UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-6581
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
CORNELL M. TAYLOR,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District
Judge. (5:06-HC-02196-br)
Submitted: February 19, 2009 Decided: February 23, 2009
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas R. Wilson, GREENE & WILSON, P.A., New Bern, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, David
T. Huband, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cornell M. Taylor appeals from the district court’s
order finding that he had violated the terms of his conditional
release and recommitting him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246
(2006). On appeal, Taylor contends that the court erred in
revoking his conditional release because there was insufficient
evidence of Taylor’s risk to person or property in the community
and the court failed to make factual findings on the statutory
elements of conditional release. Finding no error, we affirm.
To be permitted to remain on conditional release in
the community after a civil commitment, Taylor must have
recovered from his mental disease or defect to such extent that
his release would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another person or serious damage to property of
another. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e). A district court’s denial of
release under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) is a factual determination
that will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Woods, 995 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). “A
finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239
(4th Cir. 2007).
2
We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in revoking Taylor’s conditional release. Taylor admitted
violating the terms of his release on two occasions when he left
his living facility, consumed alcohol, and returned to the
facility. After consumption, Taylor was not immediately able to
take his prescribed medications. Following the second incident,
Taylor stated that he could not cope with the conditional
release plan.
The district court shall remand a conditionally
released person to a suitable facility if it finds that (1) the
person has “fail[ed] to comply with the prescribed regimen of
medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment;” and
(2) that in light of the person’s failure, “his continued
release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to property of another.” 18
U.S.C. § 4246(f). The court previously found by clear and
convincing evidence that without commitment, there is a
substantial risk of bodily injury. Use of alcohol and failure
to take prescribed medications are “major factors in determining
potential dangerousness.” United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966,
970 (8th Cir. 1994).
Taylor also argues that the district court erred by
failing to place facts related to his violations on the record
or in the order revoking his conditional release. However, the
3
full record before the court supported the court’s findings.
Further, the motions and letters regarding Taylor’s conduct were
served on counsel and received and submitted to the court prior
to sentencing. We therefore conclude that the district court’s
findings are sufficient and it did not clearly err in revoking
Taylor’s conditional release.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
revoking conditional release. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4