UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4310
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICHARD MORRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00321-RDB-1)
Submitted: October 17, 2008 Decided: January 12, 2009
Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Denise C. Barrett, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod
J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, A. David Copperthite,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Morris was charged in a one count indictment with
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture
or substance containing cocaine base and a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of marijuana. Morris subsequently
filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements and
evidence seized from his home and two vehicles. The district court
denied Morris’ motion, finding that the police had a reasonable
articulable suspicion to seize Morris, and therefore, the search of
his BMW and the later searches of his home and Lexus were
constitutional. Morris then entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s order denying
his suppression motion. The district court sentenced Morris to 240
months’ imprisonment. Morris timely noted his appeal and argues
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress as the
officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize him. We
affirm.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from “unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government, and its protections extend
to brief investigatory stops . . . that fall short of traditional
arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2000)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In the context of investigatory detentions, the
Supreme Court has held that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
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police officers may conduct an investigatory stop if officers have
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry,
392 U.S. at 31; see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
Such an investigatory stop must be based on "at least a minimal
level of objective justification" but the standard for reasonable
suspicion is less demanding than for probable cause. Wardlow, 528
U.S. at 123.
In assessing whether officers had a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, this court must consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the seizure. United States v. Sprinkle,
106 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1997)(quoting United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)). “Reasonable
suspicion is a commonsensical proposition. Courts are not remiss
in crediting the practical experience of officers who observe on a
daily basis what transpires on the streets.” United States
v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993).
To establish reasonable articulable suspicion, an officer
must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27) (internal quotations omitted)).
However, reasonable articulable suspicion may be established by a
series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent when viewed
separately, but when viewed in the aggregate by a trained police
officer warrant further investigation. See id. at 9-10 (quoting
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). In assessing whether reasonable suspicion
existed, the facts, whether seemingly innocent or obviously
incriminating, are to “be assessed in light of their effect on the
respective officer’s perception of the situation at hand.” United
States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 414 (4th Cir. 2008). Even when each
fact alone may be susceptible of an innocent explanation, “the
question is whether taken together they are sufficient to form a
particularized and objective basis for an officer’s suspicions.”
United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 365-66 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Here, when the officers seized Morris, they had
reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaged or about to
engage in a drug transaction. The officers were in a high crime
area known for narcotics activity. The officers observed Morris
but believed he was his brother, Weldon Pendleton, whom the
officers had arrested previously in that vicinity for narcotics
dealing.* Although Morris stopped at a gas station and appeared to
enter the gas station convenience store, he purchased neither gas
nor any items from the store. He was, however, talking on a cell
phone. After leaving the store, Morris met up with a young man,
who was talking on a cell phone, who had come running across the
*
Morris and Pendleton are apparently so similar in appearance
that the district court, in looking at photos of the two men,
believed at first they were twins.
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parking lot from the other side of the street. The two men spoke
for a minute, looked in the officers’ direction, and then walked
back into the store and out of the officers’ line of sight. Both
men then emerged from the store, got into the BMW and left.
However, Morris did not leave the area but executed a
series of right hand turns and pulled back into the gas station
parking lot one to two minutes after first leaving the lot.
Detective Campbell testified that he became suspicious of Morris
from the moment he first emerged from the convenience store and met
up with the young man because, during his nine years working in
various drug units, he had observed drug transactions occur in
similar situations. His suspicions were heightened by Morris’
driving behavior as he had also observed similar activity in the
past, which indicated to him a drug deal was occurring in the BMW.
Accordingly, when Detective Brooks seized Morris by ordering him at
gunpoint to get back into the BMW, he did so only after the
officers developed reasonable suspicion that Morris was involved in
a drug transaction. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
553 (1980); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
Based on the facts by the district court, we affirm the
order denying Morris’ motion to suppress. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions of the parties are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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