree with the district court that the
6
That is, that the candidate had accepted the appointment as
principal in a new school, that the announcement of that
appointment was about to take place, and that she was interviewing
for another job. In addition to the ethical and loyalty issues
associated with that situation was the issue relative to the
panel’s being able to complete the hiring process within the time-
frame requested by the candidate. Moreover, Coleman’s argument
that the panel’s discomfort with regard to plaintiff’s candidate’s
newly accepted position was evidence of unfair or discriminatory
treatment because the job application asked whether the applicant
preferred not to have LCPS contact their present employer is
without merit. This was not simply a situation where an employee
wished to keep a job search confidential. Rather, it was a
situation where the candidate had recently accepted, with another
school district, a very visible and important position, which
position was about to be publicly announced, only to turn around
and interview with another school district hoping to acquire what
she apparently thought to be a more desirable position. That the
panel was uncomfortable with this situation, especially where
another well-qualified candidate readily was available, is neither
surprising nor does it constitute evidence of discrimination.
10
employer has offered unrebutted legitimate and non-discriminatory
reasons for terminating Coleman. While she disputes the extent,
timing, and particulars of the employer’s complaints with her job
performance,7 she does not dispute that: (1) Britt, her immediate
supervisor, had sent her a series of emails prior to her
participation on the June 8, 2005, interview panel expressing
questions, concerns, or comments suggestive of her failure to
perform or complete duties and assignments; and (2) she was aware
that he had concerns about her job performance several days prior
to their June 10th meeting, and prior to the June 8th interviews,
prompting her to draft the “Respect” document. Nor has Coleman
demonstrated, despite the extensive record in this case, that the
real reason for her termination was racially based. See Holland,
487 F.3d at 218.
Finally, although not relied upon by the district court,
we note that the same people who hired Coleman for the job, Britt
and Hatrick, one of whom also is African-American, made the
decision ultimately to terminate her, thus powerfully undercutting
her claim of racial discrimination. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d
796, 797, 798 (4th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that “[f]rom the
standpoint of the putative discriminator, it hardly makes sense to
7
We find Coleman’s argument that Britt’s failure to follow
specified performance review guidelines somehow demonstrates
pretext and evidence of his intention to discriminate against her
to be uncompelling.
11
hire workers from a group one dislikes . . . only to fire them once
they are on the job” and concluding that “[w]hen the hirer and
firer are the same individual, there is a powerful inference
relating to the ‘ultimate question’ that discrimination did not
motivate the employer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment and dismissal of Coleman’s action. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
12