Pena v. Porter

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-1768

MANUEL PENA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY RAY PORTER; JAMES BENNETT BARBOUR; JASON GLENN
BARNES; THE TOWN OF CLAYTON, The Town of Clayton, NC,

Defendants – Appellants.

--------------------

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL
FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED,

Amicus Supporting Appellee.

No. 07-1891

MANUEL PENA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY RAY PORTER; JAMES BENNETT BARBOUR; JASON GLENN
BARNES; THE TOWN OF CLAYTON, The Town of Clayton, NC,

Defendants – Appellees.

--------------------
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL
FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED,

Amicus Supporting Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:04-cv-00970-BR)

Argued: September 24, 2008 Decided: March 13, 2009

Before MICHAEL and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and Richard L.
VOORHEES, United States District Judge for the Western District
of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part without
prejudice, and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Voorhees
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Michael and Judge Traxler
joined.

ARGUED: Dan McCord Hartzog, CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG, L.L.P.,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Douglas Everette Kingsbery, THARRINGTON SMITH, L.L.P., Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Kari R.
Johnson, CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG, L.L.P., Raleigh, North
Carolina; Brian E. Edes, CROSSLEY, MCINTOSH & COLLIER,
Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Wade M. Smith, Denise Walker, THARRINGTON SMITH, L.L.P.,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Katherine Lewis Parker, Legal Director, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Amicus Supporting Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2
VOORHEES, District Judge:

This case stems from a police shooting. Plaintiff filed

suit in federal district court alleging, inter alia, excessive

force, illegal search of his curtilage, racial discrimination in

both the search of his curtilage and the use of force, and

various state law claims. The district court issued an order

granting summary judgment in part to both sides and granting and

denying qualified immunity in part, and each side now appeals

certain aspects of this decision. For the reasons stated below,

we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Around 10:00 p.m. on a cold February 2, 2004, two probation

officers attempted to arrest Rudolpho Gonzales (hereinafter

“Gonzales”) for probation violations. After the probation

officers handcuffed Gonzales, he escaped by simply running away.

Unable to find him, the probation officers called the Clayton,

North Carolina Police Department for assistance.

Officer Jeffrey Porter (hereinafter “Officer Porter,” or

collectively “Officers”) responded to the call around 10:25 p.m.

After conferring with the probation officers, Officer Porter

attempted to track Gonzales with his K-9. Officer Porter

followed the K-9 north to an American Legion hall, which is

3
across the street from Gonzales’s home. At this point, the K-9

stopped tracking. Officer Porter and the probation officers

decided to terminate their search, but Officer Porter promised

to remain vigilant. The probation officers returned to search

Gonzales’s home again but ultimately ended their search for the

night.

At approximately 10:45 p.m., Officer Porter and his partner

decided to search the area south of the Gonzales home.

Unsuccessful, Officer Porter then met Officers James Barbour and

Jason Barnes to discuss the situation. Together, the Officers

decided to reconstitute their search for Gonzales in the area

south of Gonzales’s trailer. While Officer Porter searched for

Gonzales around Main Street, Officers Barbour and Barnes

searched near the local train tracks.

When this search proved fruitless, Officer Barbour

suggested to Officer Barnes that Gonzales might have sought

shelter because of the snow and proposed searching the property

of Hector Pena, which was roughly 500 feet from the American

Legion hall. A wood-line ran behind the American Legion hall to

the rear of the Pena property and beyond. According to the

Officers, this wood-line offered the path of least resistance

for an escapee, thus making it a likely route for Gonzales. As

Officers Barbour and Barnes headed toward the Pena property,

Officer Porter decided to join them.

4
 Although there were approximately forty other homes or

trailers in the same general area, Officer Barbour was already

familiar with the Pena property, having been there on two

previous occasions to investigate a suspicious death and a

domestic disturbance. As a result of these encounters, Officer

Barbour felt that Hector Pena was “a little crooked” and might

be inclined to assist Gonzales. Based on his prior experiences,

Officer Barbour also knew that the Pena property contained

several uninhabited structures which could shelter Gonzales from

the cold and construction equipment which might be useful for

cutting handcuffs. Additionally, Officers Porter and Barbour

thought that Hector Pena would be more likely to assist Gonzales

since the two men were both Hispanic and shared a common

language. As Officer Porter explained, “It’s been my experience

in dealing with the Hispanic community that they tend to help

one another more so than what Americans do.” J.A. 471.

The Officers arrived at the Pena property around 11:18 p.m.

A house, two trailers, several uninhabited storage sheds,

chicken coops, and construction equipment utilized in Hector

Pena’s concrete pouring business occupied the property, which

was fronted by Liberty Lane, a public road. A private driveway

bisected the Pena property and provided access from the public

road to the rear of the property. To the left of the driveway,

5
Hector Pena lived with his family in a house facing Liberty

Lane.

Manuel Pena (hereinafter “Pena”), Hector Pena’s father,

lived further back from the street in a trailer that was located

behind Hector Pena’s house and likewise sat to the left of the

driveway. Pena’s trailer was positioned with its front door and

access porch facing the rear of the Pena property. A six-foot

tall privacy fence screened the trailer from Hector Pena’s house

and the public road beyond. This fence ran along the back side

of the trailer (opposite from the front door), parallel to both

the length of the trailer and the public road. The three foot

wide area between the trailer and the privacy fence was enclosed

on one end by a camper shell and potted plants and on the other

end by storage barrels and crates. Within this space, Pena

stored toys for his grandchildren and other supplies. Nearby

were several chicken coops kept by Pena, which housed

approximately 80 chickens. 1

Slightly farther back from the road and on the right side

of the driveway sat another trailer, which housed some of Hector

Pena’s employees. Scattered around this trailer and Pena’s

trailer were several storage sheds, construction equipment,
1
Although Hector Pena had legal title to all of the land
herein described as the “Pena property,” Manuel Pena had
exclusive use and control of the property on which his trailer
was sited.

6
cars, and a goat pen, in addition to the aforementioned chicken

coops.

The Officers state that they approached the Pena property

intending to canvass the area and to investigate the

disappearance of Gonzales. According to the Officers, they

planned to knock on doors and hoped to find someone who had

relevant information. When the Officers arrived, there were no

lights on in any of the residences. After turning down the

driveway, Officer Barbour first approached the trailer on the

right and knocked, but he received no answer. Officer Porter

then proceeded to knock on Pena’s trailer door. There was no

response there either. Officer Porter also peered into this

trailer’s window, but he did not see anyone at this time.

After receiving no answer, Officer Porter instructed the

other officers to continue looking around. The Officers began

walking around the area, shining their flashlights and searching

for Gonzales. The Officers checked vehicles, outbuildings, and

along the chicken coops to see if Gonzales might be hiding

anywhere. The Officers also searched the three foot wide space

between Pena’s trailer and the privacy fence. During this time,

the Officers became suspicious because they discovered burning

candles, raw meat, beer cans, and a smoldering fire, which

indicated to the Officers that people had recently left the

property in a hurry.

7
 Before leaving, Officer Porter decided to return to the

porch of Pena’s trailer. Officer Porter shined his flashlight

through the window next to the door and this time observed Pena

asleep on his bed, and Officer Barbour joined Porter on the

porch and confirmed this observation. Officer Barbour then

knocked on the door of Pena’s trailer a second time, while

Barnes and Porter stood off of the porch on either side of the

door. As he knocked on the door and window, Officer Barbour

stated “mucho panucho,” 2 which, translated loosely, is Spanish

slang for “a lot of vagina.” At some point shortly after this,

Pena came to the door.

When Pena opened the door, he was holding a rifle in one

hand. Upon observing this, Officer Porter shouted that Pena had

a gun, and Officer Barbour jumped off of the porch. At the

same time or shortly thereafter, Officer Porter fired two shots

that struck Pena in the upper torso and right arm.

Subsequently, Officer Porter and Officer Barbour fired an

additional fourteen shots into the trailer.

2
This is the spelling used in the transcripts of the
depositions given by the Officers. In Pena’s complaint, the
word is rendered “penucho.” The correct spelling may in fact be
“panocha.” Regardless, the court will use the spelling
“panucho” throughout this opinion. Since this is the spelling
provided in the transcript of the Officers’ depositions, it
probably resembles what was said by Officer Barbour on the night
in question most closely.

8
 Other than these few general facts, the parties dispute the

details of the shooting. Pena admits that he drank at least

eight beers while having a cookout with friends earlier in the

evening and then fell asleep “hard.” 3 Pena asserts that he was

not aroused by the knocking on the door and window but rather by

the sound of his dogs and chickens. According to Pena, he

grabbed his rifle fearing that a fox or other predator was

raiding his chicken coops. Although Pena acknowledges going to

the door with the rifle, he claims that he held it lowered and

in his right hand as he opened the door with his left hand.

Pena states that he observed the Officers and their badges, but

he avers that the Officers never identified themselves as

police, either before or after he came to the door. Pena

contends that the Officers immediately opened fire on him,

without giving any warning or instructions. Pena denies staring

or looking at any one officer prior to being shot.

After being struck by the first two bullets fired by

Officer Porter, Pena asserts that he fell back inside and that

the spring-hinged door closed automatically. As the door began

to close, Pena alleges that Officers Porter and Barbour fired

the subsequent fourteen shots into the trailer and through the

trailer door. Pena says that he avoided the subsequent fourteen
3
When measured at the hospital after the shooting, Pena’s
blood alcohol level was .204 mg/dL.

9
shots only because the first two shots had knocked him to the

floor. In contrast with the Officers’ testimony, Pena does not

recall opening the door and threatening the Officers again.

However, Pena remembers little after he fell to the floor.

For their part, the Officers state that after Officer

Porter identified the gun to the others, Officers Barbour and

Barnes sought refuge behind a car and another trailer,

respectively. Officer Porter remained in his original position,

which was in the open about ten to fifteen feet from Pena’s

trailer.

Officer Porter contends that all three Officers ordered

Pena to drop the gun and to put his hands up. 4 Throughout the

confrontation, Officer Porter claims that Pena was uneasy on his

feet. Officer Porter also claims that upon coming to the door,

Pena began to look around and that Pena’s eyes then appeared to

lock onto him. According to Officer Porter, at this point Pena

began to shoulder his gun. Fearing for his safety, Officer

4
The testimony of the other officers is similar to the
testimony of Officer Porter. Officer Barbour testified that
Officer Porter said “drop your weapon” twice before opening fire
and that numerous other commands were given in Spanish and
English as the events unfolded. Officer Barnes’s statement to
the SBI after the shooting recounted that both Officer Barbour
and Officer Porter commanded Pena to put the gun down repeatedly
and that Officer Barbour was also saying “put your hands up” in
Spanish, although the timing of these commands is not entirely
clear from Officer Barnes’s statement.

10
Porter says that only then did he fire the first two shots at

Pena.

After the first two shots were fired, the Officers state

that Pena stumbled back inside, and the door closed. The

Officers further state that seconds later, the door reopened and

Pena was still holding the gun in a threatening manner. The

Officers assert that they again ordered Pena to drop the gun and

that Pena again locked his eyes onto Officer Porter. Officers

Porter and Barbour then directed a total of fourteen subsequent

shots at Pena, none of which struck their intended target.

Officer Barnes lacked a clear line of fire and never discharged

his weapon. At this point, the Officers testify that Pena again

retreated into his trailer, whereupon Officer Porter ordered the

Officers to cease fire. After the Officers radioed for

assistance, they state that Pena opened the door a third time,

stepped out unarmed onto the trailer’s small front porch, placed

his hands on the porch railing, and collapsed.

Pena filed a complaint on December 22, 2004 alleging, inter

alia, violations of the federal and North Carolina constitutions

for use of excessive force and illegal search and seizure, as

well as state common law claims of invasion of privacy,

trespass, assault, battery, gross negligence, and damage to

property. The complaint was amended in January 2006 to include

a claim for punitive damages and two additional claims brought

11
under the federal constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which

alleged that both the Officers’ search of Pena’s property and

the Officers’ use of force against Pena were racially motivated

and thus discriminatory. In March 2006, the Officers moved for

summary judgment as to all claims, and Pena moved for summary

judgment on his claims regarding the search of his curtilage and

his bedroom. The district court granted both motions in part

and denied both motions in part. This appeal was timely filed

by the Officers, and Pena subsequently and timely filed a cross-

appeal.

II.

A.

The Officers ask this court to review an order denying

qualified immunity. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court

may review any “final decisions” of a district court. “Because

qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate . . .

it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go

to trial.” Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, Md., 309

F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Thus, under

the collateral order doctrine, an order of a district court

rejecting the defense of qualified immunity is final for the

purposes of § 1291. Id. However, our review of orders denying

summary judgment based on qualified immunity is limited to a

12
review of the legal issues, such as whether there was a

violation of law and whether this law was clearly established.

Id. (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)). This court

reviews such issues of law de novo. See Washington v. Wilmore,

407 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2005). In so doing, this court must

accept the facts as viewed by the district court, and this court

may not review whether the non-moving party presented evidence

sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact. See

Gray-Hopkins, 309 F.3d at 229.

B.

The parties also ask this court to review portions of the

district court decision granting qualified immunity and granting

or denying summary judgment. Because these decisions are not

appealable as final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or as

collateral orders under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541 (1949), the parties ask this court to exercise

pendent appellate jurisdiction to review these rulings.

Pendent appellate jurisdiction allows this court to

consider issues that would not otherwise be immediately

appealable if the factual and legal issues involved are

“inextricably intertwined” with the questions that are properly

before this court on interlocutory appeal. See Swint v.

Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995); Rux v. Sudan,

461 F.3d 461, 474-75 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “[p]endent

13
appellate jurisdiction is an exception of limited and narrow

application driven by considerations of need, rather than

efficiency.” Rux, 461 F.3d at 475. As such, it is not

sufficient for the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction

that two legal issues arise from the same set of facts.

Instead, issues are “inextricably intertwined” only (1) when

this court must decide a pendent issue to ensure effective

review of the claims properly raised on interlocutory appeal or

(2) when resolution of a properly appealed issue necessarily

resolves the pendent issue. Id. at 476. Furthermore, the

decision to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction is purely

discretionary. Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 549 n.2 (4th Cir.

2002). When relevant, the availability of pendent appellate

jurisdiction will be discussed in our analysis of the specific

claims presented on appeal.

III.

A seizure accomplished with the use of excessive force is

unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. See Waterman,

393 F.3d at 476 (citing Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527

(4th Cir. 2003)). In determining reasonableness, a court must

weigh the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s right against the countervailing government

interest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). A court

14
reviewing an excessive use of force claim must determine whether

the force employed was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances and at the moment of action. See Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396-99. In so doing, a court must pay “careful attention to

the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. at

396. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.

(citation omitted).

The use of deadly force by a police officer is reasonable

when the officer has “probable cause” to believe that the

suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer

or to others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

Where a suspect poses no immediate threat, the use of deadly

force is not justified. However, “if the suspect threatens the

officer with a weapon . . . deadly force may be used if

necessary . . . and if, where feasible, some warning has been

given.” Id. at 11-12.

A.

The district court found that there were genuine issues of

material fact precluding summary judgment on Pena’s excessive

force claim regarding the first two shots fired by Officer

Porter. Until these issues could be resolved, the district

15
court held that it was unable to rule on the issue of qualified

immunity with respect to this claim. We agree.

Generally, government officials performing discretionary

functions are granted qualified immunity and are thus “shielded

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). A defense of qualified

immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law’,” and it “protects law enforcement

officers from ‘bad guesses in gray areas’ and ensures that they

are liable only ‘for transgressing bright lines’.” Waterman v.

Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

A court evaluating a defense of qualified immunity first must

determine whether the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional

right. If this is the case, the court then looks to see if that

right was clearly established at the time of the violation. See

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Only when both of

these questions are answered in the affirmative is the defense

of qualified immunity unavailable. 5

5
Although this sequential, two-step procedure is no longer
mandatory in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, __ S. Ct. __ (2009), it may
still be followed where appropriate, as in the present case.

16
 Regarding the first two shots, the district court found

these few undisputed facts: Pena was asleep inside his trailer,

he awoke and came to the door carrying a rifle, he opened the

door, and Officer Porter shot him twice in the upper body. For

the remaining factual issues, the district court accepted, as it

was required to do, the facts as described by Pena. According

to Pena’s testimony, Pena opened his door with his rifle pointed

down; he did not threaten the Officers in any manner; no

warnings or commands were given; and Pena was shot almost

immediately. The district court concluded that under this

version of the events there was sufficient evidence to overcome

qualified immunity and to support a claim against Officer

Porter. We agree. If this version of the facts is accepted,

Pena would pose no immediate threat unless and until he aimed

his gun at the Officers, and thus Officer Porter’s use of deadly

force in this situation would be unreasonable and in violation

of clearly established law.

The Officers argue, however, that any disputed facts are

irrelevant when deciding the issue of qualified immunity.

Regardless of how the events in this case unfolded, the Officers

assert that the initial use of force was reasonable simply

because Pena was carrying a gun. As support for this claim, the

Officers point to several cases from this circuit holding that

deadly force was justified in part because the shooting victim

17
was armed. However, these cases do not stand for a principle as

broad as the one articulated by the Officers. The

reasonableness of deadly force must always be adjudged in light

of all of the circumstances surrounding the use of force.

Although the presence of a weapon (or the reasonable belief that

the victim possesses a weapon) is an important factor when

determining reasonableness, it is not the only factor. Contrary

to the Officers’ interpretation, the police do not have the

unfettered authority to shoot any member of the public carrying

a gun or other weapon.

In all of the cases cited by the Officers, other

circumstances, in addition to the fact that the suspect was

armed, were present which gave police the necessary “probable

cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of physical

harm, either to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.

For instance, in Elliot v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996),

the suspect and subsequent shooting victim was arrested,

handcuffed, and placed in the back of a police car. Despite

this, the suspect still managed to point a gun at the police

officers before being shot. In Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213

(4th Cir. 1991), the suspect was stopped as part of a narcotics

sting and refused to follow the officer’s directions to place

his hands where they could be seen. Similarly, in Anderson v.

Russell, 247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2001), the officers ordered a

18
man suspected of carrying a gun inside a shopping mall to get on

his hands and knees. The man initially complied, but he was

shot by a police officer after he lowered his hands and reached

behind his back towards a bulge under his clothing. 6 Id. at 128.

In McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994), the victim

was shot as he was running towards a police officer in the

confusing moments immediately after the officer had been warned

that an arrestee was loose and had gained access to a

magistrate’s firearm. Finally, in Sigman v. Chapel Hill, 161

F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998), the police knew at the time of the

shooting that the victim was drunk and enraged, had just lost

his job, had been cutting himself, and had previously threatened

-- with a large chef’s knife -- his own life, his girlfriend’s

life, and the police present on the scene.

In contrast, in the present case, accepting Pena’s version

of events as true, the Officers had no probable cause to believe

that Pena was dangerous other than the fact that he possessed a

weapon. Pena did not threaten the Officers with the gun, and

the Officers did not witness Pena threatening anyone else. The

Officers could not have believed that Pena was a violent

6
The bulge was in fact a radio that the suspect was
attempting to silence.

19
criminal. 7 Furthermore, Pena was not under arrest at the time of

the confrontation, and Pena was unaware that police officers

were outside his trailer when he opened his front door to make

sure that his chickens were safe. 8 Thus, Pena’s decision to

bring his gun when he went outside in the middle of the night

after being awoken by the sound of his dogs barking and the

squawking emanating from his chicken coops was perfectly

reasonable, and this should have been apparent to the Officers

at the time of the shooting.

This is not a situation, as in Elliot, where the shooting

victim had already been arrested by the police, making any

effort to access a weapon an attempt at violent resistance.

Instead, accepting the truth of Pena’s statement, Pena did not

know that anyone was outside his trailer when he opened his

door. In addition, this is not a case where the shooting victim

7
This is true even if the Officers mistakenly believed that
Pena was Gonzales. Gonzales’s offenses were all minor and
nonviolent.
8
Although the crucial fact is not what Pena subjectively
believed but what the Officers reasonably perceived in light of
the circumstances known to them at the time, there is evidence
in the record that the Officers did not identify themselves when
knocking on Pena’s door, thus making it unreasonable for the
Officers to believe that Pena’s decision to arm himself was a
sign of hostility to the police. In addition, the time of night
and the fact that Pena had been sleeping also made it more
reasonable for him to bring a gun to the door, which in turn
made it less objectively reasonable for the Officers to consider
this an act of aggression.

20
refused to obey police commands in a tense situation, as in

Slattery and Anderson, because according to Pena the Officers

did not give any commands or warnings prior to the shooting.

Nor is this a case where the shooting victim was threatening

another person, as in Sigman. Absent any additional factors

which would give the Officers probable cause to fear for their

safety or for the safety of others, the mere presence of a

weapon is not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Pena as

found by the district court, we cannot say as a matter of law

that Officer Porter’s use of force was constitutionally

reasonable. If Pena’s accusations are true, Officer Porter

deprived Pena of his constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable seizure, and this right is amply established by

past decisions of both the Supreme Court and this court. Thus,

we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as

to this claim. 9

B.

Although the district court refused to grant summary

judgment on the first two shots, the district court did grant

the Officers’ motion for summary judgment as to the subsequent

9
However, qualified immunity may still be available to
Officer Porter on this claim if the facts are later determined
to support it.

21
fourteen shots fired by Officers Barbour and Porter. This

decision is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine,

and it is not appealable as a final judgment at this time.

Thus, this court can only consider Pena’s appeal if the district

court’s ruling is the proper subject of pendent appellate

jurisdiction.

As discussed previously, pendent appellate jurisdiction

only allows this court to review otherwise unappealable

decisions if the factual and legal issues involved are

“inextricably intertwined” with the questions that are properly

before the court on appeal. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 51. When

considering whether this court may review the district court’s

decision regarding the subsequent fourteen shots, the

appropriate criteria for determining the availability of pendent

appellate jurisdiction is whether resolution of the properly

appealed issue (the first two shots) necessarily resolves this

issue as well. 10 Rux, 461 F.3d at 476. Crucially, our

discussion of the factual and legal issues surrounding the first

two shots does not answer the central question presented by

Pena’s appeal concerning the subsequent fourteen shots: namely,

does the firing of the subsequent fourteen shots constitute a
10
Pendent appellate jurisdiction is also available when
resolution of a pendent issue is necessary for the disposition
of an issue properly before the court on appeal. Rux, 461 F.3d
at 476. However, that circumstance is inapplicable here.

22
seizure when Pena was not struck by any of these bullets?

Because any ruling on the issue of the subsequent fourteen shots

would require us to consider this question, and because this

legal issue is not necessarily resolved by our review of the

firing of the first two shots, Pena’s appeal regarding the

subsequent fourteen shots must be dismissed at this time.

IV.

The Officers also appeal the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity and grant of summary judgment in favor of

Pena on his claim that the Officers’ search of the area behind

his trailer violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In

ruling on this issue, the district court found that the Officers

did in fact search Pena’s curtilage without probable cause plus

either a warrant or exigent circumstances. Although the

district court found that the Officers lawfully approached

Pena’s trailer to “knock and talk,” the district court held that

the Officers’ subsequent search of the curtilage after receiving

no response exceeded any non-search related purpose for

remaining on the curtilage and was thus illegal. We agree.

As this court has previously stated, the curtilage of a

home “is entitled to the same level of Fourth Amendment

protection extended to the home, so that, as with the home,

probable cause . . . is the appropriate standard for searches of

23
curtilage.” Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir.

2001). A police officer may enter the curtilage of a home for

certain purposes unconnected with a search, but if police

conduct thereafter exceeds any legitimate reason unconnected

with a search of the curtilage justifying the officer’s

presence, a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. 11 Although

police officers have the same right as any private citizen to

approach a residence to “knock and talk” with the inhabitants,

this right does not confer authority on police officers to make

a general investigation of the curtilage. Id. at 289-90.

In the present case, the Officers do not deny that they

entered the curtilage of Pena’s property and looked around and

behind Pena’s trailer without a search warrant. However, the

Officers argue that this behavior did not violate the Fourth

Amendment because they were allowed to proceed to the rear of

the trailer in an attempt to contact Pena when he did not

respond to the knocking on the trailer’s front door.

In Alvarez v. Montgomery County, 147 F.3d 354, 356 (4th

Cir. 1998), this court aligned itself with several other

circuits in holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not

prohibit police, attempting to speak with a homeowner, from
11
For example, in Rogers, the police exceeded their
legitimate purpose for entering the curtilage (contacting the
homeowner) when the officers attempted to search the backyard of
a home after speaking with the owner and being asked to leave.

24
entering the backyard when circumstances indicate they might

find him there.” In that case, the police received a 911 call

reporting underage drinking at a house party. Upon arriving at

the home, the police officers saw a sign in the front yard

stating “Party in Back” with an arrow pointing to the backyard.

In an effort to contact the homeowner, the officers then

proceeded to the backyard where they observed underage drinking.

In affirming summary judgment in favor of the police officers,

this court held that the officers did not violate the Fourth

Amendment since the officers had a “legitimate reason” for

entering the property unconnected with a search of the premises

and since their conduct comported with that purpose. Id. at

358-59.

The decision in Alvarez relied in part on this court’s

earlier decision in United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097

(4th Cir. 1974). In that case, federal and state agents were

investigating the defendant for the production of moonshine.

After detecting the aroma of moonshine emanating from an

apparently abandoned vehicle which lay beyond the limits of the

defendant’s property, the agents were spotted by the defendant

as he returned by car to his home. Fearing that the defendant

would remove any contraband on his property if they left, one of

the agents approached the front door of the defendant’s house to

question him. The defendant did not answer, and so the agent

25
decided to try the back door of the home. On the way to the

rear door, the agent passed another truck parked near the house,

which also “exuded a strong odor of moonshine whiskey.” Id. at

1099. The agent then deviated from his intended path to examine

the truck. Upon peering through a crack in the rear door, the

agent spotted moonshine, which he subsequently seized. In

overturning the defendant’s conviction, this court held that:

[The agent was] clearly entitled to go onto
defendant’s premises in order to question him
concerning the abandoned vehicle near his property.
Furthermore, we cannot say that [the agent] exceeded
the scope of his legitimate purpose for being there by
walking around to the back door when he was unable to
get an answer at the front door. It follows that [the
agent] got within smelling range of the truck in which
the liquor was found without unjustifiably intruding
into defendant’s fourth amendment zone of privacy . .
. . However, [the agent] did not ‘discover’ the liquor
until he actually saw it through the crack between the
rear doors of the truck . . . . It was not possible
for [the agent] to make this confirmatory observation
without exceeding the original purpose of his
intrusion, which had justified his presence on
defendant’s property up to that point, and making a
further intrusion into an area of protected privacy.

Id. at 1100-01.

The Officers’ conduct in this case violated the Fourth

Amendment. The Officers admitted that their reason for entering

the curtilage of Pena’s property was to conduct a search for

Gonzales. Even though the Officers had the right to approach

Pena’s trailer to knock and talk, when Pena did not answer the

knocking at the front door, unlike in Alvarez or Bradshaw there

26
was no reason to expect that knocking on a backdoor would

produce a different result. Pena’s trailer was less than 10

feet wide, so there was no reason to believe that a knock at the

back door would be heard by an occupant when a knock at the

front door had produced no response. In addition, the Officers

had not witnessed anyone enter the trailer, and there were no

lights on in the trailer to show that anyone was home, much less

awake. Finally, there was no sign directing people to the rear

of the trailer, and there were no noises coming from the rear of

the trailer indicating the presence of the homeowner. For all

of these reasons, we agree with the finding of the district

court that the evidence “does not suggest that the [O]fficers

had reason to believe that any resident might be in the backyard

of plaintiff’s camper or that they were going to a back door.”

J.A. 183.

Furthermore, even if the Officers’ decision to walk to the

back of the trailer was reasonable as part of an effort to speak

with the trailer’s owner, the Officers nonetheless exceeded this

legitimate purpose by searching the private, enclosed storage

area abutting Pena’s trailer and by continuing to search the

curtilage after it quickly became apparent that Pena’s trailer

lacked a rear door. Although the Officers were suspicious of

the scene they discovered upon their arrival at the Pena

residence, no evidence of any kind linked Gonzales to this

27
particular property. Thus, these suspicions fell far short of

the probable cause necessary to support a search, and the

Officers also lacked both a warrant and exigent circumstances. 12

The Officers also claim that their actions were justified

as a protective sweep of the area. Police may conduct a

protective sweep when they have a reasonable belief, based on

specific and articulable facts, that there is an imminent threat

to their safety. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).

However, “[p]rotective sweeps are not justified as a matter of

course.” Fishbein v. Glenwood Springs, 469 F.3d 957, 962 (10th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A protective sweep is “not a

full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory

inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.” Buie,

494 U.S. at 335. As such, a protective sweep may not last

longer than is necessary to ensure the officers’ safety. Id. at

335-36. Although Buie allowed for a protective sweep in the

specific context of an arrest, several circuits have since held

that a protective sweep is reasonable in other situations as

well. See e.g., United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578 (5th Cir.

2004) (allowing protective sweep after deputy sheriffs entered a

trailer home with occupant’s consent); United States v. Taylor,
12
Although exigent circumstances might exist if the
Officers had probable cause to believe that Gonzales was on the
property, a vague “hunch” that Gonzales might be present
certainly does not satisfy this requirement.

28
248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (approving protective sweep after

consent entry of home); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273

(9th Cir. 1993) (same). 13

Most cases to consider the constitutionality of protective

sweeps arise from police sweeps within personal homes. Outside

of a home, the risk of danger to police officers is

substantially diminished. See United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d

1235, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2004). However, in a pre-Buie

decision, this court held that a protective sweep of curtilage

contemporaneous to an arrest was constitutional where the police

officers had a reasonable fear for their safety. United States

v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir. 1985).

In the present case, the Officers’ conduct cannot be

condoned as a protective sweep because the Officers have failed

to articulate specific facts demonstrating that they reasonably

feared for their safety. The Officers point to the raw chicken,

empty beer cans, and smoldering fire as evidence that people had

only recently left the property, and Officer Barbour opined,

“It’s always an uneasy feeling when you got somebody on the run

and you could be standing on top of that somebody and not know

13
This circuit has not squarely addressed the
constitutionality of a protective sweep made in circumstances
other than an arrest. Since we hold that a protective sweep was
not justified on the facts of this case for other reasons, we do
not need to decide this issue at present.

29
it.” J.A. 824. However, nothing in these facts suggests

danger. Only an unsubstantiated “hunch” connected Gonzales -- a

nonviolent offender -- with the Pena property. The scene that

greeted the Officers upon their arrival showed no evidence of

unlawful activity, and there was no reason to believe that the

people who had recently been grilling chicken would pose any

threat to the police. Although the Officers may have

subjectively believed that the atmosphere that night was eerie,

this is not a specific, articulable fact that indicates the

Officers reasonably feared for their own safety.

Thus, the Officers’ attempts to explain their presence

within Pena’s curtilage as something other than a search are

unconvincing. Because the Officers searched the curtilage of

Pena’s property without probable cause plus either a warrant or

exigent circumstances, the Officers violated Pena’s Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, and this

right is clearly established. Our decisions in both Rogers and

Alvarez make plain that the curtilage of a home is afforded the

same Fourth Amendment protection as the home itself. Therefore,

we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on

this claim.

We likewise affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor

of Pena on this claim. In their briefs, the Officers

acknowledge that “there are no factual disputes” regarding the

30
search of Pena’s curtilage. Br. Appellant 38. In fact, Pena

was asleep as these events unfolded, and all relevant facts were

furnished by the Officers’ testimony. Thus, our resolution of

the qualified immunity issue necessarily resolves this issue as

well.

V.

Pena next contends that the Officers’ search of his

property and the Officers’ allegedly excessive use of force were

racially motivated and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To bring

a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he

is a member of a racial minority, (2) that defendants had the

intent to discriminate against him on the basis of his race, and

(3) that the defendants’ discrimination concerned one of the

statute’s enumerated activities. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221

F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000).

Pena also asserts a cause of action under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments based on the same facts. However,

“subjective motives are irrelevant to a proper Fourth Amendment

analysis,” and thus Pena’s constitutional claims of racial

discrimination are properly analyzed under the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996)

(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996)).

31
 In order to establish a violation of the equal protection

clause, and to satisfy the second element of a § 1981 claim, a

plaintiff must be able to show purposeful discrimination. Gen.

Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390

(1982). This circuit has never decided whether racially

motivated searches and seizures fall within § 1981’s enumerated

activities and thus satisfy the third prong of a § 1981 claim.

However, assuming without deciding that these claims are viable

under § 1981, Pena’s statutory and constitutional claims still

fail because he has not established that the Officers’ conduct

was the result of purposeful discrimination. Thus, the Officers

did not violate a statutory or constitutional right, and they

are entitled to qualified immunity.

A.

Pena’s evidence of racial discrimination relating to the

search of his trailer’s curtilage is insufficient to establish a

violation of either his constitutional rights or 42 U.S.C. §

1981. 14 Although Pena correctly asserts that he is not required

to show that racial animus was the sole motivation for the

allegedly discriminatory conduct, Pena must at a minimum be able

14
Because the district court did not fully set forth the
facts on which its decision was based, this court assumes the
facts that may reasonably be inferred from the record when
viewed in the light most favorable to Pena. Waterman, 393 F.3d
at 473.

32
to show that he was treated differently because of his race.

See Farm Labor Org. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523,

536 (6th Cir. 2002). Because the Officers have articulated

multiple credible, race-neutral criteria supporting their

decision to investigate the property, which Pena does not

dispute, Pena is unable to meet this burden.

Several race-neutral factors led the Officers to the Pena

property. First, the Pena property lies in close proximity to

the American Legion Post where the police canine lost Gonzalez’s

scent, and the Officers felt that the wood line near the Pena

property offered the path of least resistance for an escapee.

Although other trailer homes are in the same general vicinity,

the Officers focused on the Pena property as a result of

additional reasons peculiar to that property. For one, Pena’s

property contains multiple residences, several unoccupied

structures including two sheds, and numerous large pieces of

equipment related to Pena’s business as a cement layer. Having

been to the Pena property previously, Officer Barbour was aware

of these conditions and felt that they would afford a good place

for Gonzalez to hide. Officer Barbour also believed that the

tools necessary for cutting handcuffs could be found among this

construction equipment.

The circumstances surrounding Officer Barbour’s prior

contact with the Pena property were an additional race-neutral

33
factor supporting the decision to investigate this specific

location. On two separate occasions, Officer Barbour had been

called to the Pena property to investigate possibly criminal

incidents. A suspicious death had occurred on the property, and

Barbour had also responded to a report of a domestic dispute. 15

For all of these reasons, Pena’s property was distinct in

Barbour’s mind and stood out from the other nearby residences.

In light of this location-specific information, the Pena

property was a logical place for the Officers to inquire about

Gonzalez, especially when considered in light of its close

proximity to the last place where the police canine indicated.

In the face of this evidence, Pena argues that the

Officers’ racial animus is shown by (1) the Officers’ use of

shared language as a justification for their investigation of

the Pena property, (2) Officer Barbour’s use of the crude slang

phrase “mucho panucho” in an attempt to rouse Pena and have him

answer the door, and (3) the Officers’ testimony that in their

experience the Hispanic community tended to help other

Hispanics. The court will address each of these facts in turn.

First, the use of shared language as a justification for a

search is not per se racially discriminatory. See Hernandez v.
15
In fact, more than one domestic dispute had been reported
to the police, but it appears from the record that Officer
Barbour only responded to one of these disturbances. See J.A.
793, 1087

34
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991); United States v. Ortiz, 422

U.S. 891, 897 (1975) (listing ability to speak English as

relevant for establishing probable cause to search vehicles near

the Mexican-American border). In Hernandez, the Supreme Court

recognized that a prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges

based on the ability of jurors to speak Spanish “raised a

plausible, though not a necessary, inference that language might

be a pretext for what in fact were race-based peremptory

challenges,” but in that case the Supreme Court refused to

overturn the trial court’s decision that there was no

discriminatory intent. 500 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).

Admittedly, the shared language of Gonzalez and Pena does

not predispose Pena to aid Gonzalez. However, a shared language

does increase the likelihood that Pena could assist Gonzalez if

he wished, whereas a language barrier would hinder effective

communication and assistance. Although “shared language” may at

times serve as a post hoc, race-neutral rationalization of

racially discriminatory motives, there is no evidence to support

this conclusion in the present case. The Officers did not

target Spanish-speaking Hispanics for investigation while

refusing to question Spanish language speakers of different

races or ethnicities. In fact, the record does not show that

the Officers knew of any other Spanish speakers who lived

nearby.

35
 By itself, shared language might not be enough to establish

a race neutral justification for a search. However, in the

instant case, this factor was one of many leading the Officers

to the Pena property. When viewed in conjunction with all of

the other reasons leading to the search of the Pena property,

the presence of a shared language does have some tendency, if

only slight, to increase the likelihood that Pena might have

aided Gonzalez.

Second, Officer Barbour’s use of the phrase “mucho panucho”

in attempting to have Pena answer the door of his trailer, while

offensive, is likewise not indicative of racial animus. “Mucho

panucho” is not a racial slur, and Officer Barbour was not using

the phrase to describe Pena. Instead, Officer Barbour was using

the phrase in an admittedly “childish” attempt to bond with Pena

and to make Pena more receptive to answering the door. 16 J.A.

847. Although Officer Barbour stated that he would not use a

similar phrase when dealing with Caucasians, this hesitancy

likely stemmed not from racial bias but from his inability to

transpose the cultural context of this slang phrase. Removed

from this cultural context slang lacks meaning, and even a

16
According to Officer Barbour’s uncontradicted testimony,
this phrase is used widely among Hispanic males in the area.
Officer Barbour felt that employing the phrase would make him
sound like “one of the guys” and thus less threatening. J.A.
847.

36
direct translation of a slang phrase will be inaccurate or

incomplete. See J.A. 846-48. If Officer Barbour believed the

phrase was a racial insult, he would not have felt that

employing the phrase would increase Pena’s inclination to open

the door.

Finally, the Officers’ belief that Hispanics were more

likely to aid other Hispanics is perhaps the most troubling

explanation offered for their investigation of the Pena

property. However, considering all of the other circumstances

surrounding the Officers’ decision to target the Pena property,

Pena has not presented sufficient evidence to establish racial

animus or to show that the Officers’ decision would have been

different if Pena was not Hispanic. 17

Since there was no violation of Pena’s constitutional or

statutory rights as alleged in this claim, the Officers are

17
Pena points to the case of Lankford v. Gelston as
factually similar to the instant case. 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.
1966). In that case, the Baltimore, Maryland police targeted
the homes of black residents for warrantless searches after a
police shooting, based solely on the Police Department’s belief
that black residents would be more likely to aid the suspects in
the shooting, who were also black. More than 300 homes were
searched over a period of 19 days. However, that case is
clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the instant
case, the Officers did not target the Pena residence on the sole
basis of Pena’s race, and the Officers did not indiscriminately
target other Hispanic residences in the nearby area, much less
in the community at large as in Lankford.

37
entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the district

court’s denial of qualified immunity on this claim is reversed.

B.

We affirm the dismissal of Pena’s claim for racial

discrimination in the use of the allegedly excessive force for

the same reasons enunciated above. Because the factual and

legal issues surrounding both claims of discrimination are

identical, our decision that the search of Pena’s curtilage was

not discriminatory necessarily entails the same result on the

claim for discriminatory use of force, and the exercise of

pendent appellate jurisdiction is appropriate.

Furthermore, this court notes that the evidence of racial

discrimination in the use of force is even more tenuous than in

the Officers’ initial decision to investigate the Pena property.

None of the evidence offered by Pena demonstrates that the

Officers were more likely to use force against him because of

his race. Undeniably, Pena answered his door armed with a

rifle. Although the Officers’ subsequent use of force may or

may not have been reasonable, nothing suggests that this

decision to use force was motivated by anything other than the

Officers’ genuine fear for their own safety.

38
 VI.

Pena also alleges numerous violations of state law arising

out of the same encounter with the police. The Officers appeal

the district court’s decision to deny summary judgment on Pena’s

claims for assault, battery, gross negligence, damage to

property, and state and federal law claims of punitive damages.

Pena appeals the district court’s decision to grant summary

judgment in favor of the Officers on Pena’s state law claims for

trespass and invasion of privacy.

The Officers’ appeal regarding the denial of summary

judgment on Pena’s state law claims for assault and battery is

meritless. These claims are “subsumed within the federal

excessive force claim and so go forward as well.” Rowland v.

Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994). As to the other state

law issues (and the federal claim for punitive damages) appealed

by the Officers, they are not the proper subject of

interlocutory review. Because these claims raise separate legal

issues from the claims properly presented to us on appeal, the

exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is also

inappropriate. Therefore, these appeals will be dismissed.

Likewise, neither state law claim Pena asks us to review is

the proper subject of an immediate appeal. Although the

trespass claim arises from the same facts as Pena’s Fourth

Amendment claim for an illegal search of his curtilage, Pena

39
appeals the district court’s decision to dismiss this claim

based on public official immunity. Because this argument raises

distinct legal issues that are not intertwined with any issue

properly before us on appeal, pendent appellate jurisdiction is

unavailable to allow for a review of this ruling at this time.

Similarly, the state law claim for invasion of privacy requires

resolution of unique legal issues unconnected with the denial of

qualified immunity, and therefore we must also decline to review

this claim. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed as well.

VII.

In sum, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity as to the first two shots fired by Officer Porter, we

affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and

grant of summary judgment on Pena’s claim for an illegal search

of his curtilage, we reverse the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity as to Pena’s claim that the search of his

curtilage was racially motivated, we affirm the district court’s

decision to dismiss Pena’s claim of racial discrimination in the

Officers’ use of allegedly excessive force, and we affirm the

district court’s decision denying summary judgment in favor of

the Officers on Pena’s state law claims for assault and battery.

Furthermore, we decline to entertain Pena’s appeal of the

district court’s decision to grant summary judgment and

40
qualified immunity to the Officers regarding the subsequent

fourteen shots. We likewise refuse to review all other

remaining appeals of both parties concerning Pena’s state law

claims and federal claim for punitive damages. None of these

issues are properly before us on appeal at this time, and none

are subject to the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction.

Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed without prejudice.

This case is remanded to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
AND REMANDED

41