UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4820
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS HERMAN MORRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-
cr-00029-RWT-1)
Submitted: May 17, 2012 Decided: May 25, 2012
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph M. Owens, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Adam K. Ake, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Herman Morris appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result
of a search and seizure by Officer Juan Nolasco. Morris entered
a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm as a
convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) but preserved
his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
On appeal, Morris argues that the district court erred
in failing to suppress the evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. We review the factual findings underlying a
district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634
F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial of a
suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. Id.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer
has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that
criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). A
“seizure” warranting Fourth Amendment protection occurs when, in
view of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person
would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate the
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encounter. United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 653 (4th
Cir. 1996). Police officers may approach an individual on a
public street and ask questions without implicating the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991). The general rule is that a seizure “requires either
physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the
assertion of authority.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
626 (1991).
Morris contends that Officer Nolasco violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an investigatory stop
without sufficient articulable suspicion. The district court
found that Officer Nolasco observed Morris riding a bicycle in
the middle of the street, late at night, swerving across the
lanes. Officer Nolasco drove alongside Morris to ask him if he
felt well enough to ride. Morris did not respond. Officer
Nolasco then asked Morris to approach the car and produce
identification. When the Officer began to exit his vehicle,
Morris threw down his bicycle and began to flee. The district
court determined that, even if Officer Nolasco’s inquiries
amounted to an investigatory stop, his conduct was justified by
reasonable suspicion that Morris had operated his bicycle in
violation of Maryland’s traffic laws. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann.,
Transp. § 21-1202 (“Every person operating a bicycle . . . is
subject to all the duties required of the driver of a vehicle .
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. . .”). We agree and therefore reject Morris’s argument that
this encounter violated the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, although Morris was unquestionably seized
after he fled and then subsequently reached into his waistband,
we conclude that this conduct provided Officer Nolasco with
sufficient suspicion to effectuate a seizure at that point. See
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2006) (unprovoked
flight provides cause for an investigative stop); United States
v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004) (under totality of
circumstances approach, due weight is given to common sense
judgment of officer).
We therefore affirm the ruling of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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