UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4644
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES PALMER, a/k/a Charles Stallworth, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:07-cr-00190-1)
Submitted: November 5, 2008 Decided: November 20, 2008
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Christian M. Capece, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T.
Miller, United States Attorney, Joshua C. Hanks, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Palmer pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and
was sentenced to seventy months’ imprisonment. Although Palmer
does not contest on appeal the district court’s calculation of
the advisory guidelines range, he asserts two sentencing errors.
First, Palmer argues that the court erred by imposing a sentence
greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing as
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Second, he contends
that the advisory guidelines range applied to him both
overstates the seriousness of his conduct and does not
sufficiently address his recent attempts to change his life. We
affirm.
We review sentences for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
586, 597 (2007); United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74
(4th Cir. 2007). This court may afford sentences that fall
within the properly calculated guidelines range a presumption of
reasonableness. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473; see Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (upholding presumption of
reasonableness of within-guidelines sentence). This presumption
can be rebutted only by showing “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2
2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here,
the district court properly calculated the guidelines range and
correctly treated the sentencing guidelines as advisory.
In determining an appropriate sentence, a district
court “need not robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every
subsection,” but should “provide [this court] an assurance that
the sentencing court considered the § 3553(a) factors with
regard to the particular defendant.” United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Here, the district court explained that it
had considered both the § 3553(a) factors and the advisory
guideline range. Moreover, the court stated that it believed
the sentence was appropriate when viewed in light of the
particular circumstances of the offense, Palmer’s repeated
criminal convictions, and the need to protect the public from
Palmer’s further criminal acts. Accordingly, we find that the
seventy-month sentence, which is within the advisory guidelines
range, is reasonable. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462.
Because we reject Palmer’s challenge to his sentence,
we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
addressed in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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